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Abstract 
The migration of sensitive data and applications from the on-premise data centre to a cloud environment 
increases cyber risks to users, mainly because the cloud environment is managed and maintained by a 
third-party. In particular, the partial surrender of sensitive data and application to a cloud environment 
creates numerous concerns that are related to a lack of security transparency. Security transparency 
involves the disclosure of information by cloud service providers about the security measures being put 
in place to protect assets and meet the expectations of customers. It establishes trust in service 
relationship between cloud service providers and customers, and without evidence of continuous 
transparency, trust and confidence are affected and are likely to hinder extensive usage of cloud 
services. Also, insufficient security transparency is considered as an added level of risk and increases 
the difficulty of demonstrating conformance to customer requirements and ensuring that the cloud 
service providers adequately implement security obligations.  
The research community have acknowledged the pressing need to address security transparency 
concerns, and although technical aspects for ensuring security and privacy have been researched widely, 
the focus on security transparency is still scarce. The relatively few literature mostly approach the issue 
of security transparency from cloud providers’ perspective, while other works have contributed feasible 
techniques for comparison and selection of cloud service providers using metrics such as transparency 
and trustworthiness. However, there is still a shortage of research that focuses on improving security 
transparency from cloud users’ point of view. In particular, there is still a gap in the literature that (i) 
dissects security transparency from the lens of conceptual knowledge up to implementation from 
organizational and technical perspectives and; (ii) support continuous transparency by enabling the 
vetting and probing of cloud service providers’ conformity to specific customer requirements. The 
significant growth in moving business to the cloud – due to its scalability and perceived effectiveness 
– underlines the dire need for research in this area.    
This thesis presents a framework that comprises the core conceptual elements that constitute security 
transparency in cloud computing. It contributes to the knowledge domain of security transparency in 
cloud computing by proposing the following. Firstly, the research analyses the basics of cloud security 
transparency by exploring the notion and foundational concepts that constitute security transparency. 
Secondly, it proposes a framework which integrates various concepts from requirement engineering 
domain and an accompanying process that could be followed to implement the framework. The 
framework and its process provide an essential set of conceptual ideas, activities and steps that can be 
followed at an organizational level to attain security transparency, which are based on the principles of 
industry standards and best practices. Thirdly, for ensuring continuous transparency, the thesis proposes 
an essential tool that supports the collection and assessment of evidence from cloud providers, including 
the establishment of remedial actions for redressing deficiencies in cloud provider practices. The tool 
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serves as a supplementary component of the proposed framework that enables continuous inspection of 
how predefined customer requirements are being satisfied.  
The thesis also validates the proposed security transparency framework and tool in terms of validity, 
applicability, adaptability, and acceptability using two different case studies. Feedbacks are collected 
from stakeholders and analysed using essential criteria such as ease of use, relevance, usability, etc. The 
result of the analysis illustrates the validity and acceptability of both the framework and tool in 
enhancing security transparency in a real-world environment.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 Introduction  
In traditional operating environments, businesses usually procure physical hardware and software 
resources to deploy IT infrastructure for supporting business goals and objectives, which are often 
associated with a considerable cost for procurement, maintenance and upgrade (Rittinghouse and 
Ransome, 2017). But that is no longer the case as many businesses nowadays consider cloud computing 
as an enabler of business strategy that provides a competitive edge (Marston et al., 2011). This is made 
possible by the evolution of virtualisation technologies, high-speed networks and the widespread 
availability of multicore high-performance computing platforms that have substantially created 
unlimited possibilities for businesses to access higher computing power on a pay-as-you-go basis. As a 
computational model, cloud computing is fast becoming one of the most rapidly evolved computing 
paradigm in recent times and is still receiving a lot of attention, owing to the advantages it offers such 
as high capacity computing, reduced operational cost and enabling endless business transformations 
(Sun, 2019). Businesses across all industries are continually considering the migration of mission-
critical data and applications to cloud-based services to benefit from the multifarious advantages offered 
by the technology (Garrison et al., 2012).  
 
Despite its benefits, cloud computing comes with numerous challenges that forestall extensive adoption 
(Bhushan and Gupta, 2017). For example, current studies and literature have cited cloud service 
providers (CSP) ability to provide adequate security transparency as a significant hindrance to cloud 
adoption (Kandukuri and Rakshit, 2009, Jouini and Rabai, 2019). This concern could be influenced by 
the uncertainties surrounding CSPs’ use of appropriate practices and processes to deliver reasonable 
means for satisfying asset security and other requirements, as well as due diligence to promptly inform 
customers on events relating to security incidents  (Kandukuri and Rakshit, 2009). The apprehension 
over security lapses and lack of visibility on critical operations will continue to hinder broader cloud 
adoption, particularly for businesses dealing with security-critical data and applications (Ouedraogo et 
al., 2015b). In a nutshell, there is the need for a systematic approach to help businesses ensure that 
assets in the cloud environment are sufficiently protected, security events transparently shared to users, 
while also supporting audibility. Such an assertion arises from the consideration that the processes 
applied to secure assets are geographically dispersed from customers’ premises— a practice that makes 
transparency highly necessary due to the devolution of security-related responsibilities.  
1.1 Statement of the Problem  
The migration of mission-critical data to cloud service implies a partial surrender or sharing significant 
control over security and handling of data. The lack of control over data creates other problems that 
affect security and privacy of data which are far within reach of cloud computing customers. This is 
especially the case as customers move their business process or data to the cloud, their risk profile also 
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changes, and becomes a combination of inherent risks and a subset of the CSPs’(Rao and Selvamani, 
2015). As a result, customers of cloud computing service are more concerned about how the CSP is 
controlling sensitive data, especially if the data is highly critical. This issue is mainly due to lack of 
transparency, and to some extent, lack of vetting mechanisms by which customers can evaluate CSPs 
practices and conformance to necessary data security measures once data is migrated to the cloud 
(Ouedraogo et al., 2015a). What is more worrying is the fall-out effect that is likely to happen from this 
lax approach to security controls from the CSP side. A recent study of significant security incidents in 
cloud services by Proofpoint (Proofpoint, 2019) found that 40% of cloud customers have had at least 
one account compromise and data breach in their environment unreported by the CSP. This example 
and many more incidents highlight essential concerns such as what security practices are being put in 
place by the CSP to ensure the safety of customer data? How is the CSP able to show that they are in 
full compliance with customer requirements? What measures are put in place to ensure that customers 
get informed of events requiring their prompt attention? (Sun, 2019) (Flittner et al., 2016).   
Thus, despite the numerous benefits and rapid acceptance of the cloud computing, three are still pressing 
challenges that forestall broader acceptance of cloud service, including lack of transparency, 
accountability, trust and privacy, and deployed controls (Singh and Chatterjee, 2017, Rittinghouse and 
Ransome, 2016). Several efforts have been proposed in the literature for fostering security transparency. 
Some of such contributions have recommended purposely developed tools and techniques that serve to 
aid the selection of CSP before cloud migration takes place. Such contributions include C.A.RE 
(Ouedraogo and Mouratidis, 2013), SMICloud (Garg et al., 2013), service quality model with provider 
trustworthiness (Sumetanupap and Senivongse, 2011), Cloud Security Alliance’s Trust, and Assurance 
Registry (STAR) (Cloud Security Alliance, 2015). While a lot of focus centres on addressing 
transparency issues before customers move data to the cloud, there is still a lack of on-going 
transparency, particularly on deployed controls and practices of the CSP after cloud migration. As 
argued by Anisetti et al (Anisetti et al., 2017), transparency can only be achieved when reliable evidence 
on the behaviour of cloud services, processes and deployed controls are shared and independently 
verified by customers on continuous basis. Hence, continuous collection and verification of reliable 
evidence relating to CSP handling of customer and requirements have  become paramount for a 
trustworthy cloud.   
In addition, security transparency is still a significant issue as some challenges need to be addressed 
from the viewpoint of cloud customers. For instance, there is the argument that major CSPs such as 
Amazon, Google and Rackspace have well documented and publicised security practices. However, the 
scant security information and evidence available make it difficult for customers to garner enough 
insight into actual security controls, and to verify the existence of CSP acclaimed processes (A Martin, 
2018).  This is due to the inadequacy of evidence-based analysis and verification mechanisms, which 
is perceived to continue as a barrier to customers’ trust and prevent customers from taking full 
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advantage of cloud services (Almorsy et al., 2016).  Also, vetting mechanisms (auditing capabilities) 
that support customers to perform a systematic evaluation to determine the CSPs conformance to 
predefined requirements is another critical issue. 
Security auditing based on relevant company requirements gives customers the ability to identify and 
probe CSPs visibly: conformity to contractual agreements, data security requirements, and potential 
issues to assets under the custody of a CSP. Additionally, security auditing enables businesses to have 
sufficient information in identifying security lapses and assessing the adequacy of CSP security 
implementations which help in meeting regulatory compliance. However, auditing solutions in the 
cloud are still lacking and insufficiently developed in assisting businesses to track assets, identify how 
requirements are being met, or detect the occurrence of security incidents to critical assets. 
In this direction, the Cloud Security Alliance introduced the STAR registry system (Cloud Security 
Alliance, 2015), which aims at documenting the security controls provided by various CSP offerings. 
CSA STAR comprises the CAIQ questionnaire that organisations and auditors can use to ask CSP 
questions relating to their security procedures. However, this initiative only supports organisations to 
consider CSP assertions but does not support evidence-based auditing and probing of CSPs after cloud 
migration. Further, some CSPs only support limited incident response within their services to assist 
customers in the containment of incidents that have already occurred and affected critical assets. It could 
be argued that cloud security controls are not tailored according to user-specific needs, and literature 
citations (Jouini and Rabai, 2019, Bhushan and Gupta, 2017) have also shown that CSPs usually focus 
more on controls related to the overall cloud infrastructure rather than specific user needs. Other 
application-specific techniques used in the traditional client-server model are also used and applied to 
cloud context but may fall short in different ways. 
1.1.1 Research Approach to the Problems  
The approach of this thesis is upon the perception that organisations, in general, tend to have less trust 
and confidence in cloud computing, especially if there is limited disclosure or insufficient information 
about CSP practices. Unfortunately, cloud services are non-transparent, particularly in certain aspects 
of operations such as the fulfilment of user expectations. However, this can be mitigated if users are 
given with adequate assurance that CSPs follow standard practices in mitigating risks, in addition to the 
provision of adequate insight regarding the conformance to requirements based on verifiable evidence 
from the CSP. Therefore, in this thesis, it is established that by providing security transparency 
capabilities at sufficient granularity, a monumental success would be achieved towards addressing 
salient user concerns relating to trust issues, loss of control and uncertain security guarantees. The 
research approaches the problem by proposing a systematic framework that aims to help organisations 
to specify the security requirements relevant for their assets, continuously probe CSP conformance to 
such security requirements through the collection and analysis of evidence, and establishing of remedial 
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actions that need to be implemented by the CSP. This approach is considered to not only enhance 
security transparency but also improve assurance and accountability in cloud computing services.   
1.3 Research Questions 
The rationale behind this research is to develop a framework that supports organisations to achieve 
security transparency when using cloud services. A state of the art literature review is carried out to 
achieve this aim, and  essential questions that need answering are identified and summarised as follows:  
RQ1: How can security transparency be achieved for assets outsourced to a cloud-based 
environment?   
RQ2:  How can organisations migrate assets to the cloud-based on crucial security transparency 
requirements?   
RQ3:  How can organisations attain security transparency and assess the fulfilment of crucial asset 
requirements by probing a CSP?   
In responding to the research questions, the research develops a framework that allows a comprehensive 
understanding of security transparency in cloud computing. It provides a set of interrelated concepts 
and a process that provide:  
i. The fundamental knowledge of cloud transparency and the necessary concepts for attaining 
security transparency in cloud services.  
ii. The integration of security transparency concepts to support cloud customers achieve 
transparency according to business-related requirements. 
iii. A technical perspective of tool support that enables the specification of requirements, collection 
and assessment of evidence relating to the fulfilment of predefined requirements.   
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives  
The main aim of this research is to propose and develop a framework that supports security transparency 
in cloud computing, which will ultimately increase user trust in cloud services. The objectives are given 
below:  
O1:  Develop a novel framework that provides users with a solution to achieve security transparency 
from conceptual, organizational, and technical perspectives. 
O2: Propose an implementable security transparency process for cloud migration activities based 
on the framework, which is formed on the principles of different industry standards.   
O3:  Develop an assessment tool that enables organisations to collect evidence, and assess CSP’s 
conformance to established requirements, as well as suggesting remedial actions in areas where 
security improvements are needed  
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1.5 Research Contributions  
In addressing the research problems and questions, the research has taken a stride and made several 
novel and state of the art contributions. For example, the study has produced a new definition of security 
transparency as the disclosure of information relating to the security practices and management of 
customers resources in the cloud to help them in monitoring, verifying and tracking their assets across 
cloud infrastructure. Cloud security transparency establishes the trustworthiness of the operations of 
the CSP by enabling security monitoring, incident detection, reporting and management from the cloud 
customer’s point of view. In this way, the research has made significant contributions by developing a 
comprehensive framework that integrates various concepts and process towards establishing security 
transparency in cloud services. The four novel contributions of this research are listed as:  
i. Contribution 1: The thesis has addressed some of the challenges associated with cloud security 
transparency by providing the basics of security transparency in the cloud context. It elaborates 
what constitutes transparency, its deployment types and practices by using ontological semantics. 
Considering the insufficient literature that aims at addressing security transparency challenges in 
the cloud, this contribution improves the state of the art knowledge around security transparency 
and the means for enabling it. 
ii. Contribution 2: The research contributes to the current-state-of-the-art knowledge by proposing 
a security transparency framework. The framework aims at providing a common vocabulary that 
facilitates the understanding, conceptualisation, and implementation of security transparency 
from organizational and technical perspectives. It comprises a set of concepts that have been 
established based on security modelling techniques such as Secure Tropos (Mouratidis and 
Giorgini, 2007), and formalized using OWL ontologies (Antoniou and Van Harmelen, 2004) to 
support representation, sharing and reusability of security transparency knowledge. Besides, the 
framework is accompanied by a process which expresses the conceptual framework into plans, 
actions and strategies that businesses can follow to accomplish security transparency based on 
principles of best practices.   
iii. Contribution 3: The third contribution of this thesis is the development of a tool security 
transparency and audit tool (STAT). STAT serves as tool support that facilitates the collection 
and analysis of evidence from the CSP regarding specific user requirements. In other words, 
STAT helps as an additional component for the proposed framework, which provides a simplified 
way by which organisations can request for and obtain evidence from CSPs, perform an 
intelligent assessment of collected evidence for CSP conformance to requirements, and 
specification of remedial actions using audit decision logics.   
iv. Contribution 4: The last contribution is the implementation of the framework. The 
implementation is used to assess the validity and applicability of the framework, its process and 
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the security transparency tool in supporting real-world organisations to achieve security 
transparency.   
1.6 Thesis Outline  
This thesis comprises eight chapters, each focusing on a particular aspect of the research as shown in 
Figure 1.1  
 
Chapter One: 
Introduction
Detailed description 
of the proposed 
research 
Chapter Two: 
Systematic Literature 
Review
In-depth analysis of 
previous and related works 
for identifying resaerch gap  
Chapter Three:  
Research Methodology 
Description of methods and 
techniques used for validating 
the research  
Chapter Six: 
Security Transaprency 
Framework Process 
Provides the underlying 
activities and steps invovled in 
the implementation of the 
security transaprency 
framework   
Chapter Seven: 
Towards Security 
Transparency and Audit 
Tool (STAT)
Presents the design and 
features of a tool that supports 
the collection and analysis of 
evidences from cloud providers 
Chapter Nine: : 
Conclusion 
Conclusive remarks, 
limitations of the research 
and future works
Chapter Five: : 
Contextualisng Cloud 
Security Transparency 
Introduction of the important 
facets that underpin Security 
Transparency 
Chapter Four:  
Cloud Security 
Transparency Framework 
 Presentation of the cloud 
security transparency using 
three levels of abstraction 
Chapter Eight: 
Evaluation of the Security 
Transaprency Framework 
Emperical investigation to 
validate the applicability and 
usefulness of the proposed 
framework  
 
Figure 1.1 Thesis Outline 
Chapter One: the thesis starts with the introduction of the research context that provides an 
understanding of the research area. Research questions are created to guide the identification of research 
aims, objectives and the contributions of the research towards solving the critical issue.  
Chapter Two: provides a review of literature consisting: of a brief overview of the research focus – 
that is, cloud computing including the benefits it offers and the associated challenges, the underlying 
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notions that are crucial to the research, and the related works that have been proposed in the area of 
security transparency.   
Chapter Three: presents an overview of the research approach and methodologies deployed to 
establish the applicability and validity of the proposed framework.  
Chapter Four: contextualises and dissects cloud security transparency by providing a new definition, 
highlighting its basics, principles, categories and deployment practices. 
Chapter Five: the main focus of the thesis is discussed - that is, a cloud security transparency 
framework by providing an in-depth discussion of the different levels of abstraction adopted for the 
research. The chapter elaborates the method for supporting users in the understanding and alignment of 
security transparency with the application of ontology-based modelling. 
Chapter Six: presents an overview of the underlying process involved in the security transparency 
framework by introducing different phases of activities that organisations can follow to implement the 
framework, as well as for understanding cloud adoption process that shifts towards attaining security 
transparency.    
Chapter Seven: presents an overview of the security transparency tool by discussing the architectural 
design, specifications, and features of the tool.  
Chapter Eight: presents an empirical approach used for implementing the proposed framework. The 
chapter presents the different methods adopted for validating the research.   
Chapter Nine: concludes the thesis and provides a comprehensive summary of the proposed approach, 
with a focus on its practical approach. It also discusses the future directions for the research.  
1.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has introduced the research context in this thesis. In particular, the chapter narrates the 
problem domain that needs addressing, including the existing measures being used to solve the 
problems, and how this research proposes to resolve such issues. The chapter also presented essential 
research questions that have been drawn, which will be answered in the course of the thesis. Besides, 
the contributions made by the research in addressing the research questions are also presented, and 
lastly, the outline of the whole thesis is shown in this chapter.      
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review 
2.1  Introduction  
It is essential to provide a common understanding of the crucial aspects of the research area, including 
an overview of cloud computing. The primary security issues in cloud computing and the types of 
controls for addressing these issues are also presented.  The chapter also presents related works that are 
similar to the approach pursued in this work. Hence, the first part of the chapter provides the background 
of cloud computing. The second part consists of related works that have been conducted in the area of 
security audit, software agent systems, industry projects and cloud compliance, all of which have 
similarities with the approach proposed in this research.  Also, the review of related works includes a 
narration of the limitations associated with each technique. The study of literature gives the reader an 
understanding of existing problems, proposed solutions and weaknesses of the current state of the art in 
cloud security transparency.     
2.2 Overview of Cloud Computing  
Cloud computing, as a computational model, is fast becoming one of the most rapidly evolving 
technology in recent times and is receiving a lot of attention (Oliveira et al., 2014). It is a paradigm that 
makes it possible to share a pool of configurable resources and achieve on-demand network access such 
as networks and services (Qian et al., 2009, Zhang et al., 2010). Cloud services have become an integral 
part of everyday life and have drastically changed how businesses and organisations function. Perhaps, 
most companies and individuals have resorted to the use of cloud services to support their needs without 
even realising it. For example, companies nowadays use iCloud, Office 365 and Google Drive for 
running their day-to-day businesses activities. 
The cloud mainly comprises multiple layers of significant infrastructure components that support each 
other in the delivery of services that are accessible to a large user base. A large number of applications 
hosted within the cloud infrastructure and the variation of user and application requirements make it 
highly heterogeneous in structure (Armbrust et al., 2009). Each component provides a different type of 
service in the cloud. A brief discussion of cloud components is vital to understanding the challenges 
and differences between deployment and service types.  
2.2.1 Cloud Service Models 
Cloud service models, also referred to as cloud types in some literature, are architectural models for 
providing different kinds of services to customers and they can be perceived as a multi-layered 
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computing architecture where services are built from an underlying layer (Subashini and Kavitha, 
2011). As shown in Figure 2.1, the first layer is infrastructure as a service (IaaS) that sits on top of 
virtualised computing resources. The second layer comprises platform-as-a-service (PaaS) that supports 
application development and deployment capabilities. While software-as-a-service (SaaS) is built at the 
top layer to serve as user application level for supporting applications and application programming 
interfaces (APIs).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Cloud Service Models (Mell and Grance, 2009) 
2.2.2 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS):  
Infrastructure as a service offers computing infrastructure solutions as a service to customers, mainly 
by providing virtual compute and storage capabilities. CSPs manage the physical resources, while 
customers run their software stack; manage the guest operating system and other allocated virtual 
resources. One of the benefits provided by IaaS is that customers have overall control over their data, 
and it gives them the ability to pay for what they use. Dropbox is an example of IaaS. 
2.2.3 Software as a Service (SaaS) 
Software as a service provides software applications that support users to address specific business 
functions, processes and other essential needs. In this service type, the CSPs manage the hosting 
environment and the software applications that are made available to customers. However, in some 
cases, customers are given the privilege to manage specific configurations within the supported software 
application.   
Service Type  Service Content    Service Content    
Service Type  
Service Type  
Service Type  
Cloud Applications  
Social networks, Office Suites, CRM, 
video processing   
Cloud Platform 
Programming Languages, Frameworks, 
Mashups, Editors, Structured Data   
Cloud Infrastructure 
Compute Servers, Data Storage, 
Firewall, Load Balancer  
Web Browser   
Cloud 
Development 
Environment   
Virtual 
Infrastructure 
Manager   
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2.2.4 Platform as a Service (PaaS)   
A Platform as a Service is a software platform that can be used by customers to develop and host their 
software application or other information systems. Under PaaS, services are managed by the CSP while 
customers manage their software stack. An example of PaaS is Microsoft Azure.  
2.3 Cloud Deployment Models  
Cloud deployment models represent the specific category of the cloud environment. Cloud computing 
consists of four main deployment types:  
2.3.1 Public Cloud 
Infrastructure in public cloud is controlled by the CSP where resources are dynamically provided on a 
fine-grained, self-service basis over the internet and become accessible via a web application to the 
general public. The CSP usually manages the physical infrastructure, but some other specific functions 
could be outsourced to a third party. Public cloud is more suitable for businesses that require resiliency 
and elasticity of applications that many users can consume. This model is attractive because of its 
decreased capital overhead and operational cost. Amazon web services is an example of a public cloud.  
2.3.2 Private Cloud  
A private cloud involves a distinct, secure and more reliable deployment model that is owned and used 
by a particular specific company. It provides computing power to within a virtualized environment 
using an underlying pool of physical computing resources that are only accessible to a single company, 
thereby providing greater control and privacy. Businesses that have dynamic requirements, critical 
missions and uptime requirements are better suited to private cloud. In general, performance obstacles 
and security challenges can be evaded in a private cloud, but may also be prone to other vulnerabilities 
such as internal data theft. Example of private cloud deployment includes telecoms infrastructure and 
financial institutions.  
2.3.3 Community Cloud 
Community cloud allows business or organisations with common business functions, requirements or 
objectives to collaborate and establish their specific cloud infrastructure to realise some of the benefits 
of cloud computing. The community members generally share similar performance, privacy and 
security apprehensions. A community cloud can be hosted internally or externally, as well as internally 
managed or outsourced to a third-party provider. In particular, a community cloud is appropriate for 
businesses that work on a similar project or mission needing centralised capabilities for managing and 
implementing the project Examples of community cloud include banks and trading firms.  
2.3.4 Hybrid Cloud   
Hybrid cloud is a mixture of private, community or public cloud that are bound together to support 
higher availability, reliability and resiliency. Hybrid cloud permits a business to increase the capacity 
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or capability by assimilation or customization with another cloud service. In particular, resources are 
managed and provided either in-house or by external providers.  
2.4 Security Issues in Cloud 
Cloud computing continues to evolve and expand over time. New security challenges constantly emerge 
that create concerns and hamper the progress of wide-scale adoption (Pearson and Benameur, 2010a). 
The environment tends to be surrounded by complex issues that introduce significant risk to businesses 
(Bhadauria et al., 2011). As long as third-party services make up the cloud, the problem of security and 
privacy of customer data cannot be completely avoided. Apart from the security issues, cloud users are 
also apprehensive as to what security controls are available in the cloud to provide adequate protection 
as a result of relinquishing control of sensitive data and applications to a CSP (Zissis and Lekkas, 2012). 
Some of the pressing concerns to which a resolution is proposed in this thesis involve security risks to 
customer data and the insufficient monitoring resources for providing transparency. Other issues that 
aggravate the concerns are the insufficiency, or otherwise immaturity of CSPs to support prospective 
customers in ensuring the fulfilment of their security requirements. While these concerns are 
perspicuous, there other significant challenges in the cloud domain that have been cited in the literature 
and industry. This thesis summarises both industry and literature-cited security challenges that are 
relevant to the problem domain (Ryoo et al., 2014):   
 Loss of Governance: The adoption and migration of enterprise or corporate data imply a partial 
surrender of control to the CSP, which results in losing some control over policies, procedures 
and monitoring of user data. This loss of control can generate other problems that affect 
policies, security or privacy procedures that are far within reach of the organisation.  
 Transparency: Prospective cloud computing users opting to adopt cloud services usually raise 
concerns over lack of information on security controls, vulnerabilities, and threats and they do 
not have visibility into CSP activities that ensure policy and procedures are being enforced in 
operations. Organisations typically require details that may enable them to perform risk 
assessment and management on services offered. Furthermore, users have concern over 
compliance with privacy law and data governance that accommodates the application of 
policies and principles to protect customer data.  
 Trust Issues: The complex internal setups of cloud computing sometimes makes it difficult for 
cloud users to acknowledge provider’s trust owing to the user relinquishing direct control over 
many aspects of security and privacy to the provider.  Also, as data is being stored and processed 
by a third party, which is confined outside the vicinity of an organisation that is being protected 
with security controls, it escalates the level of risk and instils fear to the cloud users.  
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 Data Loss: Public clouds store the data of multiple users on a shared environment where a loss 
of privileged access may bring a severe security concern to other cloud users. Accordingly, lack 
of proper information management such as the use of appropriate encryption algorithms, 
authentication and access privilege result in sensitive damages and unexpected leakages. 
Therefore, user data at rest, in transit or use, needs to be controlled and protected using 
cryptographic measures and standard communication protocols.   
 Ambiguous Accountability: Accountability involves defining compliance to internal and 
external governance criteria, implementation of suitable actions such as contractual and legal 
requirements, substantiating such actions and accepting the responsibilities for failure to act 
appropriately. The lack of a clear definition of accountability and responsibility among CSPs 
and users may bring about the conceptual problem between them, and this may create a 
contractual inconsistency that may further induce anomaly or incidents.  
2.5 Security Controls in Cloud  
Security is essential but also a challenging aspect of cloud systems. It refers to a broad set of technical 
and operational safeguards deployed to protect data and applications and address the security challenges 
associated with cloud computing (Krutz and Vines, 2010, Ramgovind et al., 2010). The rationale behind 
the need for security protection is the fact that once users’ sensitive data are migrated to the cloud, it 
resides in the CSPs infrastructure and depending on the cloud service, a user may have little or no 
control over the data. The loss of full control over security may create other privacy issues that could 
hinder business processes (Rittinghouse and Ransome, 2016).  
In general, many types of security controls are deployed within a cloud architecture, and they can be 
listed according to the area of application (operational or technical) and categorized by functionality 
(preventive, detective corrective and deterrent) (Krutz and Vines, 2010). Operational controls deal with 
policies, procedures, and standards that provide guidelines for facilitating the security of customer data 
from both customer and provider sides. Technical controls, on the other hand, involve a set of technical 
measures or strategies necessary to prevent, detect, and counter threats to customer data and the cloud 
systems. In this context, cloud security controls can be classified according to: 
2.5.1 Preventive Controls 
Preventive controls aim to prevent security violations, malicious actions and enforce access control 
against customer’s data. Example of cloud preventive controls include encryption, intrusion prevention 
systems (IPS) and firewalls   
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2.5.2 Detective Controls 
These controls are put in place to help detect violations and malicious activities. They do not stop or 
mitigate malicious activities, but only identify and report attempts or occurrence. Examples include 
intrusion detection systems (IDS), security logs and audit trails.  
2.5.3 Corrective Controls 
Corrective controls attempt to reinstate, correct or restore a cloud system to normal process after a 
security violation has occurred. Examples include: repairing the operating system of a host cloud 
machine or restoring data from a recent backup.   
2.5.4 Deterrent Controls 
A CSP implements deterrent controls in an attempt to discourage attackers from attacking cloud 
systems. A cloud user could also employ a visible practice of sound information security management 
to deter potential attackers. Example of deterrent controls includes monitoring and logging. 
2.6 Related Works  
In this section, related works in the area of virtual machine monitoring, cloud compliance; software-
agent and security audits as a transparency mechanism are  presented. Other works that are not explicitly 
meant for addressing clouds security transparency but can be used for the purpose are also discussed. 
This includes a discussion of works in the domain of audit and assurance, best practices, cloud forensics, 
including security incident management. A review of literature in these areas allows the reader to 
understand the limitations of the current state of the art, gain an understanding of the cloud security 
transparency-related problems and form the basis for this research.     
2.6.1 Audit and Assurance 
One of the major concerns when moving data to a cloud environment is the loss of control over the data. 
In a typical non-cloud scenario, an organization knows where correctly data is stored (e.g. on which 
server and disks), but this is not the case in the cloud, due to information hidden by the CSP as well as 
the use of distributed file systems in the cloud. As a result, new mechanisms and approaches to assuring 
the auditability of data in the cloud have been proposed. A literature review is presented in this context 
to highlight the current state of the art in cloud auditing domain.  
2.6.1.1 Data and Storage Integrity Audits in Cloud  
One of the approaches to cloud audits is to assure the integrity of cloud-based storage service where 
data is stored in the cloud is downloaded and checked for completeness, thereby enabling transparency. 
Recent works performed in this area include:  
Tian et al. (Tian et al., 2019) presented a cloud storage auditing technique that aims at addressing the 
challenges associated with determining CSP conformance to the legal expectations of users using data 
integrity auditing scheme. The approach proposes a public auditing scheme that encompasses identity-
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privacy preservation, group dynamics and identity traceability, and batch notification. It adopts a 
Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature technique to generate homomorphic authenticators that 
preserve the identity privacy of users, and random masking that blinds data proof as a means for 
protecting data privacy.  
Identity-based integrity auditing for cloud storage is presented by Shen et al. (Shen et al., 2018). The 
authors proposed a new scheme for remote data integrity auditing called identity-based shared data 
integrity auditing which encrypts shared sensitive information before sending it to the cloud and then 
generates signatures that are used to verify the integrity of the encrypted file. In the scheme, a sanitizer 
is used to sanitize data blocks corresponding to sensitive information of a sensitive file, a user then 
blinds the data blocks which correspond to the original sensitive information and generate the 
corresponding signature before being sent back to a sanitizer. The blinded data blocks are converted 
into a uniform format, including the confidential information.  
Secure storage, verification and auditing (SecSVA) of data in the cloud is presented by Aujla et al. 
(Aujla et al., 2018). SecSVA aims to ensure secure third party auditing with integrity preservation in 
the cloud environment. It consists of several modules that include an attribute-based secure data 
duplication framework, and a secure Kerberos that is designed for secure auditing of data stored in the 
cloud in which different algorithms for key generation, encryption, and decryption are designed. The 
architecture of SecSVA supports data authentication, verification, auditing, integrity and confidentiality 
for cloud storage.   
Similarly, Sookhak et al. (Sookhak et al., 2014) developed a remote data auditing method which uses 
an algebraic signature that allows clients to efficiently check data possession in cloud storage while 
incurring less computational overhead on the cloud side and client-side compared to homophobic 
cryptosystem. The work extended data auditing scheme by designing an efficient data structure that 
could support dynamic data update features with minimum computation overhead on client and cloud 
service sides. They implemented the scheme to prove its security and performance in comparison to 
other data auditing methods. 
The fundamental principle of any data-centric audit requires the checks for the completeness and 
integrity of data stored in the cloud. The literature presented in this context provides promising 
mechanisms for ensuring security transparency through integrity audits. These approaches may be 
necessary for small datasets, but it is mostly infeasible and might be prohibitive due to downloading 
large datasets in terms of bandwidth cost and overhead performance; hence, very impractical. Also, the 
computation cost on the server-side for generating proofs could limit how a user can frequently verify 
the integrity of outsourced data. Also, the additional metadata that is required along with the original 
data stored in the cloud creates storage overhead on both the client and server sides, which, in turn, 
creates storage inefficiency.  
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2.6.1.2 Regulatory Compliance, Standards and Best Practices  
Relevant standards and best practices have become prominent features in the realm of security 
transparency through evaluating security and privacy controls in cloud computing. Most of these 
frameworks are considered in general ICT, e.g. (27001, 2013, COBIT, 2019) describe security 
protection mechanisms including organizational and technical controls for preventing data breaches, 
ensuring integrity and privacy protection.  
Cloud Controls Matrix is developed by CSA (Cloud Security Alliance, 2017a), which aims at producing 
best-practice and a solid foundation for security transparency. Its goal is to provide fundamental security 
principles that guide and supports cloud users in assessing the general security risk of a cloud service. 
It gives a detailed description of security principles that are based on established control frameworks, 
standards and regulations such as ISO 27001/27002, PCI-DSS among others  
Another essential project by the CSA is the Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ)  
(Cloud Security Alliance, 2017b). CAIQ is intended to assist cloud auditor and users in evaluating the 
security services of a CSP using a list of questions they might want to ask a CSP. CAIQ provides 
numerous advantages to the CSP such that it enables the provider to submit their response in a public 
domain for every potential customer to access.  
Security, Trust & Assurance Registry (STAR) (Cloud Security Alliance, 2017c) is another initiative 
that provides a public database of CSPs that have completed assessment based on CCM and CAIQ. It 
comprises different levels of START certifications ranging from self-assessment, which is self-
explanatory, certification and attestation which  require an evaluation by a third-party, and continuous, 
which is a certification based on constant monitoring.  
Similarly, some recent work on accountability in the cloud have emerged through projects such as 
A4CLOUD, whereby researchers are thriving to devise models that can help put in place a set of 
mechanisms that ensure CSPs are held accountable for breach to SLA or a security incident that can be 
traced back to a lax in their security. In the context of A4Cloud, the concept of transparency in the 
broader sense is considered as an attribute of Accountability (A4 Cloud, 2017).  
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) developed a framework 
that enables cloud customers to collect assurance information about the security protection of assets 
from CSPs. The framework provides a set of questions that potential cloud customers may wish to ask 
about a CSP. The questions are mostly based on industry standards such as the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards 
(European Network and Information Security Agency, 2010).  
All of the initiatives mentioned above are subject to an audit that aims to ensure security transparency 
and assure a certain level of compliance to established criteria. Audits are usually conducted to evaluate 
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compliance with one of these standards as part of a certification process. However, the intervals at 
which the audit is performed is generally quite long (yearly or longer). There is the potential that policy 
violations can remain undetected, and the frequent probing of violations is not considered. An important 
aspect that needs to be addressed is the period of uncertainty by enabling continuous assessment of 
cloud operations in respect to conformity to requirements. In addition, best-practice like the CSA STAR 
provide a pre-assessment metric that measures the transparency level of various CSPs before cloud 
services are adopted or provide a mechanism by which cloud users ask for and receive information 
about elements of transparency supported by a CSP. But it fails to acknowledge the tendency of CSPs 
to generate a false representation of their services without continuous verification.  
2.7.2 Cloud Forensics  
Cloud forensics deals with the process of performing a structured investigation by collecting and 
analysing digital information to reconstruct security events while also protecting the privacy rights of 
cotenants in a cloud infrastructure. Cloud forensics is an essential element of security transparency by 
enabling the identification, collection, preservation and analysis of data so that it can be effectively used 
to establish the integrity of data. New techniques and methodologies are being developed for cloud 
forensics.  
Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) is one of the techniques used for providing evidence in cloud 
forensics (Pape, 2017). VMI leverages the capabilities of a hypervisor to examine the virtual machine 
at runtime for intrusion detection activities (e.g. malware detection on introspected VM). Deshpande et 
al. (Deshpande et al., 2018) proposed a logging and replay system that analyses intrusions, which runs 
in a VM, performs logging in the host OS and replays the whole VM process for analysis and improving 
the transparency of VM runtime.  
Borisaniya et al. (Borisaniya and Patel, 2019) argued that VM monitoring is a promising technique for 
activity detection at the hypervisor level. The authors proposed a VMI security framework that 
leverages derivation-based approach to monitor activities running inside a VM, which utilises the 
hardware-based system call tracing tool to extract system call traces of VM processes. It uses a 
derivation-based approach to monitor activities running inside the VM from outside by extracting 
system call traces of each process and detect any potential malicious activity.  
In Lauren et al. (Laurén and Leppänen, 2018), a web-based monitoring system for VM called Nitro 
Web is presented. Nitro Web is capable real-time of data collection, detection and visualisation of call 
activities taking place within a VM, which is built on top of Nitro, a python-based VMI framework for 
analysing VM state. The authors maintained that the Nitro Web provides a transparency VM monitoring 
capabilities because it does not require involvement or cooperation from the guest OS being monitored. 
A Cloning and Injection based VM Inspection in Cloud (CIVIC) is proposed by (Suneja et al., 2017). 
CIVIC is a mechanism that enables inspection of production VMs by creating a replica of the VMs 
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runtime state in a spate isolated sandbox environment. It then uses a runtime code inject to introduce 
userspace-level functionality for over the replicated VM state to avoid guest modification. CIVIC 
enables VM introspection based monitoring and inspection solutions.  
Jia et (Jia et al., 2017) proposed an architecture (T-MVI) that prevents the malicious access to VM data 
and subversion of regular VM routine. The technique guarantees VM integrity by monitoring the 
contents of a virtual machine in real-time from the hypervisor level. Their architecture examines and 
eliminates the risks of privacy leakage and security bypass through isolating the core code for virtual 
machines to an isolated environment within the hardware component. The authors maintained that the 
proposed architecture could prevent attackers from hijacking the data emanating from VM or falsify 
information to gain illegitimate access to the computing node. However, the work failed to demonstrate 
how captured information about VM is communicated or analysed for identifying security lapses and 
vulnerabilities to the VM. 
In Deshpande (Deshpande and Ainapure, 2016), the authors contend that virtual machine introspection 
serves as a right solution for monitoring malicious activities in VMs such as taking control of host 
privileges through software loopholes or attacks on virtual machines in the same cloud platform. To 
mitigate the problem, they proposed an intelligent real-time virtualisation monitoring system that 
continuously checks the status of guest VMs in both static and dynamic modes to identify and prevent 
cloud resources from attacks. The approach aims to achieve reasonable efficiency and security by 
ensuring that VM is protected from various forms of attacks and to add intelligence to VM introspection 
by embedding a pattern recognition algorithm for identifying threats. The authors used a system call 
tracing tool which monitors the status of virtual machines. However, the work is mainly built on static 
threat pattern recognition that is not dynamic enough to identify emerging threats 
Tovarnak et al. (Tovarňák et al., 2014) identified the lack of multi-tenant monitoring support and limited 
access to provider controlled monitoring information prohibits cloud customer from determining the 
status of resources of their interests adequately. To address this problem, they proposed a distributed 
event-driven monitoring model for enabling multiple simultaneous consumers a real-time collection 
and analysis of monitoring data related to the behaviour and state of many distributed entities. The 
contribution emphasises the use of behaviour monitoring that includes the collection and analysis of 
data related to the actions and changes to the state of the resources monitored to detect behaviour 
deviations and their patterns.   
The most important aspect of cloud forensics as proposed by the literature, as mentioned above involves 
the heterogeneity and availability of evidence, and access to evidence sources, which are vital to 
ensuring security transparency. However, the application of VMI for cloud forensics faces many 
challenges. For example, the legal authority and time synchronisation due to the distributed nature of 
cloud services, as well as the preservation of evidence integrity, chain of custody and availability of 
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sufficient storage capacity are some of the significant drawbacks in the proposed approaches. Other 
challenges include the protection of privacy rights in a multitenant environment when investigators 
collect evidence. For instance, if a VM that runs in a cloud server becomes the object of interest in a 
forensic investigation, the entire server may be seized by the law enforcement, and this may result in 
co-located VMs owned by other tenants to be affected. In particular, the CSP may be unwilling to 
provide an investigator with the required access to physical machines, and in some cases, such as where 
multiple jurisdictions are involved, the CSP may not be obligated to do so. Furthermore, another major 
problem is dynamicity, i.e. cloud forensics does not mainly focus on the areas of security that are of 
significant importance to the cloud customer. The failure to appropriately harbour customer 
expectations amounts to ineffectiveness to dispense transparency unless otherwise done differently.   
2.7.3 Software Agent and SLA Monitoring   
Ouedraogo et al. in (Ouedraogo et al., 2015b) proposed one of the first solutions for promoting security 
transparency in the cloud realm. Their contribution, which is event-driven, allows both CSU and CSP 
to make specifications to represent patterns of events, whose occurrence can be an evidence of a security 
anomaly or breach or merely a sign of nefarious use of the cloud infrastructure by some of its users. 
Casola et al. in (Casola et al., 2015) presented a monitoring architecture that integrates different 
security-related monitoring tools to provide continuous monitoring capabilities for SLA security 
parameters. The monitoring architecture put forward by the authors is built on and integrated with 
monitoring components belonging to SPECS framework, which also aims at designing and 
implementing a management framework of the SLA lifecycle.  
Casola et al. in (Casola et al., 2014) also discussed a preliminary design and implementation of a 
security solution for PaaS based on SLA approach to address the issues related to the management of 
security requirements in the cloud. The work adopts a dedicated cloudware platform that is deployed 
over infrastructure resources. The platform supports end-users and CSPs to specify their security 
requirements using SLAs, evaluate security features offered by remote cloud security brokers, 
management of SLA lifecycle as well as the development and deployment of security services.  
Pauley (Pauley, 2010) developed an assessment scorecard that assesses the transparency worthiness of 
CSPs from three dimensions, namely: security, privacy, auditability and service level agreements. In 
Pauley’s contribution, a pre-assessment can be performed on CSPs based on three factors relating to 
the CSP and their business entity. The scorecard consists of a pre-assessment phase that is used to 
generate and assign values to a CSP, based on which threshold values are compared to determine if the 
CSP is eligible for another assessment at post-assessment phase. At the post-assessment stage, the 
transparency worthiness of a CSP is compared against a set of questions that have been formulated 
based on the four dimensions. The approach also considers several factors relating to a CSP to support 
organisations to perform the assessment. Such factors include CSPs’, years of business, published 
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security or privacy breaches, published data loss, profitable or public, similar customers, membership 
to standards etc.  This approach serves as a guideline for organisations to evaluate CSPs transparency. 
However, it is quite complicated and does not appear to be useful for an organisation with a broad set 
of requirements.  
Garg et al. (Garg et al., 2013) proposed a framework that enables cloud users to compare different cloud 
offerings based on specific user requirements using analytical hierarchy process (AHP) approach 
(Vaidya and Kumar, 2006). This particular framework utilizes specific cloud service measurement 
indexes such as accountability, agility, assurance, cost, performance, security and privacy, and stability.  
In addition, CloudHarmony (Leitner and Cito, 2016) developed an online cloud measurement tool that 
enables customers to evaluate the performance of CSPs. The platform consists of four major 
components: CloudSquare, CloudScores, CloudReports, and CloudMatch. Cloud customers can use 
CloudSquare to search and compare services provided by CSPs based on attributes such as price, 
performance, and geographical location. CloudScores provides customers with access to benchmarking 
metrics that evaluate the performance of cloud services based on memory, CPU, and network, while 
CloudReports provides analytical reports of CSPs performance. CloudMatch, on the other hand, allows 
customers to perform tests such as the speed of uploading and downloading large files and network 
latency across different geographical locations. However, this approach mainly focuses on the 
evaluation of CSPs based on certain variables but does not consider CSP security and compliance.  
In addition, Li et al. (Li et al., 2010) developed a framework that aims at assisting potential cloud 
customers in evaluating the performance and comparing the cost of CSSPs, based on a set of metrics 
including storage, memory and network. The framework consists of a tool called CloudCmp that is 
designed to perform this comparison. The tool is used to perform a study on the major cloud providers 
in the market. However, similar to CloudHarmony, the evaluation focused on specific attributes that are 
not security oriented 
The works, as mentioned earlier, are associated with several limitations. For example, one problem 
deals with dynamicity, i.e. it does not mainly focus on the areas of security that are of significant 
importance to the cloud customer. The failure to appropriately harbour customer expectations amounts 
to ineffectiveness to dispense transparency unless otherwise done differently. Other transparency 
initiatives by the research community either serve to provide a pre-assessment metric that measures the 
transparency level of various CSPs before cloud services are adopted or provide a mechanism by which 
cloud users ask for and receive information about elements of transparency supported by a CSP. The 
need for continuous visibility and transparent probing of activities based on evidence is not considered. 
The works also failed to acknowledge the tendency of CSPs to generate a false representation of their 
services without continuous verification. Another limitation deals with the unfeasibility of attaining 
absolute transparency on all the clauses within an SLA, which could be ascribed to the security or legal 
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constraints that may restrain CSPs from making certain disclosures, as well as the enormity or otherwise 
practicality of all areas of cloud security that ought to be covered. 
2.7.4 Industry Practices and Systems  
When exploring the associated processes, methods and initiatives for enabling security transparency, it 
is vital to consider existing industry practices. Various vendors in the cloud industry have developed 
systems and associated processes for distributed data collection for monitoring purposes in cloud 
infrastructure, such as the renowned Nagios (Nagios, 2017), which supports distributed data collection 
and analysis. Most of these systems are mainly Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
systems, which serve as the means for detecting security events and collecting information from various 
sources. Therefore, in the following, the characteristics of some of the currently powerful commercial 
SIEM solutions for both cloud monitoring and data centre is presented. The list is based on a review by 
Solutions Review (Solutions Review, 2017), which evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of these 
systems.   
IBM developed QRadar SIEM (IBM, 2017) that is available as a hardware virtual appliance and 
software packages based on the customer’s event velocity. It includes several components such as 
network insight, user analytics that addresses insider threat use cases, and an advisor that provides 
automated root cause research for identified threats. McAfee SIEM (MacAfee SIEM, 2017) is 
developed to deliver application monitoring and threat intelligence capabilities. It provides real-time 
status and understanding of threat data, as well as a view of the systems, risks, and activities of cloud 
systems.  
Also, Amazon CloudWatch (CloudWatch, 2019) allows the monitoring of AWS resources and 
applications to run on AWS in real-time to collect and track metrics and automatically displays the 
metrics being used by AWS service user, including the capability to manage logs and set incident 
alarms.  
LogRhythm (LogRythm Inc., 2017) combines log management, event management, file integrity 
monitoring and machine analytics with host and network forensics in an integrated security intelligence 
platform. It helps in the collection of security event log data throughout cloud systems, including 
network security controls, user applications and operating systems, including to analyse data to identify 
possible signs of malicious activity and to help recover from successful attacks.    
Alert Logic (Alert Logic, 2019) provides Security-as-a-Service for on-premises, cloud and hybrid 
infrastructures to deliver deep security insight and continuous protection. Depending on the cloud 
service provision model, it considers cloud security to be a shared responsibility between the CSP and 
the customer concerning information security. 
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Logentries (Logentries Inc., 2019) is another product that provides real-time log management and 
analytics services. It is delivered as a SaaS and enables secure collection and analysis of log files while 
preventing leakage of unencrypted sensitive data. Logentries includes alerts to identify security threats 
and investigation of malicious activities. Also, it enables the management of vast amount of data, 
visualisation and automatic analysis and reporting security incident. 
Rackspace Monitoring API (Rackspace, 2019) currently supports monitoring for external services and 
allows customers to query the Rackspace cloud management system (CMS) for performance metrics 
on the CSP infrastructure.  Generally, Rackspace monitoring API enables customers to simultaneously 
monitor the performance of different resources from multiple data centres and enables the collection of 
a variety of data that can be used for measuring critical data.  
Salesforce ReST API (Salesforce, 2019) provides a ReST API for event monitoring data that contains 
useful for assessing usage trends and user behaviour. It can be applied to integrate log data within back-
end storage and data marts to correlate data from multiple and disparate cloud systems. It also includes 
an audit trail generator for costuming actions done by service administrators. 
EventTracker (Netsuron EventTracker, 2019) is another SIEM solution that integrates prediction, 
prevention, detection and response service offerings primarily to midsised commercial enterprises and 
government organisations with SIEM compliance reporting requirements. EventTracker also provides 
support for file integrity monitoring, as well as add-ons for vulnerability and configuration assessment.   
Many of the above-stated industry systems make use of logging data generated in the cloud 
infrastructure, and they have numerous strengths and weaknesses. However, such systems are designed 
to capture log data from a specific area of the cloud infrastructure (such as network or database 
activities), and the extent to which logging information is captured from the cloud environment is 
dependent on the focus of the tool. They do not provide vital information regarding other layers and 
heterogeneous sources of the cloud stack 
2.8 Chapter Summary  
In this chapter, a brief discussion of the primary service model and deployment models of cloud 
computing have been presented to establish a common understanding of the research domain. A 
particular focus is on current security issues considered as problematic; mostly over aspects of cloud 
security transparency, privacy and governance concerns. Additionally, the chapter presented some 
elements of security controls in cloud computing. Importantly, the chapter elaborates on how the 
existing approaches that influence security transparency in cloud.  A particular focus has been placed 
on the relevant literature on cloud audit, cloud forensics, and industrial systems, including evidence 
collection and assessment since these two properties are essential aspects of the proposed framework. 
Contemporary works from these domains are considered because one of the significant problems in 
cloud security transparency is the lack of evidence collection and analysis regarding the controls 
22 
 
implemented by CSPs. In this research, it is argued that customer trust can be increased if CSPs act and 
implement appropriate data protection machinists according to customer expectations by providing 
evidence-based assessment capabilities.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
A research methodology is an essential tool for identifying existing problems which need to be 
investigated and reach the objectives set out for particular research (Kothari, 2004). It can be seen as a 
method for collecting meaningful data and performing a systematic analysis to get accurate and realistic 
results. Research methodology clarifies the study’s aims and identifies the elements that are pertinent 
to the research needs (Neuman, 2013). Mackenzie and Knipe (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006) noted that 
research methodology highlights how techniques and procedures in the research design can be used, 
distinguishes between methods and results, and also crucial for achieving and clarifying key research 
aims. Generally, the purpose of research methodology can be described as giving a clear idea of the 
methods or processes that should be used to address the research problems. Therefore, research 
methodology is an essential element which clarifies all the steps needed to achieve the research 
objectives in this thesis.  
This chapter presents an outline of the techniques and theories applied in developing the proposed 
framework, including the research approach employed to validate the Cloud Security Transparency 
Framework (CSTF). Specifically, a combination of three important steps is used, consisting of a 
literature review, framework development, and evaluation process.  
3.2 Methodology for Framework Development  
The framework development process is mainly guided by a combination of theories, industry standards 
and methodologies. Figure 3.1 provides an insight into the steps used in the methodology for framework 
development.  
 
Figure 3.1: Methodology for Framework Development 
3.2.1 Step 1: Literature Review  
 The first step involves the application of a methodology for reviewing existing literature. It is mainly 
carried out to identify, analyse and summarise the present state-of-the-art literature concerning the 
methods and approaches for enabling cloud security transparency. Evidence from the literature is 
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pointed out to outline various techniques that are adopted for developing CSTF, addressing research 
questions, aims and objectives.   
3.2.2 Step 2: Framework Development  
The second step deals with the development of CSTF, which incorporates many concepts, a unified 
process and tool support for performing an audit. The concepts constitute and provide the high-level 
foundation for understanding security transparency from conceptual, organizational and technical 
perspectives. The process describes different phases of activities which can be followed by any 
organisation to achieve security transparency, and lastly, security transparency and audit tool is 
specifically designed to support organisations utilize security audit as a means for achieving security 
transparency 
In developing the framework, several techniques, theories and standards are employed for ensuring that 
it is developed and implemented according to generally accepted principles. In particular, sections from 
renowned industry standards, guidelines, frameworks and models were applied across different 
activities within the process by looking at specific features within the standards and where they can be 
applied in the process. The following section provides an insight into the many techniques and standards 
used:  
3.2.2.1 Secure Tropos  
The proposed framework needed to be developed based on standard methodology, and for that reason, 
Secure Tropos was considered (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007). Secure Tropos is a novel agent-oriented 
software development methodology that covers development process from initial requirement analysis 
to detailed design, which allows for greater understanding of the operational environment of a software 
system (Bresciani et al., 2004). Therefore, the research follows a set of concepts, such as actors, 
constraints, and goals based on Secure Tropos (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007).  Secure Tropos uses 
the concepts of actors, goals and social dependencies to define and view a multi-agent system and its 
social dependencies as a set of actors from within organizational settings (Giorgini et al., 2007). The 
research extends secure Tropos by using new concepts such as evidence, risk, and audit in an attempt 
to develop the proposed framework. The reason for choosing Secure Tropos is that it is well suited for 
modelling security requirements and provides in-depth analysis of security issues from organization 
and its social setting.  The concepts of Secure Tropos and those proposed in our approach are integrated 
to enable the identification of goals, assets, and assessing CSP evidence.  
3.2.2.2 Ontology and Semantic Web Language  
Ontology is a formal language that allows the explicit specification and conceptualization of ideas that 
represent the abstract model of a phenomenon (Maedche and Staab, 2001). It enables the construction 
of knowledge and provides the advantage of knowledge representation in organized metadata of 
complex information resources (McGuinness and Van Harmelen, 2004). The metadata provides 
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semantic information about resources which are encoded as instances. The proposed framework 
comprises various concepts that represent abstract ideas in the domain knowledge of transparency. 
Ontology is used to provide an explicit knowledge-based understanding of the attributes, relationships, 
restrictions and rules between the concepts.    
3.2.2.3 Industry Standards  
Renowned industry standards, guidelines, frameworks, methodologies and models were followed in 
developing the framework, some of which include:  
 CSA CCM: is used because it provides a set of controls that provide fundamental security 
principles to help cloud computing customers and vendors achieve security relating to 
information asset protection in the cloud industry (Cloud Security Alliance, 2017a). The CCM 
was adopted to specify essential security requirements for asset protection that must be met by 
the CSP, and form the basis of a security audit.  
 CSA CAIQ: provides a template questionnaire containing a set of questions that can be used by 
auditors to assess the security capabilities of a CSP (Cloud Security Alliance, 2017b). CAIQ is 
considered for creating security audit checklist that for obtaining assertions and evidence from 
CSPs.   
 CIS CSC: is designed to help organisations safeguard their assets. It consists of critical and 
actionable controls that are designed to defend organisations against known attacks, achieves 
higher overall cybersecurity defence, and implement a coherent security program.  
 ENISA Cloud Controls: provides a guide to assess organisations’ security risks that are CSP-
oriented and focuses on control measures that protect cloud computing systems against 
operational risks (ENISA, 2016).  
 ISAE 3402 Standards: provide guidelines for the conduct and performance of security audit 
according to established criteria and procedure (ISAE500). This standard is employed in 
establishing audit criteria for assessing CSP evidence.    
3.2.3 Step 3 Research Validation  
An empirical research method is selected for implementing and validating the contributions of this 
research. According to Euneson et al. (Runeson and Höst, 2009), empirical studies are increasingly 
becoming popular in information systems research because it has proven to be an effective research 
method to collect relevant data for investigating a specific problem in information systems. Therefore, 
a case-study approach was employed to validate the contributions of this research. The case study 
approach is widely used in research domain because it is useful for an explanatory research project, and 
serves as the basis for the development of well-structured research findings (Straub et al., 2004). The 
rationale behind employing a case-study is to obtain meaningful feedback regarding the validity of 
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CSTF as well as stakeholders views on the usefulness of STAT and then analyse the feedback to 
determine the acceptability and validity of the proposed framework.    
3.2.3.1 Technology Acceptance Model  
In formulating and evaluating the questionnaire used in collecting stakeholders’ feedback, we use the 
renowned Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) and the Unified Theory of Acceptance 
and Use of Technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh et al., 2003). TAM deals with the prediction of the 
adaptability of a newly developed information system by users within an environment, to determine its 
acceptability to a context and the modifications that need to be made to make it acceptable to all users. 
The authors maintained that the acceptability of any information system is determined by two major 
factors: perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use. Perceived usefulness entails the degree to which 
a person believes the use of a system will improve his performance (Davis, 1989). Perceived ease of 
use refers to the degree to which an individual believes that the use of a system will improve 
performance. On the other hand, UTAUT proposed four constructs, namely: performance expectancy, 
social influence, effort expectancy, and facilitating conditions that are direct determinants of usage of 
intention and behaviour (Karahanna and Straub, 1999). Therefore, TAM and UTAUT were selected as 
they appear to have some relationship in their constructs for in evaluating feedbacks.    
3.3 Research Approach  
A research approach is a systematic and orderly application of numerous steps for the collection, 
analysis and interpretation of data to draw meaningful insights and conclusions (Amaratunga et al., 
2002). Orlikowski and Baroudi (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991) state that it is imperative to understand 
the aims of research to clearly determine and choose a suitable technique to achieve the research’s 
purpose. The authors further emphasised that when selecting a research approach, two factors need to 
be considered: the characteristics of the topic and the time to conduct the research. There are many 
types of research approaches such as inductive, deductive, descriptive, explanatory and experimental. 
Many of such different methods form the main pillars used in this study to identify, select and develop 
a suitable research design and technique for data collection and analysis. Research approaches can 
usually be categorised according to qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods. For each methodology, 
the primary methods and the various steps needed for the application of each method is provided  
3.3.1 Qualitative Research   
Qualitative research is associated with the social constructivist paradigm that prioritises constructed 
nature of reality, it is investigative and mainly used to discover the general perception of a particular 
group or audience regarding an issue (Kumar and Phrommathed, 2005). Qualitative research focuses 
more on recording and analysis to uncover the deeper meaning and significance of human experiences, 
which assists in understanding a phenomenon. Traditionally, qualitative research uses non-numerical 
data such as discussions, explanations, and conversations which makes qualitative data-rich with strong 
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potential for revealing complex phenomenon by focusing on problems in their social environments 
(Creswell and Creswell, 2017). A qualitative approach is used when secondary data are insufficient to 
achieve depth in research (Bryman, 2006). The interview is the most commonly used technique for data 
collection, and it can be undertaken using structured or unstructured questions, as well as a combination 
of both. Interviews can normally take place through face-to-face interaction or electronic platforms such 
as telephone or video conferencing. Figure 3.2 shows the main methods and steps involved in the 
application of qualitative research method.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Qualitative Methods  
3.3.2 Quantitative Research 
The quantitative approach is associated with the interpretation of numeric data such as ratio, percentages 
or intervals, and using items of analysis such as diagrams or graphs for interpreting and visualising 
results (Bryman, 2006). In other terms, a quantitative approach is an empirical paradigm, which usually 
involves collecting and converting data into numerical form so that statistical analysis can be performed 
to conclude (Mugenda, 2003). The quantitative approach is predominantly used to quantify and interpret 
numerical data by surveying a target audience. An example of the methods used for collecting 
quantitative data is a questionnaire that contains a set of relevant questions for which answers are 
provided. Statistical techniques analyse the data gathered from the questionnaire and the results are 
generalised to the population (Burns and Bursn, 2000).  Figure 3.3 shows the various steps involved in 
the application of a quantitative method. 
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Figure 3.3: Quantitative Methods 
3.3.3 Mixed Methods  
Mixed methods consist of a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, especially in the 
aspect of data gathering, analysis, and interpretation (Creswell et al., 2003). A mixed-method provides 
more forms and options for approaches to consider. A vital factor to consider in any process is the 
reliability, which involves dependability, consistency, replicability of results (Amaratunga et al., 2002). 
A mixed-method ensures and improves the reliability of any research, and can be achieved through 
different procedures such as interviews and questionnaires. In addition, using a mixed-method, different 
type of data are collected from multiple sources, which add value and enhance the reliability of data 
and findings.   
3.4 Research Method used for this Research   
After the identification of the various and most commonly used research approaches, the next step is to 
establish a suitable research method that could be applied for this research. Based on the nature of this 
work, which involves the development, implementation and validation of CSTF, considering the 
research studies included, and the corresponding research questions whose aim is to contribute to the 
research goal, a qualitative research method was selected to guide the conduct of the research work. 
The rationale for using a qualitative research approach for this thesis include: qualitative study enables 
the understanding of a studied context by communicating with participants and capturing their 
experiences; it also allows the documentation of findings in more detailed and variable contents than in 
quantitative approach, and the study context materials can be evaluated with greater detail. Also, 
qualitative research allows the researcher to understand and present the context as it is seen and 
experienced by the stakeholders without predetermining those standpoints.  
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Additionally, for ensuring that logical research results are obtained, various research strategies that are 
associated with qualitative research method were applied. Case studies have been considered to guide 
the implementation, validity and usability of STAT. In particular, two case studies are used to evaluate 
the practical application in a real-world environment.   
3.5 Research Design  
A research design is described as a blueprint that provides a clear picture of the research structure, 
including the methods used for data collection, research questions and sources of data used in the 
conduct of the research (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Research design enables a researcher to outline all 
the tools needed for the research, such as selecting a suitable research methodology (Lewis, 2015). In 
other terms, research design focuses on the type of study to be conducted to reach specific outcomes 
and another way to see it is an action plan that provides a sequence of tasks or activities for getting from 
the research questions to results or conclusions (Maxwell, 2012).  
Figure 3.4 provides an overview of the research design process followed in this work, which consists 
of five crucial stages. The first stage deals with review and analysis of existing literature within the 
problem domain to establish the knowledge gap. The second stage focuses on the development of CSTF 
for addressing purported research problems. The methods for the implementation and validation of the 
proposed CSTF are developed in the third stage, whereas the analysis and interpretation of data are 
performed in the fourth step. The last step deals with concluding the limitations of the study and future 
research work. 
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3.6 Research Strategy 
According to Berg (L BERG, 2001), research strategy is a step-by-step plan of actions that provides a 
researcher with the direction to conduct systematic research, using suitable methods to validate the 
study and to produce quality results and detailed findings. Oates (Oates, 2005) also stated that a research 
strategy enables a researcher to establish why a particular research method befits the research context 
and how selected methods address the research questions. Denzin (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994) further 
emphasised that research strategy deals with the improvement of artefacts and learning through making 
and invention or enhancements. Research strategy entails different components as research 
methodology, research design, and method of data collection, analysis and validation.  
The choice of a research strategy is subjective and depends on the nature of the research problem. 
Various authors have presented different research strategies that can be applied to different contexts. 
Mills (Mills, 2000) has stressed that there are four fundamental types of research strategies that can be 
used: a case study, laboratory experiment, action research, and survey. However, when a new 
technology is introduced in an organisation, action research is usually conducted to explore and explain 
the socio-technical effects of the technology on users and operations. As a strategy, action research has 
been widely used in information system research because it aims to contribute both the practical 
concerns of people and to the goals of socio-technical paradigm. Thus, the author of this research has 
chosen action research using case studies.  
3.7 Action Research  
Action research is a term for several research practices applied in real-world situations to solve real-life 
problems by bringing together research and action, theory and practice, local knowledge and 
participation of people in research  (Costa et al., 1991).  A researcher in action research resides and 
interacts with a group of audience, participants or people for an extended period and engages them in 
an intensive and interactive learning process, which gives both the researcher and the participants a 
broad dimension of insights into various issues (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005).   
In evaluating the CSTF, a Participatory Action Research (PAR) has been adopted because action 
research emphasises on the collaborative participation of stakeholders within a case study context. Also, 
action research improves current situations being researched by direct implementation of research 
findings through the involvement of various stakeholders (Argyris and Schön, 1997). Further, action 
research allows a researcher to gather data using different methods such as case study, brainstorming, 
questionnaire, etc. Therefore, a case study was used, including the utilisation of a survey as a means for 
collecting data.  
3.8 Case Studies  
Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989)  defined a case study as an empirical enquiry that attempts to investigate 
a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life environment mainly when the borderline between a 
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given phenomenon and context are not evident. A case study is often considered as a method that can 
investigate a contemporary phenomenon when there is a lack of knowledge and background is not 
clearly defined. Zainal (Zainal, 2007) stated that there are three main reasons to consider a case study 
research in the field of information systems: case study enables a researcher to study information 
systems in its natural setting and also enables the researcher to generate findings from practices; it also 
allows a researcher to explore questions to gain more explicit information  
Therefore, the researcher established the importance of conducting the research validation for this work 
based on case study contexts that represent a real-world environment. The case study method is adopted 
because it enables the study complex research phenomenon and allows researchers to explore the 
research context in detail and draw a conclusion from the findings (Benbasat et al., 1987).  The 
researcher has adopted two different case studies to demonstrate the validity of CSTF and STAT. The 
adoption of two case studies enables the researcher to study and compare the findings between different 
study contexts and thus allows the exploration of validity and usefulness of CSTF and STAT, which in 
turn enable the researcher to establish conclusions.  
3.8.1 Case Study Selection  
In terms of selecting the case studies, two criteria were set: the first criterion is for implementing the 
process for security transparency. For this aspect, only an organisation that newly adopted cloud 
services will be considered. The second criterion set outs to achieve the security transparency tool, 
which only considers an organisation that has already migrated to the cloud. Based on these 
considerations, contact introduced the researcher to two different organisations that fulfilled these 
criteria. The selected companies were:   
 Case Study 1: considers a London based property management firm with six operational 
offices across multiple locations, five functional departments and a considerable workforce of 
more than 100 employees. The company also has more than 2,000 properties under its 
management. It uses an enterprise content management (ECM) system to provide fundamental 
capabilities that allow users to create seamlessly, edit, review, categorize, index, and publish 
contents on its website. The company decided to migrate a component of ECM called document 
management solution (DMS) to the cloud, and the implementation of CSTF is applied to this 
case study.  
 Case Study 2: is based on a healthcare patient relationship manager (PRM) system that is 
owned by a borough in London. The system gives the swift public access to urgent care, 
treatment and advice for less critical medical problems, as well as providing clinical expertise, 
nurses and paramedics with integrated access to patients’ health information and assessment 
tool. The system also provides doctors with access to relevant aspects of patients’ medical and 
care information. The Borough has recently migrated some components of the PRM to the 
32 
 
cloud, and due to the nature and sensitivity of personal data of patients involved, it is concerned 
about the CSP’s transparency in handling the system and ensuring the privacy of personal 
information. STAT was used in this study context for helping the borough achieve security 
transparency 
3.9 Data Collection Methods  
The collection of data from the case study is a necessary process and one of the most effective methods 
to uncover all relevant details relevant to the research (Cassell and Symon, 2004). Data collection and 
analysis significantly contribute to supporting the research idea. Polkinghorne (Polkinghorne, 2005) 
highlighted that three protocols need to be followed such as an overview of the case study context; field 
procedures, such as access arrangements to information sources, and case study questions that the 
researcher considers when collecting data. Polkinghorne (Polkinghorne, 2005) further stated that there 
are different sources to collect data in case study contexts such as interview, documentation, and 
observation, while Yin (Yin, 2009) noted that six main methods can be used to collect data including 
documentation, informal meetings and workshops, focus group interviews, direct observation, 
participant observation and physical artefacts.   Various data collection techniques are used in the course 
of implementation in the case study contexts. Also, informal and formal data gathering techniques were 
employed such as an interview. Table 3.1 provides a hint of the data-gathering methods used during the 
implementation process.  
Table 3.1: Data Sources  
Data Source In the course of Used for 
Documentation Initial steps for 
framework and tool 
implementation 
Obtaining preliminary and background information about the case 
studies in terms of understanding the scope of processes and 
portfolio. 
Informal meetings and 
workshops 
Throughout the 
implementation 
process 
To provide an introduction of the process and tool to relevant 
stakeholders, and to provide them with directions throughout the 
implementation process. 
Interview and 
questionnaire 
Throughout the 
implementation 
process 
To support the evaluation of the implementation process of CSTF 
and tool based on a combination of subjective and objective 
questions. 
Observation Throughout the 
implementation 
process 
To closely monitor and observe how the stakeholders implemented 
the framework and the tool. 
 
3.9.1 Context of the Study and Participants  
The context of the survey involves two companies. The first company implemented CSTF,  while the 
second company implemented STAT. Within these two companies, the questionnaire was distributed 
to various information systems roles: system administrator, security auditor, security analysts, IT 
manager, and top management. All the respondents have an average of 3 years of working experience, 
which was an added advantage for the researcher to ensure that respondents are knowledgeable enough 
to answer the questions and provide obtaining professional feedback.  
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3.10 Summary  
This chapter presented a detailed narration of the research methodology adopted in the development 
and evaluation of the proposed framework. It outlined three important steps that have been taken, 
including a systematic literature review process, framework development, evaluation, discussion, and 
confirmation of research aims and objectives. It also presented the types of research approaches that 
exist and the chosen approach for this research. A research design is presented to provide an overview 
of the research structure, including methods used for data collection.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Contextualisation of Cloud Security Transparency 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapters have presented a background discussion on cloud computing and some important 
facets that underpin cloud security transparency. This chapter dwelled on elaborating the notion of 
transparency from broad-spectrum and narrowed into the specific perspective of cloud service. It also 
introduces a conceptual definition of transparency based on a critical analysis of the attributes that 
constitute transparent operations. The perspective followed particularly enables the review and 
extraction of the attributes of transparency by considering similar works in the areas of social sciences, 
accounting, economics, and of course, cloud security transparency. The chapter has discovered that the 
common notion that binds most contributions together is the belief that information must be disclosed 
to attain transparency. Information disclosure, however, is insufficient to methodically constitute 
transparency in the cloud domain as there are other essential auxiliary properties and processes required 
for a flourishing efficacious modus operandi.  
4.2 Transparency Basics 
Transparency in the past few years has received considerable attention across several domains as a 
result of the surge to access information (Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010). It is often considered a universal 
remedy for all kinds of socio-economic, socio-cultural, socio-political and civic problems (Etzioni, 
2010). Institutions gain the confidence of the public by ensuring that the demand and supply of 
information continue to flow and also by promoting mechanisms that access to information (Heald, 
2012). Several denominators across different domains have offered various definitions and 
interpretations of transparency. However, there is no commonly concurred definition across different 
areas, except for a universal consensus that transparency is associated with public access to information 
(Bushman et al., 2004). One way to understand the meaning is to review a few broad general definitions 
of transparency. For example, in physical terms, transparency is a characteristic of a material object to 
conduct light and make other objects easily observable (Alzetta, 1997). In fiscal economic terms, 
transparency is defined as governments being open towards the public about structures and functions, 
policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections (McCarthy, 2007). In the social sciences, 
transparency connotes the ability of interested parties to see through otherwise private information 
(Williams, 1999). Moreover, within the area of information technology, transparency is viewed 
differently and considered as implying to the actions of openness and accountability (Aslam, 2014). 
The practice of transparency comes in many different forms of varying commitments, engagements and 
obligations; thus, it is crucial to identify the categories of adopted institutional practices that are 
intended to promote transparent operations and the manner in which they are deployed. In the upcoming 
sections of this chapter, the pivotal transparency categories (such as proactive and reactive) and the 
deployment types (opaque and explicit) will be covered.   
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4.3 Cloud Security Transparency 
Transparency is an essential means for strengthening information disclosure and enhances users’ trust 
in using cloud services. It is one of the fundamental aspects of operations that ensure visibility regarding 
some important areas such as performance, configuration, billing, and workload (Aslam, 2014, 
Kalloniatis et al., 2013). Transparency in the past was particularly used to imply cloud customers’ need 
for visibility on matters such as pricing models, but a broad range of interests such as security, service 
delivery and performance are now associated with the term. Security transparency, among all other 
spectrums, has prevailed as the most censorious necessity due to the complex chain of interactions 
between multiple actors, which fundamentally calls for the need to know how security and compliance 
measures are being applied to protect sensitive assets (Pauley, 2010).  
4.3.1 Definition of Cloud Security Transparency 
Considering the apparent definitions and connotations of transparency as attempted by researchers from 
different spheres of activities, for this research, cloud security transparency is defined as the disclosure 
of information relating to the security practices and management of virtual and application resources 
in the cloud to help customers in monitoring, verifying and tracking their data across cloud 
infrastructure. Cloud security transparency establishes the trustworthiness of the operations of the 
cloud service provider by enabling security monitoring, incident detection, reporting and 
management from the customer side. It has the potentials to establish trust and help customers to make 
informed decisions, achieve security goals, and operate in compliance with requirements. 
4.3.2 Areas of Focus for Security Transparency in Cloud Environment 
The cloud environment is composed of complex domains and resources that make achieving complete 
security transparency an enormous task. Visibility in every domain of the cloud cannot be efficiently 
and reliably provided due to certain restrictions or controls that may require the CSP to conceal 
particular security or configuration information. However, from the context of this research, some of 
the cloud domains where security transparency is achieved include:  
 Authentication: Cloud security transparency makes possible the establishment and sharing 
of information regarding how end users are authenticated, granted or denied access to data 
and applications.  
 Access Roles and Duties: Organisations usually define roles, layers, responsibilities and 
security levels associated with assets. Based on these specifications, information is shared 
and logged within an organisation in a manner that shows every task or activity executed 
against a particular asset.  
 User Account: By security transparency, access attempts to authorised user accounts are 
consistently tracked, monitored and the information shared with an organisation to ensure 
every system access reported.   
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 Security Policies: Security policies are part of the control objectives that define how an 
organization’s  assets are used and make the provisioning of cloud service under the business 
and security requirements. An organisation establishes appropriate security policies that are 
enforced throughout the contract lifecycle. Violation of security policies ought to be 
transparently shared or communised with the organisation.       
 Infrastructure Security and Location: Security transparency enables the sharing of the 
physical access, security and location of infrastructure that host or process organizational 
data such as data centres, servers, network tools etc.  
 Data Security: Information relating to the implemented tools and processes designed to 
protect sensitive data is shared with an organisation employing security transparency. 
Transparency in this aspect mainly focuses on information relating to a user without the risk 
of compromising the data of other users.  
 Security Standards: Standards usually allow an organisation to follow consistent 
stipulations for ensuring the safety of IT infrastructure and assets. Security transparency also 
enhances the sharing of information in this regard by enabling CSPs to share information on 
compliance with the regulatory bodies that regulate apply to their operations.  
4.3.3 Why Security Transparency in the Cloud? 
One of the most considerable obstacles to successful cloud migration is the management of security that 
is relatively aggravated by the non-transparent nature of CSPs to disclose security-related information 
associated with their offerings (Pauley, 2010). Users are driven by the fear of undisclosed security 
events cognate to on-going provider control procedures, and they always endeavour to make informed 
decisions by relying on disclosures to achieve optimum security goals and operate in compliance with 
requirements. Successful adoption of cloud technology by corporate users, businesses and organisations 
require a clear-cut disclosure of the security policies, designs and practices of CSPs, including on-going 
visibility of relevant security measures. These requisites for transparency constitute the pathway for 
users to assess the possible risks of cloud computing and its potential impact on assets. For example, a 
CSP may choose to outline the policies and procedures being employed to ensure the availability of 
user data by disclosing information on the architectural setup of backup plans, business continuity and 
redundancy strategies that provide continuous data availability. Security transparency in public clouds 
is considered as demanding a substantial magnitude of interest in comparison to other deployment 
models, due to its characteristics of being open to the public and serving a broad customer base. In 
contrast, other deployment models such as private clouds are designed explicitly for individual 
organisations, thereby offering customised functionalities that do not necessitate transparent operations. 
4.3.4 How Security Transparency can Support Businesses  
The ability of any organisation to recognize and adequately manage risks plays an important part, and 
the value of services and operations delivered to customers and other stakeholders. Security 
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transparency enables an organisation to identify their current and future requirements as well as 
providing a roadmap for aligning such requirements with cloud services. A broad spectrum of security 
solutions that support the core business processes and operations can be quickly established, including 
the identification of platforms and solutions that support the data security strategy of a business venture. 
By following a successful security transparency approach, an organisation can overcome the burden 
that often exists between information security strategy and business strategy objectives by directly 
aligning businesses processes and the security requirements that protect data. Also, the effective 
management of the risks associated with business data residing in the cloud requires the understanding 
of the level of risks, identification and prioritisation of sensitive data. In this direction, security 
transparency supports comprehensive classification efforts within organizational function or line of 
business, by leveraging automated tools that track data across cloud repositories including databases 
and applications.  
 
Another notable point that highlights the essentiality of security transparency to business is the role it 
plays in the assessment and definition of realistic, attainable business strategies and performance goals. 
Organizational strategies outline how objectives are achievable, while goals express objectives to a 
perceptible and possible level. Factors such as technological posture, operations and organizational 
culture determine the objectives of an organisation and those that can be reasonably accomplished. As 
such, security transparency allows an in-depth understanding of an organisation’s objectives and goals 
hierarchy, by directly establishing risk-based plans to support the monitoring of assets, as well as 
improvement opportunities concerning designing and operating an effective control process that is most 
consistent with their goals. Such improvement opportunities can take various forms including 
maintaining a robust control environment to support organizational initiatives that in return improve 
security; identification of focal risks that meet the organisation’s risks appetite, including operational 
risks, business risks, technology risks and many other areas that pose significant risks of concern. In 
general, security transparency supports these processes through evaluation, recommendations to 
management, and reporting of incidents to relevant organizational stakeholders. 
 
 
4.4 Properties of Cloud Security Transparency  
Cloud security transparency is an essential aspect of the cloud that is underpinned by other important 
prerequisite properties (Chung et al., 2012). A conceptual understanding of the properties related to 
security transparency is highly imperative due to their significance in determining what constitutes 
transparency. Researchers (such as (Cappelli et al., 2010, do Prado Leite and Cappelli, 2010, Frentrup 
and Theuvsen, 2006) have identified some fundamental properties they perceive to be the founding 
blocks of security transparency. Cloud Accountability Project (A4Cloud) (A4 Cloud, 2017) has built 
methods and tools that contribute towards bringing CSPs and customers together in chains of 
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accountability for data protection in the cloud (Pearson et al., 2012). The primary objectives of A4Cloud 
include enabling CSPs to give their customers appropriate control and transparency over how their data 
is used; monitor and check compliance with customers’ expectations; enable users to make choices 
about how CSPs may use and protect their data, and ensuring accountability. Hence, within this project, 
A4Cloud has identified and decomposed some fundamental properties that are relevant for measuring 
transparency and accountability. We perceive these properties as fundamentally influential in the 
delivery of security transparency, and thus, this paper has adopted some of such properties in addition 
to others for forming the basis for our approach. A justification for adopting the provisions of A4Cloud 
Project is based on the facts that it is a renowned industry project that strongly influences accountability, 
trust and privacy standards, which are significantly related to security transparency.  
1. Auditability: Auditability refers to the ability of a CSP supported mechanism to provide 
security audit logs or information in a verifiable and accessible manner. Auditability is vital for 
customers to perform a periodic examination and verification on assets independently, and for 
determining how asset requirements are being met, who has accessed assets and how 
requirements are being managed or protected against risks. Auditability also ensures that 
security events relating to customers assets are consistently logged, and determines whether a 
CSP provides a stable balance between security controls and customers’ needs requirements.  
2. Accountability: Accountability constitutes the acceptance of responsibility for the protection 
of assets between the CSP and cloud customer. It ensures that the obligations to protect data 
are clearly established and observed, particularly between the CSP who oversees security 
protection and the cloud customer who stores and process data in a CSP environment. 
Accountability creates the necessary commitment that requires CSPs to act as the responsible 
steward and takes responsibility towards safeguarding, managing and ensuring appropriate use 
of cloud customer assets, as well as being accountable for any misuse of cloud customer asset.    
3. Assurance: This is another vital component of security transparency that relates to the ability 
of the CSP to perform and fulfil specific or predefined security requirements of the cloud 
customer, as well as providing the confidence that security controls in the cloud environment 
will function as intended.    
4. Monitorability: Deals with the provision of automated processes for collecting and analysing 
information for the detection of suspicious activities or unauthorised changes to cloud customer 
requirements. Monitorability provides cloud customers with the capabilities to consistently 
identify or be alerted of any security breaches and risks to their assets residing in the cloud.  
5. Verifiability: Verifiability relates to the ability of cloud customers to independently validate 
or verify the implementation of security controls being supported and based on evidence 
provided by the CSP. It also relates to ascertaining how the CSP meets predefined cloud 
customer security.   
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4.5 Barriers to Transparency  
The notion of transparency has gained significant prominence across all human endeavours because it 
leads to greater accountability and often enhances trust. However, despite the benefits gained through 
transparency, several barriers can affect the delivery of transparency. Some of the obstacles of 
transparency identified in the literature include (Fox, 2007, Naurin, 2006):  
 Biased information: the partisan release of information that is non-objective or influenced by 
intrinsic motivation  
 Opacity: releasing information that is obscure in meaning, to intentionally mislead customers 
and affect their decision making  
 Inaccessibility: deliberate isolation of information, making it too difficult to access facts that 
influence customer decision making  
 Secrecy: conscious concealment of information to specific customers 
 Unequal access: depriving certain customers’ access to information in the same quantity and 
quality offered to other customers.  
 Immaterial information: providing customers with information that does not serve the 
intended purposes for which it is sought.    
 Spinning: providing customers with information that is biased and only favouring the CSP.      
 
4.6 Principles of Security Transparency in Cloud 
It is necessary to provide some guiding principles that are imperative for understanding security 
transparency. The justification for these principles is to establish the fundamental norms that represent 
what is desirable and affirmative in the general sense of information disclosure within the sphere of 
cloud computing. In other words, these principles govern the action of providing visibility and to inform 
cloud actors about the precepts they are expected to uphold in the delivery of transparency. These 
considerations impact the accessibility and quality of information released under a transparency 
initiative. According to Kosack (Kosack and Fung, 2014), there are some general guiding principles for 
transparency. Our research will adopt these principles and tailor them according to the cloud-based 
systems. 
 Availability. Availability means that information relating to occurrences regarding migrated 
assets should be available to the users. A monitoring system should be configured to stream 
real-time or near-real-time status information regarding customer assets and every action 
performed to those assets. 
 Clarity. Implies that information should be clear and precise for easy understanding. In other 
terms, clarity eliminates all elements of ambiguity so that information is delivered precisely, 
in a coherent and intelligible manner. The benefit of clarity is about helping a company utilise 
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information to reduce complexity and uncertainty so that analysis can be applied to identify 
a clear path forward. An example of this is represented by a scenario where a shared 
responsibility model for security provisioning is adopted. The CSP should clarify their 
responsibility in securing cloud infrastructure, while a user should take on the responsibility 
of securing data or applications integrated into that infrastructure. 
 Current. Means that the information should be up-to-date. Information should be regularly 
communicated to customers in real-time or near real-time flow for enabling the evaluation of 
actions about customer assets in the cloud. Also, the information should clearly state the 
timestamp and occurrences of activities about cloud-hosted assets. For example, anomaly 
detection in the cloud environment much depends upon current or real-time information. 
 Relevance. Information should be relevant to the context. Cloud systems consist of numerous 
virtual machines, hardware, operating systems and applications that provide valuable 
information. A disclosure must be pertinent to provide information from a variety of 
platforms. For example, if a company subscribes to information feed on cloud resource 
availability, the usage data of the cloud resource considered should be particularly shared 
with an organisation. 
 Notification. Information relating to security incidents, events, deviations, or occurrences 
that affect customer assets in the cloud should be appropriately disseminated to concerned 
customers so that they can evaluate the occurrences and optionally take action. For example, 
the presence of dedicated monitoring systems that detect security phenomenon and notify an 
organisation to take remedial actions or invoke an autonomous action. 
 Verifiable: The information generated by the CSP can be easily verified through supporting 
evidence, testing or any other form of analysis.  
 Free of Charge or at Low Cost. Information should be automatically compiled, organised, 
collocated and streamed to concerned cloud actors that subscribe information feed for free of 
charge or at a low cost.  
4.7 Categories of Cloud Security Transparency 
It is reasonable to identify the common categories at which security transparency is actualised in cloud 
lifecycle. The significance of this is to elaborately underline the situations where CSPs tend to be 
transparent and provide some clarity into how transparency is perceived. For instance, cloud users 
usually make cloud migration decisions based on public information (freely available to all in public 
domains) where a provider is unlikely to provide detailed information due to security concerns or 
privacy restrictions. More accurate and all-encompassing information (in individual contracts) is often 
provided when agreements are reached. Supposing the private information is the most critical and 
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relevant for decision and it is only made available after agreeing on a contract, the tendency this 
generates is that users might wrongly perceive the public information as being misleading or deception 
from the part of the CSP. We, therefore, classify the various forms at which transparency is articulated 
as shown in Figure 4.1  
Transparency Categories 
Proactive 
- Notifications  
- Reports 
Reactive 
- Requests
- Responses
Contractual 
- SLAs
- Contract Clauses  
Figure 4.1 Categorisation of Cloud Security Transparency 
 Proactive Transparency (Voluntary): Otherwise referred to as voluntary disclosure, stems 
from CSPs initiatives to make rudimental security information of their offerings available to 
the whole public without a request being filed, and the aim is to generate assurances using a 
multiplicity of methods ranging from notifications to reports (through mediums such websites 
and portals, benchmarks, whitepapers etc.). This disclosure is generally intended to uplift 
customer trust and confidence, assist customers to evaluate basic CSP control environment, 
demonstrate CSP conformance to regulatory or industry requirements, and also helps 
customers address some specific questions around general cloud computing practices. It does 
not reveal information that could jeopardise the security posture of a CSP or expose them to 
harm’s way. For instance, when a cloud user’s data falls under restrictions emanating from 
regulatory or compliance requirements, the choice of a CSP hinges on the contentment that the 
provider is fully compliant to the regulatory body; otherwise, there is the risk of violating 
regulatory, legal or other privacy requirements. The CSP counteracts customer contemplation 
through proactive disclosures to illustrate controls and certifications that reveal the reliability 
of their services at the preclusive cloud strategy stages. The benefits that accrue from CSP’s 
initiative to proactively disclose information are numerous. It ensures that cloud users are 
enlightened about the security management procedures applied to their resources while in the 
custody of the CSP. From another perspective, the ready availability of information ensures 
timely access to information that helps ensure the equality of access to information for all cloud 
customers including small, large and medium enterprises without the need to file special 
request, which is indeed associated with various sort of commitments. However, a supposed 
downside of this disclosure type is the possibility of a CSP to disclose inherently limited 
information, attempt to conceal damaging information that could tarnish its reputation, or even 
proclaim deceptive controls that give an impression different from the genuine environment.  
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 Reactive Transparency (Necessary): Reactive transparency emerges from a request-
response routine at the initial procurement phase between an organisation and the CSP for the 
latter to provide additional information. It may arise from legal or regulatory requirements that 
mandate CSP to disclose certain information during contract negotiations. Through a request-
response routine, a prospective cloud customer files requests for and receive information from 
an existing CSP. This mainly takes shape through two procurement methods, i.e. Request for 
Information (RfI) and Request for Proposal (RfP). To demystify the meaning behind each of 
the terms, RfI is a request to several potential CSPs to specify conditions, information 
gathering, or for cloud strategy purposes. It is mainly used when a cloud user has not identified 
their security requirements and need more information from a CSP to help them discover what 
steps to take next before negotiations commence. While an RfP is mainly employed when a 
cloud user has determined the scope of their security requirements or identified inherent cloud 
problems but is unaware of how to solve them, the CSP analyses the customer’s security 
requirements and responds with the actual existing alternatives in their offerings. Ideally, the 
RfP reflects the strategy, short and long term requirements of the customer while seeking 
specific information, security offerings and particular items which the CSP is proposing. 
Generally, the contents of a CSP response represent the actual settings or state of their 
offerings, rather than a meagre attempt to beat competition from other vendors, which indeed 
generates transparency into how individual requirements are distinctly addressed. The 
advantage of the request-response driven approach is its ability to enable cloud users 
exclusively specifies their security requirements for assessment and the identification of 
suitable controls by the CSP. However, it could be argued that it has become a traditional 
practice for CSP’s to publish frequent solicitations in public domains so that future cloud users 
do not have to file a request, saving time for both the CSP and the customers.  
 Contractual Transparency (Statutory): This implies a valid written agreement between a 
CSP and a customer where the provider observes complete disclosure of all essential security 
services strictly relevant to a particular cloud user while refraining from divulging information 
that could compromise the privacy of other customers. Service Level Agreements (SLAs) are 
useful tools widely used by both CSPs and their customers as a channel for ensuring 
transparency and establishing a common pact to manage the security requirements requested 
by a customer and the security levels being offered by a CSP, which becomes legally binding. 
Also, the SLA forms the basis for defining responsibilities and the remedies available for 
customers in case of a contract breach. The information contained in SLAs is usually broader 
in coverage than those found in proactive and reactive transparency schemes. The Fundamental 
aspects of the SLA are the representation of the contexts shared by the two actors, and how 
each actor utilises the contexts in its operations throughout the SLA lifecycle. In other words, 
the SLA provides a comprehensive description and transparent security processes for both the 
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CSP and customer to avoid uncertainty, apprehension and disputes. Conventional SLAs 
generally provide clarity on CSP service offers, unambiguous definition of expectations and 
obligations on both sides, and the boundaries of liability. Nevertheless, a notable limitation to 
this class of transparency is that essential security property of a customer may remain 
uncaptured. But despite this limitation, it still provides critical salient characteristics that 
support customer’s consideration for (i) security governance, legal and regulatory 
requirements, (ii) and allows customers to determine the impact of CSP offerings on business 
processes, including those changes required to enable the cloud services to be effectively useful 
to operate objectives.  
4.8 Cloud Security Transparency Deployment Practices 
Cloud security transparency works as a mechanism that contributes to improved operations and fosters 
the trust-building process among users. Information that is disclosed through the performance of 
transparency takes different dimensions. Some information disclosure eminently supports the cloud 
community in decision making while, in some cases, certain disclosures present inessential information 
that perhaps generates ambivalence. Thus, the idea of cloud security transparency can be unpacked from 
different dimensions as identified by Jonathan Fox (Jonathan Fox, 2010). It mainly falls into two 
categories: opaque and explicit transparency as illustrated in Figure 4.2: 
Transparency Deployments 
Opaque
- Ambiguity 
- Inconsistency 
- Unreliability 
Explicit
Unambiguity
- Consistency 
- Reliable 
 
Figure 4.2 Cloud security transparency deployment practices. 
 Opaque Transparency. Opaque transparency means that information is not well clarified. It 
involves CSP disclosing information that either partially represents its actual operational 
values or provides equivocal statements. It may also include inconsistent or unreliable 
information in terms of how controls are actualised in the cloud environment. For example, a 
CSP might claim to operate a service with security as a key principle through the 
implementation of consistent technical network security routines but then fails to genuinely 
demonstrate the application or actual implementation of significant secure network 
architectures and security devices that monitor and control communications at the key 
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boundaries within their environment. This would mean that transparent service is provided 
with virtually futile effects. 
 Explicit Transparency. refers to the disclosure and dissemination of information that 
represents a realistic implementation of CSP security control that precisely outlines the 
processes and procedures of how operations are securely managed. It provides a 
comprehensible elucidation on the CSP’s approach to ensuring the protection of company 
assets while in their control. This type of transparency is considered as most effectively 
attracting customer trust and confidence, as well as supporting accountability in the cloud. An 
example of explicit transparency would involve a CSP supporting a system that collects data 
related to the state or behaviour of customer assets and sends such data for onward analysis 
and evaluation by the concerned customer. 
4.9 The relationship between Categories of Transparency and Deployment Practices 
An overlapping relationship could be identified as existing between the transparency categories and its 
deployment practices. It could be argued that some CSPs provide the actual information that 
corresponds to their environment, while a proportion plausibly opt to provide false information to keep 
step with market competition, and others may attempt to conceal certain damaging information that 
could affect their reputation. 
Security Transparency 
Proactive Reactive Contractual 
Opaque Explicit Opaque Explicit Explicit  
Figure 4.3 Relationship between transparency categories and deployment practices. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates how each security transparency category is associated with one of the two 
deployment practices. For instance, a CSP may proactively provide transparency through security 
whitepapers regarding the security and compliance measures they have in place to protect customer 
assets. The CSP, nonetheless, may deploy an explicit security transparency practice to provide detailed 
information into their existing monitoring and prevention controls that prevent attacks, malware and 
other unauthorized activities while refraining from disclosures that expose them to risks. However, it 
may choose to deploy an opaque transparency practice to state the existence of security controls that 
either fail to capture the actual state of controls or are presented in an ambiguous form. Moreover, 
contention in this regard upholds the opinion that contractual security transparency is mainly associated 
with explicit deployment practice. This argument is supported by the fact that contracts are enforced by 
law and become legally bound once an agreement is reached between the CSP and the user. Thus, a 
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CSP is less likely to provide non-transparent or ambiguous disclosures that could result in ramifications 
and consequently lead to indemnifying its customers. 
4.10 Summary 
This chapter provides the fundamental properties and basics of security transparency. It presented a new 
definition of security transparency from a cloud computing perspective and essential areas of focus for 
security transparency in the cloud. Also, it offered the reasons for ensuring security transparency and 
how transparency can support businesses. The chapter also discussed the salient properties of cloud 
security transparency such as auditability, accountability and assurance, as well as the barriers that 
hinder transparency. Further, the principles and categories of security transparency are introduced 
which provide the basis for developing the CSTF. Importantly, the chapter introduced security 
transparency deployment practices that are also used in determining the level of security transparency 
offered by CSPs.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Cloud Security Transparency Framework 
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, an overview of the security transparency and audit framework is presented. The term 
framework is often used in various domains such as information systems design, business process, and 
software engineering, etc. By definition, a framework is a holistic set of abstracted ideas or rules that 
can be used to deal with or solve a particular problem (Succar, 2009). From software engineering 
perspectives, a framework is defined as a set of classes that embodies an abstract design for solutions 
to a family of the problem (Johnson and Foote, 1988). In general terms, a framework is defined as a set 
of concepts that layout key factors, constructs or variables and the presumed relationship among them 
(Zachman, 1987).  
 
The motivation for adopting a framework-oriented approach in this research is that it ensures a thorough 
elucidation and manageable implementation of conceptual ideas. It also helps in identifying and 
connecting conceptual components to ensure consistency, efficiency and effectiveness, as well as 
identifying interrelationships between these components. Therefore, the cloud security transparency 
framework presented in this chapter provides a logical representation and interrelation of salient 
concepts that are necessary for the implementation of a conceptual remedy. It follows three different 
levels of abstraction along with associated concepts within these levels. These levels build the bridge 
from the concepts necessary for transparency with the organizational settings and technical means for 
implementation 
 
Additionally, the framework incorporates many techniques for enhancing security transparency and 
concentrates on providing a comprehensive means for auditing assets outsourced to the cloud. It takes 
a high-level set of concepts, decomposes and associates them with each other to provide a level of detail 
that allows for clarity in implementation. To achieve coherence and consistency in the framework, 
concepts are modelled using a renowned methodology for requirements engineering called Secure 
Tropos (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007), that is based on the i* modelling (Yu, 1997), which uses the 
concepts of actors, goals and social dependencies for defining the obligations of actors (dependees) to 
other actors (dependers). Secure Tropos contains concepts such as constraints, security constraints, 
secure dependencies, secure goal, etc. In this way, concepts from Secure Tropos are considered and 
extended in identifying and forming concepts for the framework.  
 
In addition, a common vocabulary that is based on ontologies is used, which provides a reliable solution 
to achieve the desired objective of the framework. Ontology is defined as an explicit specification of 
conceptualisation that can be looked at as an abstract, simplified view of the world that is to be 
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represented by some purpose (Gruber, 1993). Ontologies are generally used for two purposes: for 
knowledge representations and knowledge retrieval. Ontologies also provide supplementary benefits 
such as reuse of domain knowledge, making domain assumptions explicit, and to analyse domain 
knowledge (Spyns et al., 2002).  The ontology-based approach enables the definition of concepts and 
their dependencies in a more understandable way. In summary, the reasons for the ontological approach 
in the framework development are: ontology ensures coherent conceptualisation of real-world domains; 
it enables the specification of the semantic relationship between various concepts; and provides a 
common understanding of the structured association between different concepts.    
 
5.2 Approach to Framework Development: Levels of Abstractions 
The proposed framework approaches to cloud security transparency from three different levels of 
abstraction — a conceptual view, organizational level, and finally at a technical level, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. Sitting at the top level of abstraction is the conceptual view that establishes and defines the 
various concepts that constitute security transparency in cloud computing. This layer aims to introduce 
a high-level elucidation of the foundation concepts that underpin transparency, which is indeed valuable 
for helping organisations have a comprehensive understanding of how cloud security transparency can 
be implemented at subsequent levels from an organizational and technical perspective. At the middle 
layer lies the organizational level, which is triggered by the concepts developed at the conceptual level. 
It introduces other vital concepts that are mapped at an organizational setting. In other words, the 
organizational level describes how the fundamental concepts formulated at the conceptual view are 
associated with other concepts from organizational perspective for ensuring an organisation’s 
attainment of security transparency. Lastly, the technical layer that lies at the bottom of the framework 
deals with the implementation of the conceptual view and the concepts at the organizational level from 
a technical outlook. The layer specifies the technical outlook in terms of the practical development and 
implementation of security transparency using audit technique using the concepts identified in the 
previous layers. The levels of abstraction influence each other and they are related in a way that supports 
the mapping of all the concepts at each level. 
What are the  necessary concepts for transparency?
How do the identified concepts support security transparency in cloud ? 
Conceptual level
What are concepts at the organization level to support security transparency 
in cloud ? 
How do the transparency concepts map within the organization setting?
Technical level
What are  the control  measures to realize security transparency?
How do CSPs support security transparency?
Organizational level
Le
ve
ls
 o
f a
bs
tra
ct
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n
 
Figure 5.1. Levels of abstraction for security transparency in the cloud. 
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5.3 Conceptual View 
Conceptual view implies the clear interpretation and explicit deconstruction of the abstract ideas or 
concepts needed to understand what a framework is, systems or components, what it does, how it 
addresses specific objectives, and how it is best used (Chen, 1976). The conceptual view attempts to 
accurately and precisely provide a meaning for and model the concepts in such a way that people 
without high-level knowledge can understand what constitutes security transparency. It also provides 
the essential foundation concepts that are used for the development of security transparency at 
organizational and technical levels. Regardless of the category at which it is articulated and the 
deployment practice being followed, it is paramount that security transparency encompasses factors that 
support its development and delivery between cloud actors. The identified concepts are given below: 
 
5.3.1 Actor 
An actor represents an entity (an organisation, a person or CSP), that participates in a process, performs 
a task, or carries out an action in cloud computing service delivery and consumption (Castro et al., 
2002). In other words, actors could be an organisation, functional department or people that are involved 
in providing, requesting or receiving transparency through many forms of information exchange. Actors 
are related and interact with each other in one or many ways. For example, an organisation can be an 
actor with many other actors such as staffs and clients that use the services provided by the organisation. 
The interaction between actors is established by factors such as delivery and consumption of services, 
exchange of information or the provision of supporting computing needs. The increased service 
orientation and the opportunities of service offerings offered by cloud computing platforms, as well as 
the emerging opportunities to integrate different cloud service components to create value-added chain 
have given rise to a set of new roles within the cloud realm. The information about actors and the nature 
of their relationships and interactions need to be identified and documented. The dimension of 
importance includes considerations such as the role played by each actor. This information is needed to 
interpret, manage and process the actor’s input. To provide an increased level of details, five major 
actors have been identified.   
5.3.2 Transparency Request 
Security transparency is viable when actors are supported to make decisions based on the information 
provided by the CSP. The purpose of transparency request is to allow an actor to seek for and receive 
information about: the capabilities of another actor to fulfil requirements, the efficacy of an actor 
controls, and the events or incidents that affect migrated assets within the cloud environment. 
Transparency request is initiated by an actor seeking real-time, log data or documented information 
about cloud systems and operations, particularly information that discloses how actor’s requirements 
can be fulfilled and how operations are being carried out. The core of this concept is enabling an actor 
to wholly seek and collect information needed to support their operations, thereby constituting the need 
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for an explicit rather than opaque transparency. In most cases, actors (CSPs) exclusively deploy 
transparency mechanisms such as web portals as a means of making information about its operations 
available and which can satisfy transparency requests initiated by organisations. It is noteworthy to 
highlight the distinction between transparency requests and requirements concept (at an organizational 
level). Transparency requests do not independently support the description of the organisation’s 
requirements; it rather solicits details on how requirements are fulfilled and how incidents or events that 
affected organisation’s assets are reported; whereas, the requirement concept aims at enabling the 
specification of the most relevant security requirements to the assets of an organisation. 
 
5.3.3 Mechanism  
A mechanism is defined as the communication platform being adopted for the provision or disclosure 
of relevant security information about an actor’s operational processes. The term is used to imply an 
actor using initiatives such as security and audit reports to make operational, technical or procedural 
information available, detailing how it conforms to governing rules and ensuring security controls. 
Furthermore, a mechanism is predominantly the fore attribute that triggers the conceptualisation of other 
concepts because it presents first-hand information in areas of standard security practices and 
management of cloud services. 
 
5.3.4 Evidence 
Evidence refers to the submission of relevant electronic, documentary or other specific reports that are 
provided by an actor to substantiate its transparency mechanisms. The aim is to enable the actor to 
produce any forms of system, user, or application activity reports and on the general security status of 
organisation assets within the cloud environment. Another crucial aspect of the evidence is to support 
actors to perform a check and verification of disclosures against their transparency needs to purposefully 
determine the integrity of an actor’s response to requests. 
 
5.3.5 Accessibility 
Information accessibility is paramount in achieving transparency and it focuses on the ability of actors 
to access meaningful information relating to cloud controls, operations and satisfaction of requirements. 
Transparency cannot be achieved if an actor withholds information from other actors. Therefore, 
accessibility encompasses the degree to which an actor can easily locate information. It also involves 
the credence for an actor’s transparency mechanisms and evidence to be made requisitely available, 
accessible and locatable to all organisations. While making information accessible, CSPs must ensure 
that the quality of information is maintained and free from problems such as err, bias, and 
incompleteness. 
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5.3.6 Liability 
This is the state of being legally responsible for the provision of transparency, i.e. an actor becomes 
legally answerable for the contents of information supplied to other actors. An actor that is held liable 
for disclosure becomes lawfully responsible for rendering agreed redress in non-fulfilment or 
misstatement of information. For example, if contractual agreements have been reached between a CSP 
and an organisation for the former to provide 99% service availability, they become legally liable to 
ensure such and redress the organisation in the event of a failure to meet the target. 
 
5.3.6 Monitoring 
This is the ability to observe and check the quality of the information provided. To substantiate the 
accuracy of disclosure, it must be observable by other actors by, for example, analysing evidence 
generated by a transparency mechanism being supported by an actor. In other words, monitoring is a 
function of processes that can be used to establish the effectiveness of the internal operations of an actor 
by observing the content in evidence. 
 
5.3.8 Verifiability 
This is the degree to which disclosure can be confirmed to be existent and to establish its accuracy. This 
concept allows other actors to validate whether observable properties comply with agreed expectations 
or requirements. It ensures that the materials presented are made truthfully and reflect genuine 
credibility about perceived quality. 
 
CSC ACTOR
Transparency 
Request
CSP ACTOR Mechanisms Evidence
Monitorability
Verifiability
results from
enables
performs
Sent to 
supports generate
initiates
achieves
Liability 
Accessibility 
inherent to 
 
Figure 5.2 Conceptual Model of Cloud Security Transparency. 
Figure 5.2 provides an insight into the conceptual view of security transparency. An actor (an 
organisation) initiates a transparency request to another actor (CSP) soliciting for transparency on their 
operational practices, security controls, and the overall cloud service environment, relating to assets and 
measures taken to fulfil requirements. The CSP, on the other hand, supports mechanisms for 
transparency as a way of making vital information regarding operational processes available. A 
mechanism is characterised by various means for information disclosure, which is literally used to 
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disclose customary security practices and the status of customer assets within the cloud environment. 
The responsibility to support a mechanism may either be one-sided or shared amongst the two actors. 
This is commonly noticeable in situations, for instance, public clouds where a CSP is responsible for 
supporting mechanisms of transparency, whereas in specific setups such as private clouds an 
organisation is solely responsible for security administration and control of information. 
 
Additionally, the mechanism generates evidence to provide status reports on the condition of the CSP 
environment and assets belonging to an actor. For the evidence to yield significance, it must possess 
the qualities of being monitorable and verifiable for establishing the genuineness or truthfulness of 
disseminated information according to the perceived quality and expectations of an actor. Therefore, the 
organisation verifies the transparency mechanism through monitoring, thereby providing the avenue to 
verify disclosed information. 
 
5.4 Organizational Level and Ontological Modelling of Concepts  
The organizational level is based on the foundation concepts identified at the conceptual level. It is 
intended to ease the implementation of security transparency at the technical level. For example, an 
organisation at the conceptual view initiates a request for transparency demanding additional security 
information about the CSP’s security practices. The CSP responds to such a request by disclosing 
information through mechanisms for transparency such as independent third-party audit reports or 
security whitepaper. Before the request for information is sent, an organisation ought to apply some 
essential analytical steps such as: identifying their goals, assets and requirements, etc. The adoption of 
a common terminology of the concepts at the organizational level will help in understanding the 
concepts and the overall implementation of the process. A good starting point for establishing and 
elaborating these concepts in detail is through the application of ontology-based conceptual modelling.  
 
Ontology enables the conceptualization of a specific domain of interest into machine-readable form 
(Giaretta and Guarino, 1995). It is as defined by Spyns et al (Spyns et al., 2002),  as the description of 
knowledge as a set of concepts within a domain and the relationship that holds them together. In other 
definition, ontology is an entwined hierarchy of concepts that presents an explicit description of 
concepts within a particular domain, related properties describing various features and attributes of the 
concept, and restrictions (Antoniou and Van Harmelen, 2004). An ontology may be domain-specific, 
i.e. addresses a specific aspect of a domain, it can also be task-oriented for achieving a particular task, 
or it may be generic with a focus on high-level concepts (Stevens et al., 2000). In terms of application, 
an ontology can be used as a basis for software development, as common information access for humans 
and applications or as an application-neutral knowledge base (Stevens et al., 2000). The complexity of 
ontology varies, from a vocabulary that consists of a list of concepts to logic-based knowledge that 
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contains concepts, instances, relations and axioms for providing reasoning services (Lambrix and Tan, 
2005).  
 
The organizational level comprises many concepts that are built upon the concept of actors, goals, 
threats, risk analysis, requirements etc. Ontology is used to provide an explicit knowledge-based 
understanding of the attributes, relationships, restrictions and rules between the concepts. The ontology 
is supported by formal semantics for knowledge representation using rules and logic-based formalism 
that aim at laying the basis for automated deduction. Such formalisation eradicates vagueness and 
ambiguity, and thus ensures consistency for computational purposes.   
 
One of the fundamental logical formalisation techniques used for knowledge representation is first-
order logic (Smullyan, 2012) and it is chosen in this thesis to present logic as a form of knowledge 
representation for the concepts of security transparency. The benefits of first-order logic are that it 
allows the description of concepts, objects or things that have an individual identity, and to construct 
logical formulas around these objects using predicates, variables, functions and logical connectives 
(Russell and Norvig, 2016). This means that natural language statements or rules regarding the concepts 
can be expressed in terms of coherent sentences with appropriate predicate and function symbols.    
 
By using semantic rules and logical representation for each concept, the focus is placed on the graphical 
visualisation of the ontologies to aid their assessment and analysis. One technique that can be used is 
graph visualisation, which supports comprehending the structure of ontologies. Hence, Protégé is used 
to graphically visualise the ontologies because it provides an intuitive editor for ontologies and other 
extensions for ontology visualisation. Protégé is one of the most widely used free, open-source ontology 
editor that was developed at Stanford University (Noy et al., 2001). Using Protégé, concepts of the 
security transparency framework are organised in a generalisation hierarchy through “is-a” links 
(inheritance). Each concept consists of zero or multiple sub-concepts. Also, each concept has an object 
(relationship) and data (characteristics) properties to describe the various features of the modelled 
concepts.   
 
5.4.1 Actors  
The elucidation of actors provided at the conceptual level produced a broad or general meaning of actors 
that are not specific to any context. However, the demotion of actors at the organizational level takes a 
different purpose by focusing on the roles played by various entities based on a specific context. 
Therefore, actors are the entities whose interests are taken into account at the organizational level. It is 
a pivotal activity that yields useful and accurate information about the individuals or group of people 
that are involved, have vested interest or play a vital role within an organizational context. Actors are 
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highly significant in enabling an organisation to manage the process of the framework, as well as 
preventing potential misunderstandings or conflict of interest. In general, an organisation must identify 
actors that are actively involved from both within and outside including the role played by each actor. 
Organisations usually have different types of actors with different interests, duties, tasks and priorities. 
Actors are identified according to internal and external actors. Internal actors are people who are 
committed to serving the organisation such as an information security analyst, the board of directors, 
etc. External actors are entities outside an organisation such as the CSP who provide various forms of 
computing services. The listing of actors varies and will be determined in every organisation according 
to its volume of activities and resources.   
 
Table 5.1: Rule-Based Knowledge Representation of Actors 
[∀x.(actor(x) → ∀x(can be(x,y) ∧ internal(y)) ∧ external(e))] 
[∀x.(InternalActor(x) → ∀x(can be(x,a) ∧ keyPersonnel(a))  ∧ tOPMANAGEMENT (b)) ∧ otherUsers(b))] 
[∀x.(ExternalActor(x) → ∀x(can be(x,a) ∨ CloudProvider(a))  ∨ CloudBroker (r)) ∧ CloudAuditor(z))] 
[∃x.(KeyPersonnel(x)→∀a(can be (x,a) SecurityAnalyst(a)) ∧  SecurityAuditor(b) → ∀z canPerformAudit (z,x))] 
[∃x.(CloudProvider(x)→∀a(provides(x,a) ∧ IaaS(a)) ∧ (provides(x,b) ∧ PaaS(b)) ∧ (provides(x,i) ∧ IaaS(i))] 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Ontology of Actors  
5.4.2 Assets 
Assets are any application or software owned by the organisation that is used in the course of executing 
or managing business functions. This concept involves the identification of an organisation’s assets in 
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terms of the assets that are hosted in the cloud environment. Assets are profiled to include categorisation 
according to asset criticality, security goal and supported business function to the organisation. The 
relevance of this is to help the organisation to have a common, consistent, and unambiguous 
understanding of asset boundaries, clearly designated asset goals, a description of how the asset is stored 
or processed, and an opportunity to determine the asset’s criticality. The asset has four important 
attributes:  
Table 5.2: Rule-Based Knowledge Representation of Assets 
[∀x.(asset(x) ⊨∀x(contains (x,a) → ∧ assetProfile(b,x))  ∧ Criticality (y,x) ∧ gecurityGoals (z,x)))] 
[∀x.(SecurityGoal(x) ∃∀x(contains (x,a) → confidentiality(c,x))  → Integrity(i, x) → availability (a,x) → accountability 
(y,x) → conformance (z, x))] 
[∀x.(Criticality(x) ∃!∀x(can be(x,a) ∧ high (h,x))  ∧ low (l, x) ∧ medium (m,x))] 
[∀x.(AssetProfile(x) ∀x(consistOf (x,a) ∧ data(d,x))  ∧ hardware (h, x) ∧ software (s,x) ∧ businesProcess (b, x)))] 
[∀x.(AssetProfile(x) ∀x(can be (x,a) ∧ ∀xdata(d,x))  ∧ transactional (t, d) ∧ metadata(m,d) ∧ master (s,d)  ∧  logs (l,d)))] 
[∀x.(AssetProfile(x) ∀x(can be (x,a) ∧ ∀xhardware(h,x))  ∧ network(n, h) ∧ storage(s,h) ∧ servers(v,h)))] 
[∀x.(AssetProfile(x) ∀x(can be (x,a) ∧ ∀xsoftware(s,x))  ∧ vm(v, s) ∧ application(a,s) ∧ os(o,s)))] 
 
Figure 5.4: Assets Ontology  
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 Asset Profile: describes the necessary descriptive and information about the many 
components of all assets belonging to the organisation. Assets are profiled in a register to 
give a clear understanding of all assets and their subcomponents. 
 Security Goals: each asset has a specific goal that must be maintained in order to ensure the 
protection of the asset and conformance to secure behaviour. Asset goals are established 
using five key areas related to information assets, including confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, accountability, and conformance.   
 Asset Criticality: criticality is the primary indicator used by the organisation to determine 
the importance of the asset to the business. The criticality of an asset category can be highly 
critical, moderately critical or low criticality. Assets are highly critical if they have the most 
valuable to the organisation, a moderately critical rating represents a moderate value; while 
low criticality means little value to the organisation.  
 Supported Business Process: business processes are structured activities or tasks backed by 
assets to serve a particular business objective or produce a service or product. Each asset is 
related to the specific business function that it supports.  
 
5.4.3 Risks 
Risks are the potential events, activities or attacks that could potentially compromise the security of 
assets, security goals or business process leading to a loss or negative impacts. A Risk can affect an 
asset when vulnerabilities, flaws or weaknesses within the system or its environment can be exploited 
by threats such as natural or human factors to cause harm. The purpose of this concept is to identify the 
risks facing the assets, security goals and business process, as a result of threats exploiting the 
vulnerability. It also determines the likelihood of the risks to materialise and the potential consequences 
or impact of the risk attack. The risk concept also serves to provide a holistic overview of security 
measures that can be used in controlling or mitigating the risks. It consists of:  
 Threats: threats are potential dangers that might exploit a vulnerability within the cloud 
ecosystem and cause possible harm to one or many asset components to deter security goals or 
hinder the business process. Each risk is associated with a specific threat, and the threats are 
categorised to evaluate their severity to assets. Also, threats are considered from different 
sources that elaborate more about security threats associated with cloud computing such as 
ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency, 2009)    
 Risk Likelihood and Impact: the likelihood of occurrence and the possible impact or 
consequences of risks to the organisation are determined. Risk likelihood represents the 
probability that a given risk will occur. Risk impact refers to the consequences and extent to 
which an organisation is affected if a risk is realized.   
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 Control Measures: security measures are the safeguards or counter-measures that must be 
implemented to avoid, detect, counteract or minimize the impact of risks to assets or business 
process of the organisation. Control measures are identified based on the recommendations of 
industry guidelines and standards. Primarily, CSC CIS (Centre for Internet Security, 2018) and 
ENISA (ENISA, 2016) are used to identify actionable controls measures.   
 
Table 5.3: Rule-Based Knowledge Representation of Risks 
[∀x.(risks(x) ⇒∃y.(contains(r,) ⇒ threatsProfile(p,x) ∨ riskRegister(q,x) ∨ controlMeasures(y,x)))] 
[∀x.(threatsProfile(x) ⇒∃(has(r) ⇒ category(p,x) ∨ targetAsset(q,x) ∨ threatsname(y,x) ∨ threatID (q,x) ∨ severity(z,x))] 
[∀x.(severity(x) → ∀z(canbe(q) → (low(q,x)  ∧ medium (r,x)  ∧ high(y,x))] 
[∀x.(targetasset(x)  → ∀z(canbe(q) → hardware(r,x) ∧ software (s,x) ∧ data (z,x))] 
[∀x.(impact(x)  → ∀z(affects(q) → businessprocess(r,x) ∧ securitygoals(s,x))] 
[∀x.(controlmeasures(x) → ∀z(contains(y) → cnotroltype(q,x) ∨ specification (s,x))] 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Risks Ontology  
5.4.4 Requirements  
Requirements imply vital security needs for safeguarding assets and enabling security transparency. 
Requirements also refer to a set of conditions, capabilities or quality features that must be provided or 
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satisfied by the CSP to ensure the security of cloud services hosting organisation’s assets, achieving 
transparency, overall safety safeguard of assets and delivery of business operations. An organisation 
identifies and clearly defines the essential requirements that safeguard assets and which are vital to 
achieving transparency. Requirements are formulated from different dimensions and describe more 
concretely the essentialities that must be satisfied to assure the security of assets. Requirements are 
derived from industry standards and best practices such as CSC CIS (Centre for Internet Security, 2018), 
CSA CCM (Cloud Security Alliance, 2017a). 
 Transparency Requirements: these are related to measures taken for establishing confidence 
about the existence of transparency principles and mechanisms that enable an organisation to 
verify whether assets are being safeguarded and cloud systems are working as intended.  
 Basic Requirements: these are a set of actions that establish fundamental, specific and 
actionable procedures, or process for ensuring the safety of assets and prevention most 
pervasive risks.  
 Business Requirements:  these refer to a set of actions and procedures that ensure an 
organisation acts under a set of rules, policies, and comply with applicable regulations. 
 Operational Requirements: these encompass a set of procedural, governance and administrative 
actions that are enforced for ensuring comprehensive operational security in a cloud 
environment.      
 
 Table 5.4: Rule-Based Knowledge Representation of Requirement 
[∀x.(requirement(x)) ∀x(has(x,a) ⇒ assetProfile(q,x))  ∨ assetType(y,x) ∨ Controls (z,x)))] 
[∀x.(requirement(x) ⇒ (requirementType(x,q)  ⇒ operational(q,x))  ∧ business(y,x) ∧ transparency(r,x) ∧ basic (z,x))] 
[∀x.(requirement(x) ⇒ (assetType(x,q) ⇒ application(q,x)) ∧ software(y,x) ∧ data(s,x) ∧ basic (r,x) process(z,x))] 
[∀x.(requirement(x) ⇒ (Controls(x,q) ⇒ domain(q,x)) ∧ type(y,x) ∧ specification(q,x) ∧ ID(r,x)))] 
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Figure 6.6: Requirements Ontology 
5.4.5 Assess CSPs 
Before cloud migration takes place, a CSP’s comparison and assessment exercise are used to guide the 
selection of a CSP amongst many commercially available CSPs with the sole aim of identifying a 
trustworthy CSP that provides sufficient transparency mechanisms and who have the assurances to 
satisfy requirements. The comparison and assessment mainly aim at assisting an organisation in 
matching their requirements to appropriate CSPs according to operational, business, transparency and 
basic requirements. The assessment also helps organisations to reflect on the CSP’s security profile 
decision making.    
 Collect CSP Information: information about CSPs security transparency profile and assurances 
are collected to support a judgement based on credible evidence of a CSP’s transparency. 
Various information sources such as whitepapers, CSP whitepapers, etc. are used for 
information collection in respect of transparency, business, basic and operational requirements     
 Perform Assessment: multiple CSPs are compared and evaluated according to a set of questions 
formulated in accordance with the principles of security transparency, a measurement metric 
and an equation that have been specifically designed to support the assessment. The criteria 
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consider security transparency types (opaque and explicit) that are assigned to CSPs for 
determining the type of transparency they provide.     
Table 5.5: Rule-Based Knowledge Representation of Assess CSP 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Ontology for Assess CSPs 
5.4.6 Evidence 
An Evidence takes two perspectives: the first involves affirmations from the CSP before cloud 
migration takes place, which specifies the existence of acclaimed security controls and transparency 
mechanisms that provide an overview of how customer requirements can be met, and which are needful 
for assessing CSP offerings. The other perspective of evidence is meant for supporting the security audit 
exercise, and evidence in this dimension represents data, records, assertions or additional information 
that is collected to conduct security audits and in particular, relevant to the requirement that is being 
audited. This type of evidence provides a reasonable basis for arriving at conclusions and forming audit 
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opinion findings. In general, the evidence presents a detailed representation of the actual control 
implementations by the CSP in the areas of transparency, business, operational and basic requirements 
for the CSP to sustain and meet organisation’s expectations.  
 
Table 5.6: Rule-Based Knowledge Representation of Evidence 
[∀x.(evidence(x) ∀xfor(a) → securityaudit(y,x) ∧ beforemigration(z,x))] 
[∀x.(evidence(x) ∀x(requires(r) → evidencetype(q,x) ∧ evidencsource(y,x))] 
[∀x.(evidencetype(x) ∀x(canbe(r) → complianceAccreditation(c,x) ∧ securityLogs(z,x))] 
[∀x.(securitylogs(x) ∀x(canbe(r) → applicationLogs(a,x) ∧ userActivityLog(u,x) ∧ eventLog(e,x) ∧ systemLog(s,x) ∧ 
errorLog (e,x) ∧ otherLog(z,x))] 
[∀x.(compliance/accreditation (x)→ evidenceType(x))] 
[∀x.(evidencetype(x) ∀x(canbe(r) → complianceAccreditation(c,x) ∧ securityLogs(z,x))] 
[∃x.(securityLogs(x) → applicationLog(a,x) ∨ userActivityLog(u,x) ∨ eventLogs(e,x) ∨ systemLog(q,x) ∨errorLogs(e,x) 
∨otherLogs(z,x))] 
[∃x.(evidenceSource(x) → automatedLog(s,x) ∨ cspPortal(c,x) ∨ whitepaper(w,x) ∨ userExperience(u,x) ∨ auditReport(q,x) ∨ 
cspAttestation(z,x))] 
[∃x(requirement(x) → business(q,x) ∨ basic(r,x) ∨ transparency(y,x) ∨ operational(z,x))] 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Evidence Ontology  
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5.4.7 Security Audit 
Security audit entails the evaluation of a CSP’s infrastructure, policies and operations for determining 
the effectiveness of systems, processes, and controls, and as well as to the conformance of asset 
requirements. The objective of this concept is to enable an organization understands the pervasive effect 
of incidents and other related activities on assets and associated business processes, understand the 
controls that the CSP uses to manage and control assets, conclude on the effectiveness of CSP controls, 
recommend the implementation of corrective actions, changes and improvements where needed. 
Additionally, the exercise performed in this concept are guided by professional audit standard such as 
ISA 200 (ISA, 2016). The crucial components associated with this concept include:  
 Auditable Requirements: involves the determination of the range of requirements that are 
covered during the audit process such as transparency, business or operational requirements.  
 Audit Evidence Collection: relevant and reasonable evidence is obtained to support an auditor 
in making judgements and conclusions regarding the requirements and areas of controls under 
audit. Audit evidence refers to the implicit claims, and assertions, cloud system generated 
reports and representations supplied by the CSP to manifest how customer requirements are 
met and how security is achieved. Audit evidence are collected and analysed to draw reasonable 
audit conclusions based on which audit outcomes are formed. Two primary types of audit 
evidence can be obtained:  security logs and certifications/accreditations. Each evidence type 
contains a list of other evidence.  
 Audit Report/Findings: Audit reporting deals with drawing conclusions and developing a report 
to communicate findings, outcomes, and the actions to be adopted for improving controls or 
adding controls in response to each requirement that is audited. The audit report is formed based 
on the provisions of the ISA 700 standard (International Standard on Auditing, 2016). Audit 
findings are drawn based on defective, acceptable or effective practice. Defective practice 
implies substantial disparity between audit criteria and CSP evidence; acceptable practice 
indicates similarity but contains gaps or weaknesses in specific areas; whereas effective practice 
involves a considerable correlation between audit criteria and evidence.  
 Remedial Actions: remedial actions are constructive recommendations issued by the auditor 
when the audit findings substantiate significant improvements in operations and performance 
of the CSP. Recommendations focus on areas where noncompliance to requirements is noted 
or significant weaknesses in controls are found. Action plans are mainly directed at resolving 
the cause of identified problems using corrective, detective or preventive actions.   
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Table 5.7: Rule-Based Knowledge Representation of Security Audit 
[∀x:∃y:(securityAudit(x) → require(r,x) ∧ collectEvidence(y) ∧ auditableRequirement(q) ∃stoenable(s,x) → performAudit(z))] 
[∀x::(securityAudit(x) → requires(r,x) ∧ collectEvidence(y) ∧ auditableRequirement(q) ∃s toenable(s,x) → performAudit(z))] 
[∀x:(collectEvidence(x) ∨ requires(r,x) ∨ evidenceType(y) ∨ evidenceSource(r) → securityAudit(x))] 
[∀x:(evidenceType(x) → canbe(y,x) ∨ securityLogs(s)  ∨ complianceAccreditation (r))] 
[∀x:(evidenceSource(x) → canbe(y,x) ∨ automatedLogs(a)  ∨ whitepaper(w) ∨ webportal(p) ∨ userExperience(u) ∨ 
cspattestation(c) ∨ auditReport(z))] 
[∀x(auditableRequirement(x) ∧ canbe(y,x) → business(b) ∧ basic(r) ∧ transparency(r) ∨ operational(z))] 
[∀x(performAudit(x)  →  has(y,x) ∨ conformanceLevel(r) ∨ auditCriteria(c) ∨ auditReport(z))] 
[∀x(auditReport(x)  → ∃ycontains(y,x) ∨ remdialActions(r) ∨ auditJudgement(z))] 
[∀x(remedialAction(x)  → canbe(y,x) ∨ correctiveControls(s) ∧ preventiveControls(y) ∧ detectiveControls(z) ↔ canbe (s,y,z))] 
[∀x(auditJudgement(x)  → canbe(y,x) ∨ acceptablePractice(r) ∧ defectivePractice(s) ∧ effectivePractice(y) ↔ ¬canbe (r,s,y))] 
[∃x(conformanceLevel(x)  → canbe(y,x) ∨ veryHigh(v) ∧ high(h) ∧ medium(m) ∧ low(l) ∧ veryLow(y) ∧ nonconformity(z) ↔ 
¬canbe (v,h,m,l,y,z))] 
[∀x(auditCriteria(x)  → completeness(q) ∨ sufficiency(r) ∨ understandability(s) ∨ accuracy(x) ∨ reliability(z)))] 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Security Audit Ontology  
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Table 5.7: Rule-Based Knowledge Representation of Security Transparency 
[∀x(actor(x) → cambe(y)  →  internal(q) ∧ (external(z) ¬ canBe(q,z))]     
[∃x(actor(x) → internal(q) → perform(r,x) → securityAudit(a) ∨ identifyRisk(r) ∨ assessCSP(s) ∨ collectEvidence(e) ∨ 
identifyRequirement(z))]    
[∀x(asset(x) → canBe(r) ∧ data(d) ∧ software(s) ∧ hardware(q) ∧ process(p) ↔ canBe (r,d,s,q,p))]   
[∃x(actor(x) → external(e) → provide(p) → IaaS(I) ∧  PaaS (p) ∧ IaaS (y) ↔ provide(I,p,y))]     
[∀x(asset(x)  → ∃ycanHave(y,x)  ∧  securitygoals(s) ∨ requirements(r)  ∨ criticality(c))] 
[∀x(securityGoals(x) → ∃ycanHave(y,x) ∧ confidentiality(c) ∧ integrity(t) ∧ availability(a) ∧ accountability(r) ∧ 
conformance(n) ∧ canBe(c,t,a,r,n))] 
[∀x(criticality(x) → canBe(y,x) ∧ high(h) ∧ medium(t) ∧ low(z) ¬canBe(h,t,z ))] 
[∀x(risk(x) → obstructs(y,x) ∧ securityGoals(q) ∧ assets(z) ↔ obstructs(q,z))] 
[∀x(controls(x) ∧ ∃ymitigate(y,x) → risks(r))] 
[∀x(requirement(x) → ∃yinclude(q,x) ∧ transparency(t) ∧ basic(b) ∧ business(s) ∧  operational(o) ∧ include(t,b,s,o)  → 
protect(r.x) assets(z))] 
[∃x(actor(x) → internal(s) ∧ impose(s,x) ∧ ∃yrequirement(r))] 
[∀x (actor(x) → external(s) ∧ ∀yconform(c,x) → requirement(r))] 
[∀x(actor(x) → externall(e) ∧ ∃yprovide(p,x) ∧ evidence(y) → satisfy(s.x) assessCSP(r))] 
[∀x(actor(x) → externall(e) ∧ ∃yprovide(p,x) ∧ evidence(y) → satisfy(s.x) requirement(r))] 
[∃x(actor(x) → internal(s) ∧ asses(c,x) ∧ ∃CSP(r,x) ∧ beforeMigration(q) ∨ securityAudit(z))] 
[∃x(actor(x) → external(s) ∧ provides(r,x) ∧ ∃evidence(e) → support(y,x) assessCSP(q) ∨ securityAudit(z))] 
[∃x(evidence(x) → canBe(c.x) ∧ beforeMigration(q) ∧ securityAaudit(z))] 
[∀x(actor(x) → externall(e) ∧ ∃yprovide(p,x) ∧ evidence(y) → satisfy(s.x) assessCSP(r))] 
[∀x(actor(x) → externall(e) ∧ ∃yprovide(p,x) ∧ evidence(y) → satisfy(s.x) performAudit(r))] 
[∀x∀y(evidence(x,securityLog) ∧ evidence(y, complianceAccreditation) → evidence(x = y))]  
[∀x(evidence(x)→ beforeMigration(y) ¬ support(s,x) assessCSP(z))] 
[∀x(evidence(x)→ securityAudit(y) ∃ysupport(y,x) performAudit(z))] 
[∀x(assessCSP(x)→ requires(r,x) assessmentCriteria(y) ∨ principleOfTransparency(p) → ∃!select(s) ↔  CSP(q,x))] 
[∀x∀y∀z(assessCSP(x)→ canHave(c,x) ∃!assessmentResult(r,x) → opaque(y) ∧ explicit(z) ¬ canHave(c,r))]   
[∀x(securityAudit(x) → canHave(c,x) ∃performAudit(y) → auditReport(s) ∨ conformanceLevel(c) ∨applyAuditCriteria 
(z))]   
[∀x∃!z(CSP(x) → ∃!canHave(c,x) ↔ conformanceLevel(z,x))]      
[∃x(actor (x) → internal(a)  ∃canSpecify(c,x) remedialActions(z))]  
[∃x(CSP(x) → mustImplement(c,x) ∃remedialActions(z))]  
[∀x(CSP(x) ∨ auditJudgement(r, AcceptablePractice) ∨ auditJudgement(n, effectivePractice) → transparent (z))] 
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Figure 5.10.  Ontology for Overall Security Transparency Concepts  
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Figure 5.11. A meta-model for security transparency at an organizational level. 
The meta-model in Figure 5.11 shows an overall view of the concepts at the organizational level and 
their relationships. An actor could be an organization that is interested in cloud services offered by a 
CSP. At the preliminary stages of cloud adoption, the organization performs an appraisal of the 
stakeholders, both internal and external, that will be actively involved, or whose interest should be taken 
into account in the transition to a cloud environment. The identification of actors is essential not only 
for determining the roles played by actors but also for the implementation of the framework’s process. 
An organization owns a wide range of assets that require several security goals for supporting the 
business process. As a result, assets that are critical to operations are comprehensively profiled to 
include the security goal every asset must achieve, the business process supported by assets, and 
importantly, the criticality of each asset to the organization. Also, assets are usually connected to one 
or many forms of risks, especially as a result of adopting cloud services. An organization systematically 
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identifies the risks that could potentially affect assets, associated threats, including a prioritized 
estimation of the likelihood, impact of security risk scenarios and the security measures that can be 
applied to controlling to risks. Diversely, CSPs, implement necessary technical and non-technical 
controls for safeguarding customers’ assets, as well as transparency mechanisms for divulging 
information to customers regarding operational practices. In addition, the CSP adopts proactive or 
reactive transparency mechanisms to generate evidence in various forms to support potential customers’ 
access to information regarding CSP services or provide existing customers with essential data, system 
or application report that can assist customers in performing on-going verifications to conformance of 
expectations. An organization considers CSP evidence and specifies specific requirements that must be 
met. Therefore, requirements are specified from different viewpoints such as transparency, basic, 
operational and business requirements. The requirements specified become the prioritized areas that the 
organization continuously evaluate after migration to the cloud. Therefore, the evidence must be 
provided by the CSP regarding how such requirements are being satisfied. This is where monitoring 
plays a significant role and the primary purpose monitoring is to track the status of the requirements, 
user and system activities and generate many forms of reports that are shared with the organization. The 
reports subsequently serve as evidence that is subject to vetting using a security audit. The security audit 
is aimed at producing a clear audit report based on findings from evidence to establish how well 
requirements are met and how controls are operated.   
5.5 Technical Level 
This is the final level of abstraction in the framework that is mainly influenced by the organizational 
level. As stated earlier, the organizational level provides essential concepts that support the 
understanding of how security transparency can be achieved, including the relevant methodology for 
attaining security transparency. Thus, the primary focus of the technical level is to describe the technical 
means for realising transparency. This consistent flow further illustrates the connection and 
interdependence between the three levels of abstraction that can be viewed from a conceptual view, the 
organizational level down to the technical level. However, before we dwell into that, it is imperative to 
briefly highlight some essential conventional initiatives or mechanisms that can be utilised to achieve 
security transparency at the technical.   
 
 
 
67 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Means of Security Transparency at Technical Level  
5.5.1 Compliance Programs 
CSPs increasingly use compliance programs as mechanisms for demonstrating transparency through 
conformity with many traditional standards that predominantly focus on certifying the composition and 
management of security practices in their environments. Consequently, CSPs earmark a significant 
monetary budget for ensuring security and spend a sizeable amount of resources and time into 
compliance with security standards such as ISO 27001/27002, Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standards (PCI DSS), and other relevant standards. 
 
5.5.2 Self-assessments 
CSPs have realised the obligation to provide satisfactory transparency of their services to organisations. 
They often conduct a discretional self-assessment of their services by employing control objectives 
specified in frameworks that document and certify best security practice within their environment to 
provide transparency to customers. Self-assessments are usually free and open to all CSPs. One such 
framework is CSA STAR Certification that embarks on a three-levelled certification scheme to certify 
CSP’s compliance with its set of security guidance and control objectives. 
 
5.5.3 Security Policies 
CSPs enforce security transparency policies that make them committed to making information available 
to the public on demand. CSPs consider access to information a key component of active participation 
of all organisations. Transparency policies are often enforced through an Information Disclosure Policy, 
which is guided by the underlying principles of accountability and openness concerning operational 
programmes and customer-related aspects. 
 
5.5.4 Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
Another important technique for ensuring adequate disclosure of information involves the use of SLA. 
The SLA is a binding contract between the CSP and their customers, which specifies customer 
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requirements and the CSP commitment to fulfilling them. It clearly describes the security 
responsibilities and liabilities between the two parties, states the service performance and delivery, 
problem management, legal compliance, etc. 
 
5.5.5 Security Monitoring  
Security monitoring involves processes enabled by the CSP for the systematic collection and analysis 
of events of interest relating to customer data to respond to security incidents of interest, as well as 
providing a great structure to predict future security-related issues. A well-structured cloud security 
monitoring supports timely dissemination of security occurrences to interested actors for a decision on 
the appropriate course of action that ought to be taken. Security monitoring also plays an essential role 
of enhancing accountability and mutual trust using making CSP accountable for security violations that 
emerge as a result of deficient controls in their services, helps customers detect a breach of SLA 
contracts, and helps in the gathering of evidence to validate the security claims of a CSP. On the part 
of a CSP, it empowers the capturing of the current security state of cloud systems; deviations from 
expectations and the monitoring of clients’ activities to ensure malicious use of resources are prevented.  
 
5.5.6 Third-Party Audit 
This is another type of transparency mechanism that materialises in the form of a systematic and 
objective examination of CSP premises, which is mostly initiated by an independent auditor appointed 
to appraise the CSP environment physically.   
 
5.6 The Adoption of Audit as a technique for Security Transparency 
The research adopts security audit as the technique for achieving security transparency at the technical 
level. A specially built Security Transparency Audit Tool (STAT) is designed to serve as a platform on 
which an organisation can probe the activities of a CSP by seeking information about specific 
requirements and receiving evidence about the extent to which CSP fulfils the requirements. STAT is 
designed to enable organisations to leverage a dedicated security audit checklist that focuses on the 
many aspects of organisation’s requirements to probe CSP and receive evidence that is analysed to form 
an audit judgement regarding CSP’s conformance to requirements.  
This process is enabled through a query-response approach that is initiated and controlled by the 
organisation where the CSP responds to a request by supplying relevant evidence. STAT also enables 
customers to receive alerts when specific requirements are met using a communication protocol for 
message-oriented middleware based on XML (extensible Mark-up Language). The tool additionally 
provides an assessment facility that can be used to assess.  
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It is important to emphasize that STAT mainly proposes a unified, standardized API to present 
measurement results related to CSP conformance. As such, the audit tool does not cover the actual 
monitoring infrastructure and related technologies that are used to gather, store and analyse events to 
produce these measurement results. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
Process for Security Transparency 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents an overview of the underlying process involved in the cloud security transparency 
framework. Primarily, the process aims to introduce different phases of activities that organisations can 
follow for understanding and strengthening cloud transparency by looking at essential considerations 
such as identifying roles, assessing risks, and evaluating CSP controls. The process will also help 
organisations to build a cloud migration profile from scratch to the end, meaning that they will be able 
to complete the transition to the cloud and also have the ability to validate whether expectations are 
being met by the CSP continuously. Therefore, the principal beneficiaries of the framework and its 
process are organisations (including public or private establishments) who aspire to or have the 
responsibility for security transparency and data protection. Hence, it is essential to emphasize that the 
framework does not focus on individual cloud users who usually do not have as much obligation 
towards security transparency, diverse requirements and responsibilities as organisations.  
A crucial aspect of the process is that it provides methodical activities for developing an efficient cloud 
migration approach that is mainly security transparency-oriented, and which provide a roadmap for 
organisations to achieve security transparency. The core of the process includes several diverse 
activities and steps to help guide key decision points about organizational context, cloud transition 
activities, potential risks, control measures, as well as the verification of CSP compliance to security 
controls. It helps in identifying and interlinking cloud migration components for ensuring efficiency, 
effectiveness and consistency within different areas.     
Another essential feature of the process is that most of the activities are formed by considering a variety 
of leading industry best practices, frameworks, guidelines and standards that are generally applicable 
to all organisations regardless so their size or the sector in which they operate.  This implies that the 
process is all-encompassing in nature, and not tailored to a specific organisation type or solution, but 
built upon high-level considerations to ensure important cloud adoption issues are not overlooked.  
6.2 Cloud Security Transparency Framework Process: A Unified Approach 
The process for the security transparency framework is simply a unified approach that leverages existing 
industry standards to assist organisations in attaining security transparency by ensuring that every step 
and activity is performed according to generally accepted security principle. Sections of renowned 
industry standards, guidelines, frameworks and models were applied across different activities within 
the process by looking at specific features within the standards and where they can be applied in the 
process. For example, CIS CSC and ENISA are used for identifying risk control measures. This is 
because CIS CSC provides 20 controls categorized into three prioritized and defence-in-depth best 
practices that are implementable to mitigate attacks against systems and networks. Some of these 
71 
 
controls are relevant to cloud security transparency, while others are less relevant. Further, ENISA 
provides 27 baseline security controls that are more CSP-oriented and focuses on control measures that 
protect cloud computing systems against operational risks. As a result, a parallel matching is performed 
for identifying semantic equivalence between controls in CSC CIS and ENISA. Besides, Microsoft has 
proposed a structured approach for analyzing the security of systems and application namely: DREAD 
and STRIDE models. Such models enable the identification, classification, rating, comparison and 
prioritization of security risks associated with systems and applications, and these two relevant models 
have been adopted for threat analysis. OWASP methodology is also used for determining the impact of 
risks because it estimates risks from business process and technical perspectives, and it is highly 
adaptable and applicable to most organizations of all sizes. In identifying relevant risks, risk sources 
from ENISA and OWASP are considered mainly because the latter maintains a regularly-updated list 
of most pressing cloud security concerns, and the former provides a list of 35 risks that fall under 
categories such as technical, organizational, legal and non-cloud specific. Also, in the course of 
specifying requirements, CSA STAR is adopted because it provides sixteen essential security principles 
that serve as a guide to CSPs and also provides organisations with the structure to achieve asset security 
in the cloud-tailored environment. In the audit activity, ISAE 3402 and ISO 19011:2018 is used mainly 
because it sets forth internationally accepted guidance on conducting and managing audit program that 
applies to all organisations that need to conduct security audits. An overview of the different standards, 
frameworks, and models and the features or aspects derived from them is provided in figure 6.1.  
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Figure 6.1: A Unified Approach to Cloud Security Transparency
Unified Approach of the Process 
Risk Management 
Requirements Specification  CSA CCM 
Threats Profile  
STRIDE: used for categorising threats  
DREAD: used for rating and prioritising threats 
Risk Register  
OWASP Top 10 Risks 
ENISA Cloud Risks used as sources for identifying risks 
Technical  
Organizational 
Legal  
Non-cloud specific 
Risk Control Measures 
CIS CSC  
ENISA Cloud Controls 
Basic 
Foundational  
Organizational  
Risk Management 
Third Party Management 
Physical and Environmental Security  
Security of Supporting Utilities 
Integrity of Information Systems & Network Components 
Continuous Vulnerability Management 
Controlled Use of Administrative Privilege 
Secure Configuration for Hardware & Software 
Maintenance, Monitoring & Analysis of Audit Logs 
Malware Defences 
Control of Network Ports, Protocols & Services 
Email & Web Browser Protections 
Secure Configuration for Network Devices  
Data Protection 
Controlled Access 
Account Monitoring and Control 
Application Software Security   
Incident Response Management 
Penetration Tests  
Operating Procedures 
Change Management 
Asset Management 
Business Continuity  
Monitoring and Logging 
Compliance 
Interoperability & Portability  
Customer Monitoring and Log Access 
Application & Interface Security  
Audit Assurance & Compliance 
Business Continuity Management 
Change Control & Configuration  
Data Security & Information Lifecycle 
Datacentre Security Asset Management 
Encryption & Key Management  
Governance & Risk Management  
Human Resources  
Identity & Access Management  
Infrastructure & Virtualisation Security  
Interoperability & Portability  
Mobile Security  
Security Incident Management & Forensics 
Supply Chain Mgmt., Transparency & Accountability 
Threat & Vulnerability Mgmt. 
Security Audit  
Audit Evidences ISAE 500 Standard  
Evidence Collection  CSA CAIQ (Checklist) 
Supply Chain Mgmt., Transparency & Accountability  
Identity & Access Mgmt. 
Infrastructure & Virtualisation Security  
Audit Assurance & Compliance 
Application & Interface Security  
Datacentre Security 
Encryption & Key Mgmt. 
Identity & Access Mgmt. 
Human Resources 
Business Continuity Mgmt. & Op Resilience 
Security Incident Mgmt., e-discovery & Forensics 
Governance & Risk Mgmt. 
Threat & Vulnerability Mgmt. 
Interoperability & Portability  
Change Control & Configuration Mgmt. 
Audit Performance   
ISA 200-700 
SAS 70 
Audit Reporting ISA 700 
73 
 
6.3 Security Transparency Framework Process  
From the perspective of the research, a process is considered as a structured set of activities that are 
executed towards accomplishing security transparency. A process establishes a strong relationship 
between multiple steps for effective delivery of expected outcome. An activity deals with 
interdependently linked tasks that receive and convert one or more input into an output artefact (Knight 
and Burn, 2005, Beer, 1984). The process provides a means of contextualising an organisation, profiling 
risks, eliciting, and examining security requirements. The intent is to integrate distinct considerations 
into a complete exercise at the early stages of cloud computing adoption. The process manifests 
efficiency and adequacy for analysing the security aspects of cloud adoption and has the potential for 
enhancing trust and assurance in cloud services. 
The process also provides an overview of essential phases that an organisation has to take into account 
when adopting cloud solutions with security transparency in mind. For simplification purposes, the 
process is decomposed into 3 phases, and each phase contains many activities and steps that provide a 
lower level of detail, as outlined in Table 6.1. The division of the process is imperative in creating a 
comprehensive set of related activities that allow organisations to identify and achieve deliverables for 
security transparency. Phase one (context analysis) focuses on the scope of the organisation for gaining 
a comprehensive understanding of supported assets, their functions and essential security requirements. 
Phase two provides a security transparency-oriented decision support for assessing CSP transparency 
level and selection of cloud offerings. It is important to emphasise that Phase Two of the process is 
optional and is mainly intended for organisations that are at the early stages of cloud adoption and 
pondering on the selection of a suitable CSP that is capable of supporting security transparency. In other 
words, Phase Two is developed to facilitate the selection of commercially available CSPs based on the 
provider’s support for security transparency. Various cloud offerings must be compared and assessed 
based on security transparency capabilities before cloud adoption. Therefore, the step could be 
inessential for organisations that have already evaluated CSP offerings. Lastly, phase 3 deals with the 
application of a systematic audit process for determining CSP conformance to security requirements 
prescribed by an organisation. Each activity specifies the steps that need to be followed, and each step 
identifies the needful inputs, participating actors and final output.  
Primarily, the output of each activity serves as the input to the next activity that follows it. The efficacy 
of the process is mostly achieved when conducted with the support of primary and a team of security 
auditors and experts delegated by an organisation to oversee the cloud migration project. Hence, an 
organisation must delegate suitable actors to participate in and supervise the implementation of the 
process.    
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Table 6.1: Security Transparency Framework Process 
Phase Activity Steps Input Technique Performed by   Output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase One: 
Context 
Analysis 
 
 
Activity 1: 
Stakeholder 
Analysis 
Identify Actors Grouping of actors according to 
internal and external. Internal actors 
represent the respective roles and 
responsibilities of 
personnel/departments within an 
organisation. External actors include 
stakeholders that are involved in the 
delivery of cloud services.  
Examining job profile, duties, roles and 
responsibilities of actors   
Cloud user  A defined list of actors and their 
roles   
      
 
Activity 2: 
 Define 
Organizational 
Context  
Assets Profiling An overview and list of organizational 
assets detailing assets core 
functionalities and subcomponents.  
Review of asset inventory, audit reports, 
security policy, interviewing cloud users 
and physical observation of assets  
Security Analyst and Cloud 
Users 
Description of assets, functions, 
and subcomponents owners, 
criticality and required level of  
protection  
Identify the security 
goals of assets  
Existing asset profile Combination of asset control principles 
and the organisation’s security policies   
Security Analyst and Cloud 
Users 
Enumeration of security goals 
and principles that each asset 
must achieve for sustained 
operations of the organisation 
Determine asset 
criticality  
Agreed upon asset profile and goals.   Employing asset criticality ranking using 
impact value and weight score to 
determine criticality level  
Security analyst  Consistent and unambiguous 
classification of assets according 
to the criticality level to the 
organisation’s processes and 
functions.    
Identify business 
process 
Business operational structure and 
type of services provided  
Review of existing processes, facilitated 
workshops and interviews to collect 
information  
Business  Analyst and 
Security Analyst  
A description and alignment of 
business processes to 
organizational goals and assets.  
      
 
Activity 3: 
 Risk 
Management 
Determine Threat 
Profile 
Organizational assets and goals, list of 
threats and vulnerabilities provided by 
ENISA and CSA  
Employing Microsoft’s STRIDE and 
DREAD models for threat analysis.   
Security Analyst  A comprehensive threat profile 
detailing potential threats to 
assets categorisation and 
determination of threats 
according to STRIDE and 
DREAD models,   
Create a Risk 
Register 
A collection of security risks from 
OWASP, CSA and ENISA that are 
associated with the threats identified, 
including implementation controls 
from CSC CIS.  
Application of OWASP risk methodology 
that estimates risks from business process 
and technical perspectives estimates risks 
likelihood, risk impact, and control 
measures 
Security Analyst  A detailed risk register 
highlighting risks, impact, 
likelihood, rating and 
recommended controls 
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Activity 4:  
Requirements 
Specification  
Specify security 
transparency and 
other requirements  
Consideration of security 
transparency, business process, 
operational and basic security 
requirements according to the 
provisions of CSA CCM  
The use of recommended and predefined 
categorisation of requirements that can be 
specifically tailored to an organisation’s 
needs.  
Security Analyst  Requirements specification 
Matrix prioritising must be 
present in cloud controls to 
provide a secure environment 
and security transparency  
       
Phase Two 
(Optional):  
CSP Security  
Assessment 
and Selection  
 
Activity 5:  
Assess CSPs 
Collect CSP 
Information before 
Migration  
Information from multiple CSPs 
based on certain types, and 
specifically, how they can support the 
attainment of transparency, business, 
basic and operational requirements.   
A detailed search of CSP web portals, 
security whitepapers, CSP attestation, 
audit report, industry accreditation and 
certification.   
Security Analyst  Formal and explicit declarations 
from CSPs affirming the 
implementation of security 
control procedures and 
processes according to the 
organisation’s requirements.  
Assess CSP Security 
Transparency 
Declaration and attestation from CSPs 
on security controls, procedures and  
processes 
Assessment questions and criteria that 
enable the ranking of CSP capability of 
delivering security transparency  
Security Analyst  Determining the type of 
security transparency provided 
by CSPs based on the opaque or 
explicit criterion  
       
 
 
Phase Three:  
Security 
Audit and 
Reporting   
 
 
Activity 6:  
Security Audit 
Define Security 
Requirements to be 
Audited 
The list of security requirements 
identified in activity 4. 
Facilitated a preliminary survey of the 
final list of security requirements    
Security Auditor  The depth and areas of controls 
and requirements that will be 
covered in the audit  
Collect Evidence for 
the requirements to be 
audited 
The requirements and areas of CSP 
controls to be examined and assessed 
A manual technique involving a 
questionnaire derived from CSA’s 
Consensus Assessments Initiative 
Questionnaire (CAIQ). An automated 
technique for analysing evidence. 
Security Auditor The collected set of 
documentary evidence to 
support the drawing of the audit 
opinion.   
Perform Security 
Audit 
Documentary evidence provided by 
the CSP and logs and reports generated 
by automated monitoring tools  
A metric and scorecard for analysing, 
examining and comparing evidence 
against a criterion for quality evidence 
provided by SAS 70  
Security Auditor  Determining the level of CSP 
conformity to security 
requirements and ensuring 
adequate controls in their 
environment.  
Generate Audit 
Report 
The result of findings based on 
examining and analysing CSP 
evidence  
Manual and automated documentation of 
findings  
Security Auditor  Provide actors with unbiased 
and reasonable opinion on the 
adequacy, effectiveness and 
conformity of CSP relating to 
controls defined in the audited 
requirements. 
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6.3.1Activity 1: Stakeholder Analysis 
According to Goodpaster (Goodpaster, 1991), a stakeholder is any entity with a conceivable interest or 
stake in an activity. A stakeholder can be an individual, group of individuals or an institution affected 
by or who can influence the impact of an activity. The Stakeholder analysis involves the identification 
of major actors, an assessment of goals, and how they impact the cloud adoption and its viability. 
Stakeholders are actors such as top management, administrators, etc. who are directly or indirectly 
involved in influencing the success of the organization and its processes. The relevance of this activity 
is to obtain a comprehensive picture of actors and their roles in meeting requirements. This becomes 
important in identifying potential conflict of interests and other issues such as the actors responsible for 
the design, development, and maintenance of cloud-bound assets.  
6.3.1.1 Step 1.1: Identify Actors 
Actors are the entities that will contribute to the cloud migration-related decisions. Actors interact with 
the cloud system or relationship with one another through actions such as providing technical and 
nontechnical support or services to the organisation. The nature of interactions between actors needs to 
be clearly interpreted, balanced, reconciled and managed accordingly. Actors are identified based on 
their input for ensuring the success and delivery of operations for the organisation, as well as those that 
are ultimately affected by the transition of backend organizational asset to the cloud such as employees 
of an organisation. To optimally carry out an organisation’s transition to the cloud, an organisation must 
identify who the key actors are. In this case, actors can be identified according to internal and external 
actors. Internal actors include the organisation itself and skilled personnel who play different roles 
within an organisation such as a security analyst, risk manager etc. External actors mainly include the 
CSP and other third-party that provide some form of services to the CSP. Table 6.2 provides a listing 
of actors and their roles. However, the listing of actors varies and will be determined in every 
organisation according to its volume of activities and resources.  
  Table 6.2 Actors, and Roles  
Internal (Organisation) External (CSP) 
Actor Role Actor Role 
Cloud user (CU) Represent the organisation that 
owns information and assets for 
whom cloud services are created to 
support and who maintains a 
business relationship with a CSP. 
Cloud users represent the 
functional areas within an 
organisation, such as the business 
department, IT departments.    
CSP Represents an organisation or an 
entity that is responsible for making 
a service available to an organisation. 
CSP builds and manages the 
requested platform or infrastructure 
service, and ensure the security 
protection, privacy and privacy of an 
organisation’s assets, and provides 
the fulfilment of agreed-upon 
transparency and security 
requirements of an organisation.     
Security Analyst 
(SA) 
Responsible for identifying cyber 
threats and establishing plans and 
controls to protect assets. Also 
responsible for performing 
vulnerability testing, risk analysis 
and security assessment activities.  
Cloud service  
auditor 
An independent third-party that 
conducts assessments of cloud 
services, information system 
operations, and performance and 
security implementations within 
cloud services.  Cloud auditor also 
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performs an unbiased evaluation of 
cloud security controls to determine 
the extent to which controls are 
implemented correctly, operating as 
required, and produced desired 
outcomes as per the requirements of 
an organisation.      
Internal Security 
Auditor (Sec Aud.)  
Probes the safety and effectiveness 
of security controls and related 
security components of assets. 
Also, plans, execute and lead 
security audit, including evaluating 
the efficiency, effectiveness and 
compliance of business processes 
with organisation requirements, 
including generating a written 
report on audit findings.  
Cloud service 
broker 
Represents a third-party business or 
individual that acts as an 
intermediary between an 
organisation and the CSP. An 
organisation may decide to request 
cloud services from a broker instead 
of directly contacting a CSP, in 
which case the cloud broker manages 
the use, performance and delivery of 
cloud services, as well as negotiating 
the relationship between an 
organisation and the CSP.  
 
6.3.2 Activity 2: Define Organizational Context:    
Each organisation is unique and usually operates within a defined scope and available resources. To 
successfully execute the process and achieve a sound cloud adoption, it is essential to perceive each 
organization from within its operational context. Organizational context tends to establish a better 
understanding of the current state of the organisation. Tailoring the cloud migration to organizational 
context helps an organisation to ensure essential cloud migration factors are considered, and in general, 
increase the likelihood of success. It is the second activity of the process because it is pivotal to relate 
security transparency from operational perspectives succinctly. Therefore, the chief information 
security officer (security analyst) who has significant familiarity with the organisation’s line of business 
and the need behind the adoption of cloud services to examine the essence of the organisation’s use of 
assets while considering the laws and regulations binding on the organisation that may limit the use of 
information in the context of cloud services, critical nature of asset for the organisation to function, and 
the level of protection for the assets. The primary output artefacts of this business process details 
involving four steps:   
6.3.2.1 Step 1: Assets Profiling  
The basis of this step is to profile assets in terms of their boundary, components, and assigning weight 
to the assets based on assets important to the organization. Assets are specific units such as a database, 
application or program that support the delivery and usage of services offered by an organization. To 
create asset profiles, a Security Analyst is involved in identifying assets by considering assets’ core 
functions, alongside other subcomponents that are essential to achieving and maintaining crucial 
functions. Important asset information can be gathered by reviewing background materials, including 
independent audit/analytical reports, interviewing cloud users, and physical observation of 
organizational assets. Also, asset specification and management documentation provide important 
details about the organizational asset.  
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6.3.2.2 Step 2: Identify Security Goals of Assets  
Security goals are specific attributes, which are also referred to as security principles; they describe 
assets’ expected conformance to secure behaviour. Identifying security goals is an essential 
consideration to allow an organisation to determine what critical tenets of security must be ensured each 
asset during storage, processing or transmission, by authorised systems, applications or individuals. 
Also, security goals are used in determining the impact that may result from accessing assets in an 
unauthorised manner for use, disclosure, interruption, change, etc. Therefore, the Security Analyst 
considers a set of security goals that each asset aims to achieve. By doing this, the consequential impact 
that may ensure the compromise of the security goals and the level of protection needed can be easily 
determined. We have defined a set of asset security goals every asset must aim to achieve such as:   
 Confidentiality: Assets must be protected from disclosure or exposure to unauthorized 
individuals or systems. Confidentiality ensures that only those with predefined rights and 
privileges to access an asset can do so. A breach to confidentiality is the unauthorized access, 
disclosure or manipulation of the asset.     
 Integrity: Assets must be guarded against unauthorized modification and alteration. The 
integrity of asset is compromised when it is exposed to illegitimate modification, alteration, 
damage, destruction or disruption of its authentic state.  
 Availability: Assets must be accessed only by authorized users or systems without interference 
or obstruction. Assets must be available when requested, and if interrupted, the asset must 
recover and continue secure operations without adverse side effects.  The loss of availability 
is the disruption of access or use of an asset 
 Accountability:  Requires the tractability of actions, attack or incidents that occur to an asset 
to the responsible system or actor. It must be ensured that an authorized actor or an attacker 
who acts cannot deny involvement.  
 Conformance:  Assets must operate as intended without variation to expected behaviour, 
functions and regulatory requirements. The asset must be secured from vulnerabilities that can 
be exploited to cause unwanted behaviour. Any breach or deviation from specified behaviour 
constitutes nonconformance.    
6.3.2.3 Step 3: Determine Asset Criticality  
It is highly imperative to determine the criticality of all assets that are migrated to the cloud by 
performing a criticality assessment. The criticality assessment provides the foundation on which an 
organisation can identify control measures and requirements. In other words, the assessment aims at 
assessing the criticality for each asset. Asset criticality is imperative for prioritising and developing 
actions that will reduce risks to the asset, improve asset reliability, as well as defining cloud strategy in 
terms of the suitable cloud deployment and service model that should be adopted. In doing so, the 
primary security goals of an asset are assessed and the consequences of loss of the security goal 
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established using two factors as criteria: Impact on Business Process (IBP) and Impact on Goals (IoG). 
Therefore, the criticality assessment of all assets is carried out by a team of experts, with good expertise 
of knowledge of the organisation’s business process and assets.   
To ensure validity, consistency and support stakeholders in assessing asset criticality, a decision support 
system using Fuzzy Set Theory is created. A fuzzy set theory provides a way of absorbing the 
uncertainty inherent to phenomena whose information is unclear and uses a strict mathematical 
framework to ensure precision and accuracy, as well as the flexibility to deal with both quantitative and 
qualitative variables (Zimmermann, 2011).  
6.3.2.3.1 Fuzzy Asset Criticality System  
A Fuzzy Asset Criticality System (FACS) is developed (Figure 6.2) which uses IoG and IBP as two 
fuzzy inputs for assessing the level of criticality (LoC) of individual assets. FACS comprises two fuzzy 
events that serve as the system inputs, i.e. IoG and IBP, one inference engine with 25 IF-THEN rules 
based on Mamdani (Cordón, 2011) and Sugeno (Sugeno, 1993) approaches, with one crisp output after 
the de-fuzzification process.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Fuzzy Asset Criticality System 
6.3.2.3.2 Fuzzy Inputs and Outputs  
IoG and IBP are used as two fuzzy inputs, assigned to five fuzzy labels respectively as shown in Table 
6.3 and 6.4. The five labels for IoG are VH, HG, MD, LW, and VL, while the five labels for IBP include: 
NI, LI, MI, SI, VI, respectively. For comparison reasons, corresponding scores are illustrated in the left-
hand column of the tables to show how they are used in FACS. 
Furthermore, the corresponding membership functions for the fuzzy set are also defined. A triangular 
membership implies membership function that is used for IoG and which gives numerical interpretation 
to each fuzzy set. On the other hand, membership functions for IBP are represented to provide a 
numerical connotation for each fuzzy set for IBP.       
 
Fuzzy Input One: IoG 
25 IF-
THEN 
Asset 
Criticality   
Output One: LoC 
 
Fuzzy Input One: IBP 
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Table 6.3: Fuzzy Labels for IoG 
Score  Impact on Goals (IoG) Fuzzy Labels  
0 Very High  VH 
1 High  HG 
2 Medium MD 
3 Low LW 
4 Very Low VL 
 
Table 6.4: Fuzzy Labels for IBP 
Score  Impact on Business Process (IBP) Fuzzy Labels  
0 No impact on business process   NI 
1 Low impact on business process LI 
2 Moderate impact on business process MI 
3 Serious impact on business process SI 
4 Catastrophic impact on business  CI 
 
Table 6.5: Fuzzy Labels for Levels of Criticality (LoC) 
Crisp 
Score 
Fuzzy 
Score 
Level of 
Criticality 
Fuzzy 
Labels 
0 ≤ 0.5 Low  L 
1 0.5 <  ≤ 1.5 Medium  M 
2 1.5 <  ≤ 2.5 High  H 
3 2.5 < Very High  H 
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Figure 6.2: Membership Functions using Mandani Approach  
6.3.2.3.3 De-fuzzification and Crisp Output  
The IF-Then rules are presented in a matrix form (as shown in Table 6.6), which uses the labels of one 
input in rows and the label of another input variable in columns. Cells in the matrix contain output labels 
that indicate the possible output resulting from a specific combination of rows and columns. Therefore, 
using IoG and IBP as inputs, LoC is generated as output, as shown in Table 6.6.  
Table 6.6: Matrix for Asset Criticality Classifications  
            IoG 
IBP 
VH HG MD LW VL 
NI L L L M H 
LI L L L M H 
MI L L M M H 
SI L M M H H 
VI L M H H (VH) 
 
The LoC for each asset (according to Very High, High, Medium, Low) is mainly obtained using 
minimum-maximum inference, which considers the minimum of the antecedents of the maximum for 
aggregation and defuzzification. Hence, the LoC for each asset falls under one of the four categories 
from low to very high as defined in Table 6.5 
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6.3.2.4 Step 4: Identify Business Process  
A business process is a set of structured and measured activities designed to produce specific outputs 
for an organization. The business process aims to identify the operating process of an organization, 
including a review of existing processes and aligning them with assets to discover how cloud services 
can support operations. Our method of the business process consists of organizing facilitated workshops 
and interviews with strategic management to identify and collect information relating to functional 
business processes of the organization. The business processes identified are used to create a link with 
the usage of assets.  
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Table 6.6 Asset Inventory    
Asset ID Asset Name Asset Description Business Process Asset Goals Asset Criticality Required Protection 
Low Medium High Low Medium High 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
84 
 
6.3.3 Activity 3: Risk Management  
Risk management activity focuses on identifying and measuring risks related to the assets, as well as 
identifying essential controls for mitigating the risks. The Security Analyst performs this activity. Based 
on the assets identified in the previous task, all possible threats that could negatively impact the assets 
are profiled in a register. However, effective identification and control of threats require an 
understanding of threat sources, adversary behaviour, capability and intent (Workman et al., 2008). 
Only through an understanding of threat landscape can an organization have enough knowledge about 
the nature of threats they face and the control measures to implement. In other words, a holistic 
understanding of threats enables a more effective prioritization of control actions and decision making. 
This is possible when categorization is used to allow an organization to understand and create a threat 
profile expansively. Because of these considerations, the thesis has created two steps for risk 
management involving: (i) the determination of threat profile; and (ii) creation of a risk register. 
6.3.3.1 Step 1: Determine Threats Profile     
Determining the threat profile is vital because it allows the identification and understanding of threat 
characteristics. The determination of threats requires a structured representation of threat information 
that is expressive and all-encompassing due to the dynamicity of the cloud environment. A Security 
Analyst must use a sound approach that enables the gathering of valuable insights based on the analysis 
of situational and contextual threats that can be tailored to the organisation-specific threat landscape. A 
method that could be used is Microsoft’s models for the threat model called STRIDE (Swiderski and 
Snyder, 2004) and impact rating called DREAD (Shostack, 2008).  
STRIDE is an acronym formed from the first letter of Spoofing Identity, Tampering, Repudiation, 
Information Disclosure, Denial of Service and Elevation of Privilege that is used for describing known 
threats according to the type of exploits that are used.  In addition, DREAD stands for Damage potential, 
Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, and Discoverability. By using DREAD model, the 
impact rating for a given threat can be determined.  
Hence, the Security Analyst could explore publicly available sources of threat information. For 
example, we recommend that threat information approved by ENISA (ENISA, 2009) and CSA (Top 
Threats Working Group, 2017) be followed because there are several threats identified in these two 
sources. Moreover, using the STRIDE and DREAD models, actors use the following procedure to create 
a comprehensive threat profile: 
 Identify Threats: the potential threats of assets that a threat agent may leverage to attack an 
asset.  The Security Analyst needs to back up his claim with a solid foundation of Information 
sources.  
 Categorize Threats: after threats and vulnerabilities have been identified, the STRIDE 
methodology should be used to categorize and evaluate threats according to the goals and 
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purposes of the attacks. By using this classification of threats, the Security Analyst can 
determine the category of a threat. This will provide the ability to create an impact rating for 
threats. STRIDE consists of the following categories:  
o Spoofing (S): attackers masquerade as a legitimate user, system or application element.  
o Tampering (T): attackers modify or tamper assets in transit or in-store. 
o Repudiation (R): attackers perform actions that cannot be traced.  
o Information Disclosure (I): breach or unauthorized access to a critical asset.  
o Denial of Service (D): attackers disrupt or interrupt normal operations of the asset.  
o Elevation (E): attackers obtaining access privilege to an asset without legitimate 
authority.  
 Target Asset:  targets systems include software, applications or configurations that are targeted 
and subject to exploitation by a threat. 
 Determine the Severity of Threat: after threats are categorized according to STRIDE, the 
threats are rated using the DREAD model. DREAD provides a set of questions that can be 
applied to a scoring scheme to quantify the severity presented by threats. The questions include:  
o Damage Potential (D): how extensive is the damage potential?  
o Reproducibility (R): how easy it is for the threat to be repeated or reoccur?  
o Exploitability (E):  how easy is it to launch the threat?  
o Affected Users (A): what is the estimate of users that will be affected?  
o Discoverability (D): how easy is it to discover the threat?  
 
The Security Analyst can use the above questions to rate the severity of each threat. The questions can 
also be extended to meet an organization’s need. To apply the DREAD model, a rating table is used 
with corresponding values of 3, 2 and 1 to represent (3) high, (2) medium and (1) low respectively. 
Table 4.4 shows the rating values that can be used by the Security Analyst when determining the 
severity of threats. The values (between 1 and 3) are counted for each threat. The result falls within the 
range of 5 – 15. The threats with the overall ratings of 12-15 can be treated as having ‘High Severity’, 
8-11 as ‘Medium Severity’, and 5-7 as ‘Low Severity’. 
Table 6.7: Threat Severity  
Rating  3 (High) 2 (Medium)  1 (Low) 
Damage Potential (D)  The threat agent can 
compromise the security 
of an asset 
Exposure to a critical asset  Minor exposure to the critical 
asset  
Reproducibility (R)  A threat can be 
reproduced at any time to 
compromise an asset  
The threat can be reproduced, 
but only when the 
opportunity is presented to 
compromise an asset  
The threat is very unlikely to 
be replicated.  
Exploitability (E) A novice threat agent can 
easily compromise the 
asset within a short time. 
A skilled threat agent can 
compromise the asset, and 
can easily repeat the steps 
The attack requires a highly 
skilled threat agent, with in-
depth knowledge and 
resources  
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Affected Users (A) All users within the 
organisation and other 
customers  
Some users and customers A tiny proportion of users, and 
it is unlikely customers will be 
affected  
Discoverability (D) Vulnerabilities in the asset 
are very noticeable and 
can be easily exploited  
Weaknesses in the assets are 
rarely discovered.   
Vulnerabilities are hardly 
present and rarely discovered.  
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Table 6.8: Threat Profile 
Threat 
ID 
Threat Name Description  Threat Category  Target Assets Threat Severity 
S T R I D E D R E A D 
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6.3.3.2 Step 2: Create a Risk Register  
The output of threat profiling provides a list of potential security threats and the impact on assets. The 
threat register serves to help a Security Analyst to orchestrate the creation of a risk register and focus 
on the most potent threats. A risk register is an important document that provides a tentative record of 
potential risks in line with threat profile, assets and security goals. It will also enable the determination 
of how those risks are likely to occur, the severity of the risks, the steps to be taken for controlling or 
managing the risks, etc. (Höne and Eloff, 2002). Essentially, the Security Analyst defines an approach 
that makes it possible to identify, accurately estimate risks and make an informed decision about risk 
control actions. This will help in ensuring that minor risks are not prioritized while more severe risks 
are overlooked.   
To ensure consistency and relevance of risks and their impact, we recommend that the Security Analyst 
use the OWASP risk methodology (Open Web Application Security Project, 2014) for creating the risk 
register. OWASP methodology is recommended for use because it estimates risks from business process 
and technical perspectives, highly adaptable and applicable to most organizations of all size.  Six simple 
phases that include the factors that make up the likelihood and impact of each risk is included. The 
Security Analyst can then be able to use 5 phases of OWASP model to determine the severity of each 
risk. The phases for creating the risk register are provided as: 
Phase 1: Identify Risks 
The first phase deals with identifying security risks. The security analyst gathers information about the 
potential risks that may arise as a result of the exploitation of threats. A workshop can be organized 
with participants from across the organization to discuss the risks and arrive at a consensus conclusion 
about the general perception of risks and their impact on the organization. Also, risk details from 
multiple industry bodies can be considered. For example, the Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP) maintains a regularly-updated list of most pressing cloud security risks and has recently 
released a Cloud Top 10 Security Risks (OWASP Cloud - 10 Project, 2014). Gartner Group Inc. 
(Brodkin, 2008), a global research and advisory firm that provides insights, advice and tools for leaders 
in information technology provided a list of specific security risks that cloud users should consider 
before selecting a CSP. Besides, the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA, 
2009) in a report provided a list of cloud security risks comprising 35 risks that fall under one of such 
categories as technical, policy and organizational, legal and non-cloud specific risks. All these sources 
can be used  
Phase 2: Estimating Risk Likelihood 
After potential risks have been identified, the next phase is to estimate the likelihood of the risk 
occurring. Likelihood estimation provides an approximation of how likely it is for risk to occur. 
OWASP has produced several factors that can be used to determine risk likelihood. However, we 
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recommend that the Security Analyst considers threat/vulnerability factors that focus on estimating the 
probability of the threats previously identified. A threat/vulnerability likelihood table is created to help 
the Security Analyst arrive at a sensible reasonable in determining the likelihood of risks. 
Table 6.9: Risk Likelihood  
Threat Factor 0 to < 3 (Low) 3 to < 6 (Medium) 6 to 9 (High) 
Factor Description 
Ease of discovery  How easy is it for the risk to 
be discovered?  
Practically 
impossible  
Difficult  Substantially easy  
Ease of exploit  How easy is it for the risk to 
be exploited 
Theoretical  Difficult  Substantially easy  
Awareness How well familiar are threat 
agents with the risk?  
Unknown  Obvious  Public knowledge  
Intrusion detection  How likely is the risk to be 
detected?  
Active detection 
mechanisms  
Logged & reviewed  Not reviewed  
 
Phase 3: Estimating Impact for Security Goals & Business Process  
In terms of estimating the impact of risks, there are two classes of impacts that can be used – technical 
and business impact. On the one hand, technical impacts are inclined toward the security goals of an 
asset that include confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability and conformity. The aim is to 
provide a rough estimate of the magnitude of the impact on security goals if a risk occurs. The impact 
rating for technical factors is provided in Table 6.10:  
Table 6.10: Security Goals Impact Table   
Security Goals  0 to < 3 (Low) 3 to < 6 (Medium) 6 to 9 (High) 
Loss of Confidentiality   Minor disclosure of critical 
assets   
Critical assets are 
significantly affected 
Highly critical assets are 
extensively affected 
Loss of Integrity   Minor compromise of 
critical assets  
Critical assets significantly 
compromised 
All highly critical asset 
extensively compromised  
Loss of Availability  Minor interruption of 
critical assets  
Critical assets significantly 
interrupted  
All critical assets 
extensively lost  
Loss of Accountability  Threats are fully traceable   Threats are possibly 
traceable  
Threats are completely 
untreatable  
Loss of Conformance  A minor breach of 
compliance requirements  
A significant breach of 
compliance requirements  
All compliance 
requirements significant 
breached.  
 
On the other hand, business impact estimates the severity of risks to the business process of the 
organisation. The Business Analyst needs to be engaged to share insights into what is vital to the 
organisation in running its business affairs. Further, business impact reference can be utilised to 
establish the processes that are important to the organisation. 
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 Table 6.11 Risk Impact to Business Process 
Business Impact 0 to < 3 (Low) 3 to < 6 (Medium) 6 to 9 (High) 
Risk  Question to ask   
Financial damage  The extent of financial 
damage as a result of risk   
Minor effect   Significant effect  Bankruptcy  
Reputation damage  Would the risk result in 
reputation damage to the 
organization?  
Minor damage  Significant damage Loss of goodwill 
and brand damage 
Non-compliance  How much exposure does 
non-compliance introduce?  
Minor violation  Clear violation  High profile 
violation  
Privacy violation   What is the consequence of 
disclosing personal 
information?   
Minor 
consequence  
Significant 
consequence  
Highly 
consequential 
effect to privacy 
laws.  
 
Phase 4: Determine Criteria for Severity of Risk  
This phase involves using criteria for defining the likelihood estimate and impact estimate to calculate 
the overall severity for the risks. OWASP methodology uses a distributed scale of 0 to 9 for both impact 
and likelihood rating. The risk impact and likelihood levels are decomposed as in table 6.12 to help the 
Security Analyst in getting the net risk ratings.   
Table 6.12 OWASP Risk Likelihood and Impact Criteria  
Likelihood and Impact Levels 
0 to < 3 LOW  
3 to < 6 MEDIUM  
6 to 9 HIGH  
 
Phase 5: Define Control Measures 
There is a need to define a prioritised list of controls that can be used to address the risks. Risk controls 
are generic fundamental technical or procedural mechanisms that are used to manage security risks. The 
Security Analyst considers various industry standards that provide recommendations on basic security 
controls. For example, the Critical Security Controls (Centre for Internet Security, 2018) publishes a 
set of 20 controls and best practice guidelines that are not only limited or specific to cloud computing 
and which organizations should adopt to control known computer security risks.  
Thus, to define control measures, we recommend that the Security Analyst selects risk control measures 
from the predefined list provided by a renowned industry guideline named CSC CIS (Centre for Internet 
Security, 2018). CSC CIS provides 20 controls categorized into 3 prioritized and defence-in-depth set 
of best practices that are implementable and usable to mitigate attacks against systems and networks. 
Further, ENISA (ENISA, 2016) provides 27 baseline security controls that are more CSP-oriented and 
focuses on control measures that protect cloud computing systems against operational risks. It provides 
a high-level security objective for CSPs with different levels of implementation of security measures. 
The controls provided by ENISA’s are particularly used to supplement CSC CIS controls and provide 
expansive controls that are more specific to the cloud. Therefore, to choose security control measures, 
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matching is performed where each control in CSC CIS is matched to controls in ENISA to make parallel 
matching and identify semantic equivalence between them.   
The main aim of the matching process shown in the figure is to compare security control measures from 
CSC CIS to ENISA, identify and filter controls that have similarities, i.e. controls that completely 
supplement each other in terms of scope. The elements that are used for the comparison include the 
name of control measure, type, and the keywords. In such cases where control measures are found to 
be the same, the Security Analyst should adopt CSC CIS controls. However, if there is no similarity, 
control measures from both CSC CIS and ENISA should be adopted. This approach ensures contents 
are compared more thoroughly and risk control actions consistently easily identified.    
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Table 6.13: Risk Register   
 
Risk Name  Risk 
ID  
Risk Likelihood  Impact to Security goals  Impact to Business  Control Measures  
  EoD  EoE Aw I_D  Conf.  Int.  Ava.  Acc.  Con Fin. RD NC PV  
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
 
Where: EoD = ease of discovery; EoE east of exploit; Aw = awareness; I_D = intrusion detection. Conf = confidentiality; Int. = integrity; Aav = availability; 
Acc = accountability; conf = conformance. Fin = financial; RD = reputation damage; RD = noncompliance; PV = privacy violation    
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6.3.4 Activity 4: Requirements Specification 
The output of the previous activity provided a risk register, detailing an overview of various security 
risks facing an organisation and control measures for addressing risks. As stated earlier, control 
measures are well-vetted security actions which organisations can take to ensure the protection of 
assets from various kinds of harms that may be mounted by several types of attackers. This activity 
encompasses more details, mainly by considering security controls from different perspectives and 
techniques. In particular, it focuses on establishing broad security controls that do not only focus on 
addressing security risks but also for ensuring security transparency. In identifying requirements, the 
vital spectrum of cloud operations is considered such as security transparency requirements, baseline 
security requirements, compliance requirements etc. By considering all aspects of security 
requirements, the audit will be more comprehensive and elaborate to cover the verification of many 
aspects of an organisation’s requirements. Therefore, the primary objective of this activity is to 
specify essential security requirements that mandate the presence of control measures around assets 
are reiterated and identified to ensure sufficient coverage in the management of cloud services.   
6.3.4.1 Step 1: Specify Transparency and other Requirements  
In this step, the actual requirements that serve as essential constraints that must be satisfied by the 
CSP are specified. The security analyst is involved to specify asset requirements in a documented 
matrix formally. The requirements are primarily specified according to four different aspects: security 
transparency requirements, baseline requirements, business requirements, and operational 
requirements. The requirements are derived from well-known industry standards to support a set of 
accurate and verifiable and implementable controls that are driven from standard practice. Essentially, 
industry-acclaimed CSA CCM Version 3.0.1 (Cloud Security Alliance Control Matrix, 2016). CSA 
CCM provides sixteen essential security principles that guide CSPs on achieving cloud security and 
also provides organisations with the structure to achieve asset security in the cloud. Therefore, we 
recommend that the Security Analyst creates a categorised list of requirements based on CCM to 
specify the requirements that are relevant to the organisation. 
Table 6.14 Requirements Specification 
Requirements Control Domain Control Type Control ID Specification 
Transparency     
Basic     
Business     
Operational     
   
6.3.5 Activity 5: Assess CSP  
After essential security requirements have been identified, the Security Analyst needs to assess the 
reliability worthiness of a CSP in terms of their capability to provide satisfy security requirements. 
The purpose of this activity is to evaluate commercially available CSPs and determine the most 
suitable one that can fulfil security, business, and requirements. The activity is necessary because the 
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propensity to provide transparent services can vary from one CSP to another, and while transparency 
assurances are reputedly given, there are no guarantees these assurances can be nurtured and sustained 
by the CSP. Although very essential, the activity is more pertinent for organisations that are yet to 
migrate their backend assets to the cloud and somewhat optional for organisations that have already 
moved to the cloud.  Thus, the outcome of this activity is to support decision making in respect of 
choosing an appropriate CSP. This activity, therefore, contains two steps, including the collection and 
assessment of the evidence.  
6.3.5.1 Step 1: Collect CSP Information before Migration  
This step provides organizations with the chance to, before migration, select a suitable CSP or if 
already migrated, determine the security transparency worthiness of an existing one. Most of the 
commercially available CSPs usually specify or reveal the featured attributes of transparency within 
their services and stated as promises that will be fulfilled. Occasionally, organisations tend to put trust 
on CSPs based on reputation or experience of other users. The rationale behind this step is to gather 
adequate background information relating to CSPs’ transparency that significantly helps 
organisations to have a greater assurance on how security requirements are fulfilled and how risks are 
controlled. To achieve this, assurance information about as many CSPs have to be collected for 
comparison purposes to identify the most suitable candidate that can deliver security transparency. 
There are a variety of ways that can be used for collecting information. A method for collecting 
information proposed in this research involves a detailed search of prospective CSPs’ web portal for 
collecting information about their approach to security transparency. In addition, existing assessment 
offered by professional industry body, namely: CSA CloudTrust Protocol (CloudSecurityAlliance, 
2010) can be leveraged. Table 6.15 provides an insight into the type of information that can be 
collected for every requirement and the possible sources. 
Table 6.15 Type and Sources of Information  
Requirement Type of information Source of Information 
Transparency Availability  
 
 
The web portal, CSP attestation, industry 
accreditation & certifications. 
 
Clarity 
Current 
Relevance 
Notification 
Verifiable 
Free/low cost 
Independent third-party audits 
Incident Reporting 
Business Business Continuity Plans The web portal, security whitepapers, 
CloudTrust Protocol, CSP attestation, third-
party audit report, industry accreditation & 
certification 
Policies and regulatory regulations 
Risk management 
Security governance 
Basic Network / Infrastructure Services  
The web portal, security whitepapers, 
CloudTrust Protocol, CSP attestation, third-
party audit report, industry accreditation & 
certification 
 
Encryption & key management 
Sensitive Data Protection 
Unauthorized Software Installations 
Identity & access management 
Application & Interface Security 
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Controlled Access Points 
Operational Vulnerability / Patch Management The web portal, security whitepapers, 
CloudTrust Protocol, CSP attestation, third-
party audit report, industry accreditation & 
certification 
 
Infrastructure & virtualisation security 
Handling information leakage 
Data Security Integrity measures 
Datacentre Security User Access 
 
6.3.5.2 Step 2: Perform Assessment  
Statements regarding the elements of security transparency made by CSPs need to be assessed and 
verified to support decision making for selecting the trustworthy CSP. In this step, the Security 
Analyst estimates CSPs based on predefined measurement questions proposed in this thesis. The 
questions are formulated according to the principles of security transparency as presented in Chapter 
Four (such as availability, clarity, current, relevance, etc.). Moreover, a measurement metric is created 
to aid the determination of a score that can be assigned to one or multiple candidates CSPs. The 
measurement metric uses a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ for assigning score value to the distinctive questions. If the 
answer to a question is ‘Yes’, then a value of 1 is assigned, meaning that the CSP has achieved an 
aspect of security transparency relating to that question. A ‘No’ answer attracts a value of 0 meaning 
that the CSP does not meet the respective principle of security transparency in that regard. A 
measurement criterion that reflects the deployment practices of security transparency (i.e. opaque and 
explicit transparency) is applied for determining the type of security transparency proffered by each 
CSP.  
In the measurement criteria, a value of 1 to 7 is applied to determine the CSP transparency type. A 
CSP with a score of ≤ 3 is considered to have ‘Opaque Transparency’, whereas a CSP with a score of 
more than ≥ to provides explicit transparency. The assessment is applied in guiding the judgement of 
the Security Analyst to determine: (i effectively), before cloud migration, select the most suitable 
CSP; (ii) or if already migrated, determine the transparency worthiness of an existing CSP. Table 6.16 
shows security transparency principles. The assessment is helped by criteria as shown in table 6.17. 
The result of CSP assessment is reported to top management to consider and deliberate on the most 
suitable CSP that should be adopted. It is essential to mention that the migration activities are not 
covered in this research.  
Table 6.16 Assessment Questions of CSPs 
Security 
Transparency 
Principle 
Relevant Question CSPs Assessed 
CSP1  CSP2 CSP.. 
Availability  Is information published regarding the security controls and policies of the CSP?     
Clarity  Is the information published in a way that can be easily interpreted by customers?     
Current  Does the CSP publish up-to-date information regarding changes to policies, 
practices and security events/incidents?  
   
Relevance  Does the CSP publish relevant information that can support customers to elicit 
requirements and perform risk assessments? 
   
Notification  Does the CSP provide timely notification services/tools for reporting security events, 
incidents or operations concerning customer assets?   
   
Verifiable  Does the CSP provide verifiable system-generated activity logs?      
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Free/Low cost Does the CSP provide information at low/free cost?     
 Total Score    
Transparency Type    
 
Table 6.17: Criteria for Transparency 
Score 
Value 
Transparency 
Type 
Criteria 
≤ 3 Opaque  Information is not well clarified. It involves CSP disclosing information that either 
partially represents its actual operational values or provides equivocal statements. 
Also, inconsistent or unreliable information in terms of how controls are actualised 
in the cloud environment 
≥ 4 Explicit  Information is disclosed to represents a realistic implementation of CSP security 
control, precisely outlines the processes and procedures of how operations are 
securely managed.  Comprehensive elucidation on the CSP’s approach to ensuring 
the protection assets is provided 
   
Let:  
Transparency = TR; Availability = AV; Clarity = CL; Current – CU; Relevance = RE; Notification 
= NT; Verifiable = VR; and Free = FR 
 
Hence,  
𝑇𝑅 = 𝐴𝑉 + 𝐶𝐿 + 𝐶𝑈 + 𝑅𝐸 + 𝑁𝑇 + 𝑉𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅   
If:   
TR is ≥ 4, then CSP transparency is Explicit.  
Else:  
TR is ≤ 3, then CSP transparency is Opaque.  
 
6.3.6 Activity 6: Security Audit  
This is another vital activity that is performed after cloud migration has taken place. It introduces an 
ongoing audit process that is aimed at assisting organizations in examining whether the CSP 
continuously and effectively implements plans, procedures and controls that meet organizational 
security requirements for protecting assets once cloud migration has been successfully achieved. The 
audit process presented in this activity uses ISO/IEC 19011:2018 and ISAE 3402 Audit Standards. It 
is initiated by the Security Auditor to collect evidence, independently evaluate the CSP’s fulfilment 
of security transparency and controls based on the evidence collected, and prepare a substantive audit 
report to the organization’s actors. The activity consists of steps as (i) define the security requirement 
to be audited; (ii) collect evidence in respect of the security requirement; (iii) analyze evidence; (iv) 
and issue a report. Audit evidence collection implies the reliable collection of relevant evidence 
through inspection, inquiry or observation. The analysis deals with examining collected evidence to 
establish whether security requirements are being implemented. Reporting mainly involves 
documenting findings and building judgments based on evidence collected. The main output of the 
activity is to measure the conformance or nonconformance and determine the areas where a CSP must 
implement controls.  The steps involved are described below:  
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6.3.6.1 Step 1: Define the Requirements to be audited 
This step specifies the focus and depth of the audit in terms of the specific requirements and CSP 
security controls that are subject to verification. Hence, the security requirements specified in the 
preceding activity are considered and become the focal point of consideration. In addition, defining 
the security requirements to be audited allows the collection of evidence that is most relevant for the 
control areas which are under scrutiny. For example, an organization that had specified incident 
management and reporting as a requirement will need to collect, analyze and examine evidence that 
focuses on the incident management and reporting controls implemented by the CSP, and therefore, 
form the scope of the audit.   
6.3.6.2 Step 2: Collect Audit Evidence for the Requirements to be audited 
This step involves gathering documentary evidence or historical records about the CSP’s platform to 
assert proof of conformance to the organisation’s security requirements and other operational 
integrity. According to the guidelines for audit evidence collection in ISAE 500 Standard (ISAE500), 
an auditor must obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to afford a reasonable basis for forming a 
judgement. In this context, the evidence is reliable, relevant and adequate electronic records, 
computations, and client or third-party representations about the implementation of processes, 
procedures and mechanisms needed to secure the cloud platform and fulfil requirements. Evidence 
also provides all the information that can be used by an auditor to arrive at a conclusion. Audit 
evidence is assessed to allow security auditor to produce audit findings and present findings. The 
importance of collecting evidence artefacts is that it supports assertions, statements and claims about 
how individual requirements and CSP controls are met. Thus, in the course of this step, we have 
identified essential evidence that the Security Auditor needs to collect, the sources from where 
evidence is to be collected and method for obtaining the evidence.   
6.3.6.2.1 Technique for Evidence Collection 
To collect evidence, it is recommended that the security auditor uses a checklist that is primarily 
designed to support the collection of evidence. The checklist comprises a series of questions that are 
relevant to the security requirements. The intent for using the checklist is to have a uniform means 
for obtaining adequate information and assurance from the CSP regarding security practices. The 
questions in the checklist are formed by considering industry-accepted initiative namely: Consensus 
Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ V3.0.1) (Cloud Security Alliance, 2017b) and Critical 
Security Controls (CIS) (Centre for Internet Security, 2018).  
 
CAIQ provides a series of ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ questions that are aligned to control areas of CCM and which 
an auditor may ask of a CSP in assessing the capabilities and competencies of the CSP. It promotes 
the use of best practices for providing security assurance in cloud computing. Also, another 
distinguishing feature of CAIQ is that it is mapped to several industry-accepted security standards, 
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regulations and control frameworks that are mostly of interest to both CSPs and cloud users. On the 
other hand, CIS provides a set of actions and best practices for controlling most common attacks 
against systems and networks. Controls in CIS are derived from most common attack patterns 
highlighted in the leading threat reports and vetted across a broad community of industry practitioners. 
An important reason for considering CIS is the fact that it provides defence-in-depth for risks that are 
non-specific to the cloud.  
 
The questions in the checklist are categorised according to security domains and subdomains. Each 
subdomain contains several questions that must be answered by the CSP. The CSP responds to the 
questions with ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Not applicable’. Where ‘Yes’ response is obtained for a specific 
question in the checklist, the CSP must produce evidence to support their assertion concerning that 
question. A ‘No’ and ‘Not applicable’ answers do not require supporting evidence from the CSP.  
 
6.3.6.2.1 Evidence Type 
Under different circumstances, different types of evidence can be collected and each varies according 
to the requirement that is subject to audit. Some evidence pertains security and event logs, while other 
forms of evidence entail proof of CSP certifications/accreditation from standards/frameworks. In 
terms of security and event logs, the Security Auditor focuses on logs about applications, user 
activities, and security incidents etc. which contain information related to events that have occurred 
within the cloud environment. Such logs are generated by various cloud components, including 
penetration testing, vulnerability scans, intrusion detection and prevention systems, servers, 
applications and network equipment. Therefore, the types of logs collected are directly relevant and 
correlate with the security requirements that are subject to audit. In other words, the kind of event log 
collected is dependent on the context of the particular question in the checklist and security 
requirements. For example, for an organisation whose requirement include virtualisation security, 
logs from virtual machine security monitoring software provide useful data that could be of use in 
detecting malicious activity and verifying CSP’s conformance to such requirement.   
 
 Table 6.18: Types of Evidence to be collected  
Evidence Category  Specific Evidence  
 Login attempts to disabled service/suspended accounts  
Authentication and Authorisation 
Monitoring Report.  
Login failures and successes by users and systems  
Multiple login failures  
Privileged account Access (Success/Failures) 
User authentication failures  
 
Critical Failures and Errors 
Monitoring  Report  
Critical failures by virtual machines, operating systems, and applications  
A virtual machine, system and application crashes, shutdowns, restarts  
Backup failures  
Capacity exhaustion for memory, disk, CPU and other system resources  
 
 
 
Additions of accounts to administrator/privileged groups  
Additions/changes/deletion to users/groups 
Additions/changes/deletions to network services  
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Data and Systems Change Monitoring 
Report  
Applications install and updates by systems, applications and users 
Changes in file access permissions  
Changes to sensitive files  
Changes to system and configuration files  
Password changes and resets by users and administrators  
 
Malware Activity Monitoring Report  
Anti-virus protection failures  
Connections to known malware IP addresses  
Events from anti-virus tools 
Malware detection trends with outcomes  
 
 
Network Activity Monitoring Report 
Antivirus and antimalware log file 
Data loss prevention event log  
Firewall log files 
Honeypot logs  
Intrusion detection and prevention system log files  
VPN activity log files 
 
 
Resource Access and Activity 
Reports 
Application log files 
Event log files 
Service log files 
System logs files 
Virtual machine log files  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Certifications/Accreditations from 
Frameworks and Standards  
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) Security, Trust & Assurance Registry (STAR) 
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) Information 
Assurance Framework (IAF) 
European Union Data Protection Directive (EUDPD) 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 
Federal Risk and Authorisation Management Program (FEdRAMP) 
Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)/ Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) 
Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO27001:2005)   
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework  
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)  
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 
Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements 16 (SSAE 16) 
 
6.3.6.2.2 Source of Audit Evidence 
The sources a Security Auditor can explore for collecting evidence depends on the context of security 
requirement. Ideally, log files are a vital source of evidence and provide measurable benefits in 
monitoring and analysis of events of any system. Logs can be seen as a rich source of evidence 
because they provide detailed information about activities being performed and help to determine 
whether everything is working as desired. However, the monitoring and management of logs, 
especially in a distributed environment, require considerable resources for analysis and correlation. 
For example, the sources of evidence for specific security requirements such as human resources 
security cannot be obtained through logs, while security requirements such as threat and vulnerability 
management require automated tools and techniques such as penetration testing. Hence, a 
combination of sources is used depending on the security requirement under scrutiny including CSP 
assertions; security whitepaper; website information; user experience, CSP audit report, and reports 
generated by security and monitoring tools.  
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6.3.6.3 Step 3: Perform Security Audit   
Once evidence is collected, the next task is to perform the audit work following ISA 200 and ISA 402 
(ISA, 2016) standards. Specifically, the audit involves analyzing evidence in an attempt to evaluate 
and establish the conformance or non-conformance of CSP controls, i.e. determine whether security 
procedures and practices in the CSP’s environment sufficiently safeguard assets and comply with 
security requirements of the organization. To achieve this, the checklist created in the previous step 
serves as the reference point for reviewing CSP practices and the extent to which the CSP conforms 
to the organization’s requirements. 
 
6.3.6.3.1 Apply Audit Criteria 
Audit criteria is a set of procedures, policies, specifications, or requirements used as a reference 
against which evidence are compared. The audit criteria can be qualitative or quantitative, general or 
specific, focusing on what should be according to laws regulations or objectives, sound principles, 
scientific knowledge or best practices (ISA, 2016). In performing an audit, the Security Auditor uses 
justifiable audit criteria or select from standard procedures and policies. Reliable sources of audit 
criteria could be regulations, legislation and standards issued by recognized authorities. For ensuring 
that evidence is presented in conformance with generally accepted principles, the Statement on 
Auditing Standards 70 (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Auditing Standards 
Board, 1997) provides essential attributes that are paramount for evaluating the quality of audit 
evidence and to support the reasonable basis for auditors opinion. Thus, these attributes (as shown in 
Table 6.19) are adopted and reformed to the context of cloud audit to serve as the audit criteria for 
assessing evidence. The attributes are considered on the supposition that credence must be established 
in respect of whether CSP security practices and procedures are done in accordance to specified 
requirements.  
 
Table 6.19: Attributes for Quality Audit Evidence (Audit Criteria) 
 
6.3.6.3.2 Step 2: Determine Conformance Level  
This step involves assessing CSP evidence and performing appropriate analysis to form an opinion 
that is presented in the audit report. The primary aim is to establish the conformance level associated 
Parameter Description 
Sufficiency Quality evidence is sufficient quantity has been presented to support assertions made on 
specific security controls. 
Completeness The CSP has presented evidence of all security processes and procedures relating to security 
controls 
Understandability Implementation of security controls, processes and procedures are appropriately presented 
and described, and disclosures are clearly expressed. 
Accuracy Data presented and disclosures made relating to security controls, procedures and processes 
accurately reflect instances of the cloud operating environment. 
Reliability The source of evidence is reliable by nature and is dependent on the individual specific 
security control area under which it is obtained. 
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with the CSP’s practices based on the evidence produced. In other terms, once a CSP has supplied 
evidence, an auditor uses professional judgement to measure the sufficiency, reliability and 
completeness of evidence, and its understandability and accuracy. Essentially, to establish a CSP’s 
conformance level, a thorough assessment of all evidence presented by the CSP is performed. The 
evaluation mainly determines the CSP’s conformance in respect of requirements.  A simple equation 
and an assessment scorecard are created, where the Security Auditor, based on expert analysis and 
interpretation, determines the level of conformance that is associated with a CSP, i.e. the ability to 
satisfy security requirements. In other words, after evidence have been analyzed and assigned a score 
about the attributes of quality evidence, a computation is performed to determine the CSP’s level of 
conformance to the security requirements.  
i. Conformance Level to each Question: using the scorecard in Table 6.20, the Security 
Auditor assesses evidence presented by the CSP and assigns a value of either ‘1’ or ‘0’ 
according to how each evidence satisfies the attribute of quality evidence (SCUAR). For 
example, assuming a CSP had responded with a ‘Yes’ answer to a question and also 
presented supporting evidence, an auditor assesses the quality of the evidence in terms of its 
sufficiency, reliability, completeness, understandability and accuracy. If the auditor 
perceives evidence to validate the CSP’s claim, then he scores the evidence with ‘1’, 
otherwise ‘0’.   
 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇. 𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍 =
Sufficiency+Ccompleteness+Understandability+Accuracy+Reliability
5 (Attributes of Quality Evidence)
∗  100       
 
  Table 6.20: Evidence Scorecard: 
Attributes of 
Quality Evidence 
Possible 
Values 
Score Value for Evidences 
Sufficiency  1 or 0 Score = 1 if ‘Evidence is Sufficient’, else  Score = 0  
Reliability   1 or 0 Score = 1 if ‘Evidence is Reliable’, else Score = 0  
Completeness 1 or 0 Score = 1 if ‘‘Evidence is Complete, else Score = 0 
Understandability 1 or 0 Score = 1 if ‘‘Evidence is Understandable, else Score = 0 
Accuracy  1 or 0 Score = 1 if ‘Evidence is Accurate, else Score = 0 
 
Table 6.21 General Scorecard for CSP Conformity Level 
  Conformance Type Weight Conformance Level  
Very High conformance 100 5 
High conformance 80 4 
Medium conformance 60 3 
Low conformance 40 2 
Very low conformance 20 1 
Nonconformity  0 0 
145 
 
Table 6.22 Security Audit/Analysis  
Requirement Target Verification 
(Control Domain) 
Base Measure 
(Control Type) 
Specification Question CSP/User 
Response 
Means of 
Verification 
 
Audit 
Criteria 
Conformance 
Level 
Yes No S C U A R  
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
 
* Sufficiency; completeness; understandability; accuracy; transparency
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Table 6.22 provides evidence analysis and audit report. The target verification implies the set of control 
domains being assessed. For an auditor to perform the required assessments, a base measure is used, 
that is the type of control being audited. For instance, evidence produced in respect of the application 
and interface security within (target of verification) to manifest what controls exist in the area of data 
integrity (i.e. base measure). Therefore, application and interface security become the target of 
verification, whereas data integrity controls under application and interface security become the target 
of verification. Furthermore, the means of verification implies the type of evidence that was examined, 
i.e. supporting evidence produced by the CSP such as log report generated by automated security 
monitoring tools. The audit criteria highlight the audit criteria (attributes of quality evidence) upon 
which evidence is compared. Each evidence obtained is compared to the criteria for determining a 
certain weight or score that will be associated with the evidence. Assessment score assigns a score value 
to the evidence that has been analysed. Total score cumulates the overall score attained by individual 
evidence for the base measure in respect of all five audit criteria. Global score cumulates the overall 
score achieved target verification (control domain) in respect of base measures. The Conformity level 
determines the level of conformity a CSP has achieved. The outcome is a summary of findings to 
support the auditor in generating an audit report.  
6.3.6.4 Step 4: Report Audit Findings  
An audit report is defined as a written opinion or decision of an auditor based on overall findings. It is 
the primary means for communicating results of the audit to relevant actors, and in some instances, also 
shared with to the CSP. The contents of the report focus on the organisation’s requirements that have 
been assessed and the degree to which the CSP is meeting such requirements. In other words, after 
auditing the requirements of an organisation (such as transparency or fundamental requirements), the 
auditor needs to create a report regarding the finding that has been discovered during the audit. For 
instance, do the results show weak controls or flawed fulfilment of requirements? Are the requirements 
and controls determined to be effective and efficiently fulfilled? Once these considerations are 
established, remedial actions that must be implemented by the CSP are drawn by the auditor. The 
remedial actions take different perspective including, measures that are designed to pre-empt 
irregularities before they occur; measures that identify defects, threats or errors on a timely basis after 
they have occurred; measures that correct defects or risks and prevent further reoccurrence; or auditor 
statement indicating sufficient and satisfactory controls not needing further actions. In general, the 
report prepared by the Security Auditor presents findings and weaknesses discovered and 
recommendations for remedying deficiencies found. The audit report fulfils many objectives, including 
formally presenting findings; serve as a statement of assurance; and the identification of areas requiring 
remedial actions on operations, controls or policies and procedures that must be implemented.   
To ensure consistent reporting according to an established process, the audit report is developed based 
on the provisions and in compliance with information security audit standards and audit protocols. In 
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particular, the guidance for audit reporting in ISA 700 (International Standard on Auditing, 2016) are 
followed. The standard maintains that the audit report should be understandable and presented in a 
logical order, can communicate the scope, objectives, results and recommendations of the audit, and 
also to assist the organisation to take corrective actions. As a general rule, the audit report contains the 
auditee (organisation) and intended actors, the scope and extent of the audit work, findings, conclusions 
and recommendations. Therefore, based on the outcome of the previous step, the Security Auditor 
creates a report detailing audit findings and opinion. The reports contain certain information, and the 
structure within which the contents are presented is driven by the need to make reports readable and 
understandable. Hence, the audit report is drafted by considering important aspects, including:  
 Audit Requirements: provides a statement of the audit area covered, i.e. what aspect of CSP 
control as contained in the checklist is audited. In other words, it reflects on the security 
requirements. For example, if the audit covered encryption and key management: key 
generation control domain only, then encryption and key management: storage and access 
should be excluded from the report.  
 Audit Conclusion/Judgement: this provides an overall judgement regarding audit findings in 
respect of each requirement and the CSP’s security controls. In other words, once evidence has 
been examined, compared against the audit criteria and assigned a weighted score, the auditor 
provides a judgement concerning their findings. For example, the auditor might have 
discovered nonconformance in an area of fundamental security. In this instance, the auditor 
must state that CSP practices were found to be inadequate or ineffective for the requirement in 
question. There are three types of judgements that an auditor, having obtained sufficient audit 
findings, an issue to establish judgment, which includes defective, acceptable and effective 
controls.  
o Defective Practice: this type of judgement is presented in cases where the audit 
findings substantially indicate material disparities between audit criteria and CSP 
asserted evidence. From another perspective, defective controls are audit findings 
where adequate controls are not in effect, or there is a reasonable doubt that security 
requirements are being met.  
o Acceptable Practice: this judgement is issued when audit findings indicate similarity 
between audit criteria and CSP assert evidence, but there are disparities or weaknesses 
in certain areas. In another perspective, acceptable controls imply audit findings where 
security controls are in place to provide acceptable assurance; however, controls need 
to be tightened or improved in some areas. 
o Effective Practice:  judgement is presented when audit findings indicate a substantial 
correlation between audit criteria and evidence. From another perspective, effective 
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controls manifest the presence of all security controls, procedures and practices are in 
place following relevant security requirements and applicable criteria.  
 Remedial Action: action plans are constructive recommendations issued by the auditor when 
the audit findings substantiate significant improvements in operations and performance of the 
CSP. The main intention is to recommend changes to areas of requirements where non-
conformance has been observing or where significant weaknesses in controls are found. 
Remedial Action is mainly issued using corrective, detective or preventive actions. The 
responsibility for implementing remedial action could rest on the CSP or an organization. From 
both the CSP and organizational perspective, remedial actions are recommended to make sure 
the necessary measures implemented to address the lack of fulfilling requirements or 
insufficient controls.  
o Preventive: include security control measures, policies, and procedures that are to 
deter or prevent security incidents, risks, errors, or omission of requirements from 
occurring.   
o Detective: technical and non-technical security controls, policies, procedures that 
detect errors or incidents and provide visibility into malicious breaches and attacks.  
o Corrective: technical implementations and procedures that mitigate damage, correct 
errors or incidents once they have occurred.   
6.4 Chapter Summary  
This chapter presented an integrated and unified process for the security transparency framework, which 
involves multiple activities, steps, and decisions to achieve successful implementation from the 
organizational point of view. The process comprises four fundamental activities, with various steps 
connected to each activity. It leverages several industry standards to provide the basis of defining and 
achieving specific goals, mitigating threats, and establishing controls per established best practices. The 
combination of various standards and best practices ensures higher efficiency, compliance and reduces 
the potentials of errors and failures, which also reduces the tendency of repetition. 
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Table 6.23: Report Audit Findings 
Requirement  Target Verification 
(Control Domain) 
Base Measure (Control 
Type) 
Question  Audit Judgement Remedial Actions  
Defective  Acceptable  Effective  Preventive  Detective  Corrective  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Security Transparency Audit Tool (STAT) 
7.1 Introduction  
The previous Chapter presented a process for CSTF, which comprises various fundamental 
activities and steps. The final activity of the process involves a security audit that focuses on 
assessing CSPs and establishing whether they effectively implement the necessary procedures 
and controls that meet organizational requirements continuously. In this Chapter, the design of 
STAT is presented in detail, which is designed to support auditors in the performance of a security 
audit. In plain terms, STAT is designed to serve as a platform by which an organisation can probe 
the activities of a CSP by seeking information about specific requirements, receive evidence about 
how the CSP meets the requirements, and establishing assurances about the degree to which CSP 
fulfils requirements. The primary objective of STAT is to facilitate the collection and analysis of 
evidence, including the establishment of subjective audit judgement and determination of the 
required course of actions that needs to be taken, thereby promoting security transparency in the 
cloud.  
Therefore, this chapter is intended to convey the significant architectural considerations used in 
building STAT. It presents details of the features, specification and implementation outline of the 
tool. The chapter uses non-technical to mildly-technical terms to make it more comprehensive 
and understandable by providing an overview, general description, design process, and features 
of the tool. Also, high-level details for the overall design of STAT in terms of functional 
architecture, as well as the relationship between various modules and functions of the tool are  
provided. Also, a description of its essential functionalities and features is provided through an 
explanation of the many dashboards of the tool.   
7.2 Overview of STAT 
STAT is designed to be a supporting audit tool for CSTF that an organisation, in particular, 
auditors can use to perform a security audit. It is designed to enable auditors to leverage a security 
audit checklist that is formed on the principles of renowned industry-standard to probe CSP 
services, collect and analyse evidence, and produce findings regarding CSP’s conformance to 
requirements. Another vital aspect of STAT is that it aims to focus on many aspects of specific 
organizational requirements. This process is enabled through a query-response approach that is 
initiated and controlled by an auditor on behalf of an organisation, where the CSP responds to a 
request by supplying relevant evidence.   
7.3 STAT’s Intelligent Scoring and Assessment System Architecture  
Various engines have been designed and integrated for use by STAT to provide intelligent 
capabilities for assessing and computing CSPs’ conformance level to an organisation’s 
requirement based on the evidence presented by the CSP. The intelligent module of STAT 
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comprises of various engines such as registration and requirement manager. This section provides 
a brief description of STAT’s internal components.  
 
7.3.1 Registration Engine  
The registration engine (RE) allows CSPs to register and provide service specifications related to 
an organisation’s requirement, responding to the assessment checklist that is developed using the 
CAIQ, and supplying relevant evidence. The RE captures all details and inputs from the CSP and 
forwards the service specifications, CPS response and evidence to the Transparency Data (TD) 
and the Conformance Level Assessment Engine (CLAE) for further processing respectively.  
 
7.3.2 Requirement Manager   
The Requirement Manager (RM) provides a front-end to stakeholders for supporting the 
specification of relevant requirements that are subject to assessment before determining the 
conformance level of a CSP. Based on the requirement specified by stakeholders, the RM 
determines the conformance score of CPS by using the Transparency Engine (TE) and the 
Transparency Computation Engine (TCE). By default, stakeholders can receive the overall 
conformance level associated with a CSP based on the completion of the checklist. Otherwise, 
stakeholders can customize preferences of conformance level of CSP according to requirement.  
 
7.3.3 Transparency Engine  
The Transparency Engine (TE) is responsible for converting all transparency-related data into 
propositional logic (AND, OR) to model and formalize the variables that determine whether a 
CSP conforms to a particular requirement or set of requirements. The TE is built based on 
subjective probability using CertainTrust Model (Ries, 2007) that allows making decisions in the 
context of uncertainty using two representation parameters namely independent parameters 
(consisting of an estimated probability of trustworthy behaviour) Bayesian approach that uses 
beta probability density functions. CertainTrust models the reliability of an entity based on one’s 
belief that a certain proposition is true.  
 
7.3.4 Conformance Level Assessment Engine  
The Conformance Level Assessment Engine (CLAE) consists of the checklist that is designed to 
enable CSPs to provide details and evidence on their capabilities to address an organisation’s 
requirement. The questions in the checklist are designed to be answered in ‘yes’ or ‘no’ format, 
categorised as control domain (CD) and all the questions regarding CDs are stored in the 
Transparency Data (TD). The CLAE is designed based on the assumption that a CSP provides 
only one set of valid response, while the auditors are responsible for checking the validity and 
authenticity of the answered checklist using the variables in the audit criteria. Also, CLAE 
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considers evidence presented by the CSP as proof of requirement attainment and audit criteria are 
used as the basis for conformance scoring factors in the engine, which comprises the following 
equations and accompanying rules:  
 
The overall conformance score 𝑪𝒔(in %) of a CSP is computed by:  
𝐶𝑠 = [
 ∑ 𝐶𝐷 
𝑘
𝑖=1  
𝑘
]  (1) 
Where:  
Cr =  conformance score with regard to a CD as computed by (2), 
k =  number of requirements  
 
The conformance score Cs (in %) concerning a CD is computed by:  
𝐶𝑠 = 
(∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐶𝐷𝑖 
𝑚
𝑖=1 )
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑞𝑖 
𝑚
𝑖=1
∗  100  (2) 
Where: 
ActualCq =  actual conformance score concerning question q of Control Domain CD 
as computed by (3) 
TotalCq =  possible total conformance score concerning a question q of Control 
Domain CD as computed by (3),  
m = number of questions of Control Domain CD.  
 
The conformance score Cq (in %) for each question q is computed by:  
𝐶𝑞 = 
(∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑚𝑖 
𝑝
𝑖=1 )
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑚𝑖 
𝑝
𝑖=1
∗  100   (3) 
Where:  
Actual Cm = actual conformance score concerning criteria m of question q as computed by (4) 
TotalCm = possible total conformance score concerning criteria m of question q as computed 
by (4) 
P =  number of criteria of question q 
The conformance score Cs (in %) about a criteria m is computed by  
𝐶𝑠=
(∑ (𝐶𝑒𝑖∗𝑊𝑠𝑓)+
𝑟
𝑖=1 ∑ (𝐶𝑒𝑖∗𝑊𝑟𝑒)+
𝑟
𝑖=1 ∑ (𝐶𝑒𝑖∗𝑊𝑐𝑝)+∑ (𝐶𝑒𝑖∗𝑊𝑢𝑑)+∑ (𝐶𝑒𝑖∗𝑊𝑎𝑐)+
𝑟
𝑖=1 
𝑟
𝑖=1 
𝑟
𝑖=1 )
(max(𝑊𝑐𝑙))∗ 𝑟
∗  100  
(4) 
 
Where:  
Se = existence score of evidence e that is associated with criteria m (that is if evidence exists 
score = 1, else score = 0)  
Wsf = Sufficiency of evidence as in Table 6.20 
Wre = Reliability of evidence as in Table 6.20 
Wcp = Completeness of evidence as in Table 6.20 
Wud = Understandability of evidence as in Table 6.20 
Wac = Accuracy of evidence as in Table 6.20 
Maxcl = Conformance Level as in Table 6.20  
R = number of evidence associated with criteria m 
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In addition, intelligent assessment and scoring rules have been designed for use by STAT to 
provide the basis for computing an appropriate conformance level of CSP to organisation’s 
requirements. The rules consider the inputs of security auditors for the requirements, control 
domains and control types 
 
Rule 1:  
For all control domains CD1, CD2… CDn. if the conformance level of control domain in 
requirement A are the same as those of requirements B, then the overall conformance level of 
requirement A should be equal to that of B. Assume we have control domains in requirement A 
with a set of CD = {CD1 CD1, CD2… CDn.}, where CD represents the xth control domain, the 
compliance level for requirement A on the control domain CDx is represented as 𝐶𝐴
𝐶𝐷𝑥 whereas 
the overall compliance level of requirement A is 𝐶𝐴
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙. This rule is formally defined as If ∀ 
CDi ∈ CD, 𝐶𝐴
𝐶𝐷𝑖 =   𝐶𝐵
𝐶𝐷𝑖 ⇒ 𝐶𝐴
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝐶𝐵
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 
 
Rule 2:  
If for control domain CD1… CDk, requirements A and requirements B have the same compliance 
levels, and for other requirements CDk + 1, … CDn, the compliance level for requirement A are 
higher than those of requirement B, then the overall score of A should be higher than that of B. 
This rule is formally defined as:   
 
If ∀CDi ∈ { CD1, . . . CDk } , 𝐶𝐴
𝐶𝐷𝑖 = 𝐶𝐵
𝐶𝐷𝑖 and  
∀CDx ∈ {CD1+1, . . . CDn } , 𝐶𝐴
𝐶𝐷𝑥 > 𝐶𝐵
𝐶𝐷𝑥 ⇒  𝐶𝐴
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 > 𝐶𝐵
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙  
 
Rule 3:  
For control domain, CDi, for which the compliance level of a requirement A is higher than that of 
requirement B, and also there exists control domain CDx, for which the compliance level of 
requirement A is lower than that of B.  
Rule 4:  
If there exist m requirements (R1, R2, … Rm) where m > 2, the overall compliance score between 
requirements will follow the 2 previous rules outlined above, which is formally defined as:  
 
Given multiple requirements such as (R1, R2… Rm),  
  for p = 1: m – 1 
     for q = p + 1 : m 
   compute 𝐶𝑝
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙  and 𝐶𝑞
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙   following rule 1 ∼ 2 
based on the evidence provided by the CSP. 
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7.3.4 Audit Decision with Subjective Logic 
Auditors’ judgement and opinion regarding the conformance level of CSP which are formed on 
the assessments generated by CLAE using subjective logic. Subjective logic is a trust algebra 
based on Bayesian theory and Boolean logic, which is used to explicitly model uncertainties 
(Jøsang, 2016). It represents a specific belief calculus that uses a metric called opinion to express 
beliefs, where an opinion x is denoted by ω 𝑥
𝐴 = (𝑏, 𝑑, 𝑢, 𝑎) expresses the relying party A’s belief 
in the truth of statement x. Binomial logic is applied to binomial opinions that are represented by 
quadruples of real numbers ω 𝑥
 = (𝑏𝑥, 𝑑𝑥 , 𝑢𝑥,𝑎𝑥)  within an interval of [0…1] subject to constant 
𝑏𝑥 +  𝑑𝑥 +  𝑢𝑥  + 𝑎𝑥 = 1, which refer to belief, disbelief, uncertainty and atomicity of x. Further, 
subjective logic operators are applied in aggregating the opinion of different auditors over a period 
of assessments. Barycentric coordinates are then used to aggregate and visualize opinions. As 
mentioned earlier, binomial opinions are calculated based on the assessment results from CLAE 
that considers CSPs response to the checklist and overall auditors’ opinion.  
 
The Auditors’ opinion is determined by applying fuzzy concepts to a Barycentric coordinate to 
have a classification for every opinion using 3 rating classes for the opinion, which include: very 
effective, effective, very acceptable, acceptable, defective, and very defective as shown in Table 
7.1.  
 
Table 7.1: Classification of Opinion 
Region  Belief Disbelief Uncertain  
Very effective  bx ≥ 0.5 dx ≥ 0.5 ux ≤ 0.5 
Effective  0.25 ≤ bx ≥ 0.5 dx ≥ 0.25 ux ≤ 0.5 
Very acceptable  bx ≥ 0.5 dx ≥ 0.5 ux ≤ 0.5 
Acceptable  bx ≥ 0.25 0.25 ≤ dx ≤ 0.25 ux ≤ 0.5 
Defective  0.25 ≤ bx ≤ 0.25 0.25 ≤ dx ≤ 0.25 ux ≤ 0.5 
Very defective  dx ≤ 0.25 dx ≤ 0.25 ux ≤ 0.25 
 
7.3.4.1 Quantifying Audit Judgement  
By assessing evidence provided by CSPs through CLAE, auditors are allowed to establish 
judgement based on CSP responses to the checklist. Auditor’s judgement ω 𝑥
𝐴 = (𝑏, 𝑑, 𝑢, 𝑎)  is 
quantified using addition aggregation factor 𝜆 ∈ [0, 1]. The value of 𝜆 is the factor that controls 
the rapidity of time by either increasing or decreasing it, and therefore, the aggregation does not 
affect judgement if 𝜆 = 0 and is entirely neglected after a single time period, while also having 
the largest effect of 𝜆 = 1. Thus,  
 𝑟𝑦,𝑡 denotes the conformance level generated for CSP for requirement y 
 𝑅𝑦,𝑡𝑥  Implies the conformance level based on auditor x judgement and CSPs response 
over time t for requirement y.  
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 𝑅𝑦,(𝑡+1)
𝑥  Implies the general conformance level for CSP based on auditor x judgement 
after time period t + 1 for requirement y.  
Furthermore, auditors are permitted to perform an assessment of any number of time and a method 
to perform this option is created. The method considers the judgement established by an auditor 
x towards requirement y based on the previous judgement 𝑘𝑡 as well as the current 
judgement 𝑘𝑡+1. The rationale behind this consideration is based on the fact that performing 
another assessment strengthens auditors’ judgement in terms of a CSPs conformance level and 
produces well-founded judgement. Therefore, assuming the previous judgement of an auditor is 
𝑘𝑡 = 0, the new judgement 𝑅𝑦,(𝑡+1) after a period of time t + 1 can be expressed as:  
 For the first auditor assessment: 𝑅𝑦,(𝑡+1) =  λ + 𝑟𝑦,𝑡 where 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 1, 𝜆 =  (𝑘𝑡+1 −  𝑘𝑡)λ  
 For any auditor assessment but not the first one: 𝑅𝑦,(𝑡+1) =  λ + 𝑅𝑦,𝑡 where 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 1, 𝜆 
= 𝑅𝑦,(𝑡+1)
𝑥 − 𝑘𝑡  λ 
Therefore, the overall conformance level determined by all auditors x ∈ X, where X implies the 
set of all auditors judgement that performed the assessments – can be generated from the overall 
average judgement of as:  
𝑅𝑦,(𝑡+1)
𝑥 =
∑𝑥 ∈ X 𝑅𝑦,(𝑡+1)
𝑥  
[𝑋]
 
The value of k can be determined as:  
 For very effective judgement and certain class (k = 1) 
 For effective judgement and certain class (k = 1
2
) 
 For very acceptable judgement and certain class (k = 1) 
 For acceptable judgement and certain class (k = 1
2
) 
 For defective and certain class (k = - 1) 
 For very defective and certain class (k = - 1
2
 ) 
 
7.3 General Description of STAT 
STAT is a web-based front end that is written in open-source programs using PHP (Lerdorf et al., 
2006), HTML5 (Hickson and Hyatt, 2011), and MySQL database (Glass et al., 2004). The client-
side can be accessed using a standard browser, and it will be able to run on any web server that 
supports PHP and has a MySQL database. It consists of administrative, server and user modules. 
For the administrative and user interfaces, JavaServer Pages (JSP) (Hall, 2001) is used for 
displaying pages, and MySQL for retrieving, inserting, deleting and updating data in the database. 
This setup enables multiple users to log in and interacts with the tool simultaneously.  
Also, STAT is developed using two user levels – administrative and user levels. The first type of 
user is the administrator who can set up and change system settings and user privileges. The 
second user is the basic users that consist of auditors and CSPs, who can only perform operations 
assigned by the administrator. The tool comprises several different components, which can be 
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directly accessed based on the access rights of users. Each web page is associated with certain 
aspects of security audit activity and provides important functionalities to manage evidence 
collection, analysis and generation of a report. Importantly, the web pages communicate with each 
other through a common database that is built using MySQL.  
7.4  Design Process  
In designing STAT, vital considerations are made regarding the most important aspects of the 
audit activity and forming the tool’s features around these considerations. Several architectural 
designs were considered including a distributed system that utilises client-server web service 
technology, and distributed systems using PHP. For each architectural design, the pros and cons 
were considered, including feasibility and capability to cope with the features of the tool. For 
example, the architectural pattern in web services technologies is lightweight. Distributed 
systems, create more cohesion and increase the degree of interdependence between modules. PHP 
is a server-side scripting language that is independent, multi-platform, and would allow the tool 
to be more coupled, which implies that the client will be more dependent upon the server-side. 
Thus, after thorough consideration and proof of concepts, it is decided for the tool to be 
implemented as a client-server web system that will be designed using PHP.   
7.5 Architecture of STAT 
In this section, the architecture of the tool is explained. STAT is a simple three-tier, web-based 
system that uses a client-server architecture. A three-tier architecture is an architecture pattern for 
developing web applications which work around three important layers, comprising a presentation 
layer, application layer and data layer (Conallen, 2002). Three-tier architecture is used to improve 
the modularity of the tool, and particularly allow for easy extension of features. Using client-
server architecture, users can use any web browser to connect to the many services supported by 
the tool such as initiating audit assessments. On the server-side, the web server receives requests 
from the client, handles the request and generates an appropriate response to the client. The three-
tier architecture role of three-tier architecture is explained as:  
7.5.1 Presentation Layer 
The presentation layer provides visualisation and dashboards that enable an organisation, security 
auditors and CSPs to interact with the tool, and enables the visualisation of audit information of 
various kinds such as assessment results, conformance level etc. It specifically provides the 
necessary user interface to enable auditors and CSPs’ access and use the tool using a standard 
browser. This layer is built using HTML, PHP and JavaScript, and it consists of web-browsers 
for HTTP clients that efficiently interact with the application and data layers using standardised 
protocols.  
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7.5.2 Application Layer  
The application layer is built using PHP, and it essentially plays the role of linking together all 
the three layers by technically processing the various inputs and selections received at the 
presentation layer, and interacting with the vast database in the third layer. It houses the audit 
assessment module/platform, which specifically applies an algorithm to auditor’s assessment of 
CSPs to determine appropriate conformance level. It is also responsible for determining access 
rights of auditors, generating and managing access codes sent to CSPs. Also, the layer houses the 
web server, scripting language and the scripting language engine of the tool. The Web server 
enables the processing of HTTP requests for initiating the audit process, obtaining CSP responses 
and evidence. The application layer provides the technical deal with dynamic content and 
streamlines faster access of the database to extract results.  
7.5.3 Database Layer  
The database provides a centralised place where data captured in the tool are stored, manipulated, 
and accessed. The layer comprises database management systems (DBMS) and the database, 
which is built using MySQL. The rationale for the database layer is to centralise all data storage 
and retrieval duties concerning security audit, user profiles, authentication, audit history, etc. In 
other words, it contains the methods for accessing the underlying database data. Fundamentally, 
the database layer is responsible for storing numerous types of data the tool will take as an input, 
generate as output and other external services that the tool may use. The database is accessible to 
the system administrators and auditors. The high-level architecture for the tool is shown in Fig. 
7.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Architecture of STAT 
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7.6 Features of STAT 
A detailed overview of STAT features is provided in this section. The primary purpose is to 
provide a general understanding of how the tool is decomposed and how the individual 
components work together to provide the desired functionalities. Generally, the tool focuses on 
the evidence-based way of probing, assessing and reporting of findings relating to CSP 
conformity to requirements. The main features provided by the tool include three main dashboards 
consisting of essential functions that can be performed. Each functionality contains important 
components of a security audit. The three main features include administrative client; security 
auditor; CSP dashboards as shown in Fig. 8.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Features and components of STAT 
7.6.1 Administrative Dashboard 
The purpose of this feature is to provide administrative and user management functions in terms 
of authentication and providing auditors and CSPs access to the STAT platform. The 
authentication module is designed using PHP with MySQL database, which serves as an integral 
part of security procedures. The primary user of this dashboard is the STAT administrator who 
creates user accounts for all authorised auditors and the CSP whose services are subject to 
assessment. The administrative dashboard also enables the auditor to manage logs and user 
activities in terms of reviewing auditor activities and CSP profile. Also, it allows the management 
of enquiry from the CSP who may have some questions, complaint, suggestion, and submission 
of requirements or checklist regarding the assessment. The system administrator can add, remove 
or edit the list of auditors that can use the tool, in addition to password recovery capabilities. 
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Among other functions the administrative dashboard allows the auditor to maintain the overall 
system security, functionalities and definition of user access rights; create of user account; 
management of auditors assessment invitation to CSPs; control of audit platform; verification of 
CSP details and assessment invitation before being sent out by security auditors; notification 
services on completion of assessment, CSP response management, and acknowledgement of 
remedial plans by CSP.  
7.6.2 Security Auditor Dashboard  
Security Auditor Dashboard provides an auditor with the functionalities to perform a systematic 
assessment of CSPs conformity to requirements. It consists of many features that enable the 
auditor to establish requirements that will be audited, prepare security audit checklist, initiate the 
assessment process, gather and evaluate evidence from a CSP, establish and communicate the 
findings, and recommend remedial actions upon the completion of the assessment. Another 
important functionality provided by this feature is to enable an auditor to initiate the security audit 
by establishing contact with an inviting the CSP to commence the audit. This is achieved using 
an assessment invitation form that is embedded in the tool and managed by STAT administrator.  
The form consists of important details including the CSP’s name, the email address provided and 
the requirements that are being audited. This is followed by a request being sent to the CSP 
through a secure hyperlink and access credentials. The access credentials enable the CSP to log 
into STAT platform and access the checklist. In other words, the assessment invitation is 
automatically sent out to the CSP in a secure hyperlink that directly connects to the universal 
resource locator (URL) of the security audit checklist which comprises numerous questions 
prepared by the auditor  
Essentially, the auditor dashboard provides an interactive page for access to the default checklist 
that is composed of a predefined set of questions derived from industry standards, which is stored 
in the STAT platform. The focus of the checklist is the requirements that will be audited, with 
each requirement consisting of standard properties such as control domain, control type, question, 
CSP/user response and the type of evidence supplied by the CSP. Moreover, an auditor can 
modify the default checklist by adding, deleting or changing the questions. This is particularly 
important in situations where the auditor has identified the need to improve the dynamicity of the 
checklist or adaptive to the business context of the organisation. In case of modification, changes 
to the checklist are saved, encoded and sent to the MySQL server for storing.  
7.6.3 CSP Dashboard 
This is the feature that enables CSPs to participate in the assessment routine. The goal is to provide 
the capabilities for a CSP to access STAT platform and take part in the audit process by 
responding to questions in the checklist. In other words, it allows the CSP to answer the checklist 
with a view of providing evidence and enabling the cloud auditor to assess responses and evidence 
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provided. Once the CSP acknowledged the audit invitation sent by STAT administrator, access 
permission is granted using credentials issued by the administrator. The checklist then appears as 
a form, covering the requirements that have been earlier defined by the auditor. The CSP then 
answers the set of questions relevant to each requirement using a dual-type checkbox that allows 
them to toggle between two choices – ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.  Also, the evidence must be supplied by the 
CSP for every question that is answered with a “Yes” response. This is done by uploading and 
submitting documentary evidence that supports the CSPs’ assertion. Also, the dashboard allows 
the CSP to enquire the assessment or any other form of question they may have for the auditor. 
Lastly, audit findings and remedial actions recommended by the auditor are received by the CSP 
through this dashboard, who in return acknowledges and report back on the measures being taken 
to address the recommended actions.   
7.7 STAT Workflow  
This section provides a summarised narration of the steps and functions involved in the 
application of STAT with a view of helping users have an understanding of how the tool is used. 
The whole process is described in Fig 8.3.   
 
Figure 7.3: STAT Workflow 
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1. Once the tool is set up and configured, the STAT administrator creates a user account for 
an auditor that is charged with the responsibility of performing the assessment. Details 
such as name and email address are used for identifying the auditor; 
2. The auditor is issued login credentials for access to STAT platform, and the option to 
manage account settings and preferences. The auditor begins the assessment preparations 
by creating or using an existing audit checklist and assessment criteria, as well as 
selecting the company requirements that will be audited;  
3. The assessment properties prepared by the auditor are then stored in the STAT platform;  
4. The STAT administrator receives an instant notification about the completion of the 
auditor’s assessment properties, who then;   
5. Confirms the assessment properties and sends out an assessment invitation to the CSP 
through an email address of the CSP, containing a secure hyperlink and access 
credentials;  
6. When logged in, the CSP views the checklist form, provide responses, attach evidence 
where necessary and sends back to STAT platform;  
7. The STAT administrator receives the CSPs submitted checklist and evidence and notifies 
the auditor;  
8. Subsequently, the auditor begins the assessment by examining CSP responses, comparing 
evidence to audit criteria and determine a CSP’s conformance level based on an 
assessment of the evidence. In addition, the auditor generates assessment findings and 
establish remedial actions that must be implemented by the CSP; 
9. STAT platform collects findings and remedial actions;   
10. Sends a report to the CSP detailing findings and remedial actions that must be 
implemented;  
11. The CSP continuously sends an updated report about the implementation of remedial 
action; and   
12. STAT feeds the administrator about CSP update, who in turn notifies the auditor.   
7.7.1 Dashboard Views 
A preliminary view of the major dashboards in STAT is presented in this section.  The interface 
uses a straightforward plain layout with very little or no graphics. Information is displayed very 
clearly to users through HTML pages, with visualisation mechanisms that present information 
using graphical aids such as charts. As mentioned earlier, there are four main dashboards in 
STAT. First, the administrative dashboard, the auditor dashboard and the CSP dashboard. 
Screenshots from these dashboards are provided as below:  
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7.7.2 Administrative Dashboard  
7.7.2.1 Admin Login: 
This page enables STAT Administrator to log in with valid and authorised email address and 
password to carry out the task of administering Security Auditors and CSP’s and other important 
tasks on the dashboard. This page uses a sha256 Salt Hash Security mechanism to run a session 
check and transmit a valid or invalid result. If session check is valid, it means that the 
Administrator has provided a valid login credential and is being logged in to a secure dashboard 
page “index.php” if session check is invalid it means that the login details provided by the 
Administrator are invalid thereby prompting an Error message and redirecting the Admin to a 
Login page “login.php” to try again with the correct login credentials. 
Url: http://statportal.cbfnewsafrica.com  
Email: admin@admin.com 
Password: admin001 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Admin Login  
7.7.3.2 Admin Home Page  
This is the official landing page of the Admin if successfully logged in, and it comprises of the 
data display sheet with summed up figures of the CSP’s, the Auditors and the Audit requirements. 
To the left are the menu options navigable to linked pages and with various tasks.  
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Figure 7.5: Admin Home  
7.7.3.2 User Account Management  
User management i.e. (Create Security Auditor and CSP Accounts) through the “View Users 
Account” the admin can perform account management actions such as edit, delete or add a user  
View User Accounts Url: view_all_users.php 
 
Figure 7.6: Viewing user accounts  
Furthermore, the user account management enables the admin to add or create a user either as a 
“Security Auditor or as a CSP”, after filling the form, the admin is prompted to select a user role 
to enable the system to create a new user based on assigned role.  
Add User Account Url: add_user.php 
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Figure. 7.7: Adding user accounts   
7.7.3.3 Managing User Logs (Security Auditor/CSPs) 
This section enables the Admin to keep track of the particular task or actions being carried out by 
either a Security Auditor or the CSP. When a user is online, the status is represented by 1 when 
offline the status is 0. Also, is the log of the time and date of a user’s last visit and the most visited 
page and tasks performed 
 
Figure 7.8 Managing User Logs  
7.7.3.4 Manage Enquiry: 
This page enables the administrator to view all enquiry entries generated by the CSP. An enquiry 
may come in the form of a complaint, suggestion, submission of requirements or checklist etc. 
each submission by a user is tracked by the system's database and transmitted to the administrator 
in descending order with enquiry subject, date and time of submission. 
View Enquiry Url: view_enquiry.php 
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7.7.3.5 STAT Configuration Settings 
This feature comprises of some of the key components of STAT that allows the administrator to 
perform configuration settings such as email configuration and Short Messaging Services (SMS) 
configuration for sending and receiving assessment alerts.  The Email configuration entails the 
Email settings, Mail delivery Host, Mail port, Mail Username, Mail Password and Mail 
encryption. The Short Messaging Services involves the Sender ID, Username, Password and the 
Authentication Key. 
7.7.4 Security Auditor Dashboard  
7.4.4.1 Security Auditor Authentication   
This page enables the Security Auditor to log in with valid and authorised email address and 
password to carry out the task of assessing the checklists, requirements, criteria’s, results/findings 
and taking remedial actions through the assessment dashboard. This page uses a Hash MD5 
Security mechanism to run a session check and transmit a valid or invalid result. It also allows an 
auditor to gain access into the system by creating a new account with a preferred username, email 
address and password, the system processes the registration and verifies the authenticity of the 
username and email and its availability on the database “statportal_db” and table “auditor_user”.   
 
Figure 7.9: Security Auditor Authentication Form  
7.7.4.2 Security Auditor Dashboard  
Security Audit Dashboard provides the primary features of the assessment. It comprises of the 
data display sheet with summed up figures of the CSP’s, the Auditors and the Audit checklist 
requirements. To the left are the menu options navigable to linked pages and with various tasks.  
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Figure 7.10: Security Auditor Dashboard  
7.7.4.2 Audit Checklist 
This is the primary dashboard that allows the security auditor to select the requirements that will 
be assessed from a list of required options such as baseline, transparency, business, and 
operational, and prepare the audit checklist. The requirement and its checklist data are stored and 
retrieved from database name “statportal_db” database tables “tbl_baseline”, “tbl_transparency”, 
“tbl_business_data”, “tbl_operational_data”.  
The dashboard also enables the security auditor to make changes to the checklist by adding, 
editing, and deleting the overall or individual question within the checklist. After completion, the 
checklists are then stored in the STAT platform to be accessed by the CSP for a response. STAT 
administrator is then notified about the completion of the checklists by the security auditor.   
 
Figure 7.11: Creating a Checklist  
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Figure 7.12: Adding Questions to Checklists  
7.7.4.2 Audit Criteria  
This feature allows the security auditor to define and establish the audit criteria that will be used 
for assessing CSP responses and evidence supplied. The system merges the CSP User database 
table “csp_user” with the Checklist/Criteria database tables “tbl_baseline”, “tbl_transparency”, 
“tbl_business_data”, “tbl_operational_data” to check and track the answered checklist/criteria 
with each CSP’s User ID’s. It therefore tremendously reduces the workload of the security auditor 
by providing accurate records and a transparent auditing process; it also enables the security 
auditor to spend less time assessing and providing responses and remarks to its Answered 
Checklist criteria. 
 
Figure 7.13: Preparing Audit Criteria  
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Figure 7.14:  Audit Criteria  
7.7.4.3 Audit Report/Findings  
STAT allows an auditor to generate audit findings based on the assessments performed. 
Assessment findings are done compiled by the auditor detailing the conformance level achieved 
by the CSP. A bar chart data sheet is used for displaying the results for a more accurate and 
simplified visualisation. STAT automatically calculates from the specific requirement/criteria 
database tables “tbl_baseline”, “tbl_transparency”, “tbl_business_data”, “tbl_operational_data” 
through the value of evidence field: Conformance type (sum) Conformance Weight.  
7.7.5 CSP Dashboard 
This page enables the CSP to access STAT for carrying out essential tasks such as viewing and 
responding to checklists, uploading evidence, submitting a response to the checklist, receiving 
audit judgement from auditors and remedial actions that need to be implemented. The page uses 
a Hash MD5 security mechanism to run a session check and transmit a valid or invalid result.  
Login/URL details: 
Url: login1.php 
Email: csp001@csp.com 
Password: csp001 
 
7.7.5.1 CSP Dashboard  
This is the official landing page of the CSP when successfully logged in, and it comprises of the 
data display sheet with summed up figures of the CSP’s, the Auditors and the Audit checklist 
requirements. To the left are the menu options navigable to linked pages and with various tasks.  
 Dashboard Url: index.php 
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Figure 7.14: CSP Dashboard  
7.7.5.2 CSP Checklist Options  
This allows the CSP to select from the options for the available checklist i.e. Baseline, 
Transparency, Business and Operation to enable them to perform the task of viewing the 
requirements to be audited thereby responding to the checklist submitted by the Security Auditors 
with the accompanying evidence upload if required. The checklist data is stored and retrieved 
from database name “statportal_db” database tables “tbl_baseline”, “tbl_transparency”, 
“tbl_business_data”, “tbl_operational_data”. The requirement and its checklist also enable the 
CSP to view auditors submissions and take necessary actions on the checklist data types such as 
the “Target verification”, “Base measurement”, “Specification”, “Question” and Evidence 
Upload. The checklist data types are expected to be returned responded to by the CSP for proper 
transparency.  
Url: csp_baseline_response.php 
 
Figure 7.15: CSP Response to Baseline Checklists 
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7.6 STAT’s Non-Functional Requirements   
This section describes the tool’s attributes that serve as essential considerations in the design of 
the tool for supporting critical functionalities. These include performance, security, reliability 
maintainability, portability and usability.   
7.6.1 Performance  
Performance is a crucial property of the tool. For the tool to run effectively, the HTML pages 
have to be able to update data on the database. The database, at a reasonable speed, must be able 
to supply requested pages to users. This is predicted to be highly processor-intensive and the 
database server must be deployed to keep up with all user requests.  
7.6.2 Security  
Security is one of the prime focuses of STAT, and as such, various aspects of security will be 
measures that will be implemented. From a basic security perspective, a combination of username 
and password are required to log into administrative and security auditor interface, while CSP 
interface is accessed using secure login details. Besides, STAT can hold data that represent 
generic information about the CSP’s security practices and services, excluding sensitive or private 
data. As mentioned earlier, each feature is tied directly or indirectly to a user dashboard. 
Therefore, STAT uses the definitive users’ access-rights to limit the scope of information or data 
accessible to each user. Each user is given a different feature-view to access data. To ensure 
adequate security, the implementation of STAT is designed to meet the following requirements:  
 Each request to access CSP response and evidence must be authenticated to establish 
that an auditor is authorised to access the material that is requested.  
 All communication between client interface that is accessed using a standard web 
browser and the server-side of STAT must be secured by a transport mechanism that 
offers confidentiality and integrity of data being exchanged.   
7.7.3 Reliability  
To ensure the reliability of the tool, a secondary backup database server will be implemented such 
that in case of a failure occurring to the primary server or incidents resulting to nonresponse, the 
secondary server will automatically start supporting the services. Also, a synchronisation 
mechanism will be used to ensure the synching of these two database servers. The possible 
solutions for synchronising these two databases include: establishing a full periodic backup for 
the entire database, or a trigger being created where all data on the main database are 
automatically copied to the secondary database.   
7.6.4 Maintainability  
The maintenance requirements of the tool should be very minimal because an initial configuration 
and implementation will be the only required system interaction. One area of user maintenance 
would be changed to administrative changes after the system is set up. Physical maintenance on 
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the tool’s database server may be required, and this would result in a temporary loss of data and 
connectivity. Upgrades to hardware and software are predicted to have little or no effect on the 
tool but could result in downtime.  
7.6.5 Portability  
The tool is highly portable because once configured in a server, and it can be entirely moved to 
another server. The coding and program portability are possible between kernel-recompiled Linux 
distribution and Microsoft servers. However, for all the tool to work efficiently, all components 
must be compiled from source.    
7.6.6 Reusability  
The tool is designed such that the code is written in open-source programming languages and the 
components can be reused without having reusability issues.  
7.7 Summary  
In this chapter, the design and overview of STAT are presented. STAT is a specially designed 
tool that serves the role of supporting organisations to seek, collect and assess evidence from 
CSPs to establish how requirements are being fulfilled. The chapter provided the general 
description of the tool and the programming languages used in its development, such as PHP, 
HTML5, CSS and MySQL databases. It also presented design considerations, including the tool’s 
architecture which is made up of three layers namely presentation, application and database 
layers. All these layers serve different roles. Also, the features of the tool are designed according 
to three crucial dashboards namely: administrative, security auditor and CSP dashboards. These 
dashboards provide numerous functionalities that are formed based on the audit activity in the 
proposed CSTF. Also, the workflow of the tool is presented, which illustrates how the tool is used 
from start to end, supported by screenshots of the dashboards for better illustration. Lastly, non-
functional features that define the tool’s attributes such as performance, security, usability, etc. 
are also discussed.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Implementation and Validity of CSTF 
8.1 Introduction  
The CSTF presented in this research is a proposed solution that aims to address the many issues 
associated with security transparency and trust-related issues. Implementation is a principal 
activity and one of the most critical steps in the development process, especially for a framework 
of significant importance like CSTF. The implementation aims at rigorously providing clear-cut 
assessment for demonstrating the ability of the research to produce the desired effect (Straub et 
al., 2004). It also comprises a set of associated methodologies and techniques to provide the means 
to establish the value, quality and relevance of research, and in some cases, offers essential 
feedback as a basis for improvement (Boudreau et al., 2001). Some methods and techniques could 
be adopted such as action research, descriptive, and experimental methods.       
8.1.1 Empirical Research Method  
An empirical research method is chosen for the research. Empirical studies are increasingly 
becoming popular in information systems research (Runeson and Höst, 2009). It has proven to be 
an effective research method to collect relevant data for investigating a specific problem in 
information systems. Therefore, the case-study approach was employed to serve as the 
implementation approach for this research, whereby two companies were selected based on 
accessibility through the researcher’s contacts. A case-study approach is widely used in 
information systems research domain because it is useful for explanatory research projects, and 
serves as a basis for the development of well-structured research findings (Straub et al., 2004). 
The rationale behind employing a case-study is to obtain meaningful feedback regarding the 
validity and usefulness of CSTF as well as stakeholders view on the usefulness of STAT. Also, 
the author used questionnaires to collect feedback from stakeholders in the case-study contexts.   
Two sets of questionnaires were prepared to form the guiding principles for collecting data. In 
particular, the first questionnaire aims at collecting stakeholders’ perception and view about 
CSTF as a whole, while the second questionnaire is more specific to collecting stakeholder view 
about STAT in terms of its acceptability and validity to support security transparency. The 
questionnaires contain pre-formulated questions with defined response options. This 
consideration made the questionnaire highly relevant in obtaining feedback as the questions are 
clearly designed to help stakeholders express their view. Consequently, to efficiently collect 
feedback, it is imperative to develop the questionnaires using essential criteria that are formed 
according to established models for information systems adoption (Thong, 1999, Premkumar and 
Bhattacherjee, 2008). Specifically, these criteria are developed by considering Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) (Venkatesh et al., 2003) and Unified Theory of user Acceptance of 
Information Technology (UTAUT) proposed by Davis (Davis, 1989). The rationale behind these 
two models is that they are both widely used for assessing the organisation-level adoption of 
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various information systems products and services. Essentially, the criteria included ease of 
use/clarity, relevance, usefulness, flexibility and dynamics, compliance to security standards and 
best practices, trustworthiness (as shown in Appendix B and C).  
8.1.2 Data Collection  
At the initial stages of implementation, kick-off workshops were organised at each of the 
respective studied contexts. In each case, workshops were attended by senior management 
representatives and IT personnel with at least four years of working experience. The primary aim 
was to introduce the role of stakeholders in terms of the implementation exercises and feedback 
collection through the questionnaire. An overview of the process for CSTF and the essential 
features of STAT was introduced to help stakeholders develop an understanding of how the 
process/tool works, expected deliverables, procedures, and the methodology involved for data 
collection. Specifically, during the workshops, the process and implementation activities for 
CSTF were the focal point of presentation in case-study 1, whereas case-study 2 received more 
briefing on how to use STAT and its features.  
Thus, a total of 35 printed versions of the questionnaires were distributed across the two 
organisations. The respondents were introduced to the aim of the project and how their feedbacks 
can contribute towards validating CSTF/STAT and the overall research findings. They were 
briefed about the criteria followed in formulating the questionnaire. Besides, the possible 
responses are designed to fit the purpose and can be indicated as either “I strongly agree”, “I 
agree”, “Not sure”, or “Disagree”.  
Overall, a total of 31 questionnaires were returned by stakeholders from the two case-study 
contexts, implying a response rate of 88.5%. Table 8.1 provides a summary of the stakeholders 
that were involved and responses to the questionnaire within the studied case studies.  
Table 8.1: Summary of Responses from researched case-studies.  
Case-study  Stakeholders that Participated  Stakeholders that Responded   
Senior Mgt.   IT Personnel  Senior Mgt.   IT Personnel 
Case-study 1 5 13 4 12 
Case-study 2 2 15 2 13 
Total 7 28 6 31 
35 31 
  
8.1.3 Chapter Outline  
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part presents the overall implementation of the 
proposed CSTF, including the presentation of how data was collected and analysed. The case 
study is used to evaluate the implementation of CSTF from the first activity of the process through 
the last. This means that all the activities and steps involved have been applied to the case-study 
context, and stakeholders’ feedback is collected for analysis using six important criteria. The 
second part covers the implementation of STAT in the context of case-study 2. It includes the 
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application of the tool, as well as the collection of data for evaluating its usability and acceptability 
from stakeholder’s perspective. The third part provides a comparison between this research and 
other related others found in the literature. The final part deals with the discussions on overall 
findings in respect to the implementation and validation of the proposed framework. Figure 8.1 
shows an outline of the implementation approach for the proposed framework.    
 
Figure 8.1: Evaluation Approach for the Proposed Framework 
Part 1: Study 1 - Implementation of CSTF Process  
This section presents the implementation of CSTF process using case-study 1. By following the 
cloud transition process from the start to completion over some time, we were able to 
comprehensively apply most of the activities and steps within the CSTF’s process, as well as the 
opportunity to collect feedback towards evaluating its validity. Thus, a detailed description of the 
case-study is provided by firstly presenting background information and the existing system 
implementation, followed by the architecture for the migrated enterprise application. This is 
concluded by a practical demonstration of how the CSTF was achieved.   
8.2 Company Background  
The case-study is based on an anonymized company that specializes in property management in 
London. The company operates across multiple locations, with a total of 6 operational offices, 
five functional departments and a workforce of more than 100 employees. The company also has 
more than 2,000 properties under its management. The company uses an open-source enterprise 
content management (ECM) system that runs on PHP (server-side scripting language). ECM is 
generally a software that is designed to provide fundamental capabilities that allow users with 
limited or no technical expertise to create seamlessly, edit, review, categorize, index, and publish 
contents through user-friendly interfaces. The ECM facilitates the control, management, editing, 
and publishing of information and images on its website.  
The company’s staff worked with an ever-expanding document management solution (DMS), 
which is initially designed to complement their existing ECM software. The DMS is designed for 
capturing, archiving, indexing and retrieving data. It also enables the staff of the company to 
collaborate and manage the creation and flow of documents in a centralized repository, providing 
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solutions for gaining greater control of their business documents, information and processes. 
However, the computing resources of the company have been overburdened, leading to 
performance bottlenecks, in which the servers are slowing down to a crawl, thus slowing overall 
performance and affecting staff performance. The staff members found the system particularly 
frustrating and difficult to track, manage and store documents efficiently.   
8.2.1 Candidate System for Migration to Cloud 
To maximize solution effectiveness, increased efficiency and productivity, streamline services 
and achieve the highest degree of functionality to all users, the company has decided to outsource 
the DMS to the cloud. The company holds the opinion that outsourcing DMS to the cloud will 
address existing and potential challenges, as well as trigger the potential for more revenue and 
maintenance. Hence, the DMS has been designated as the candidate for cloud migration.  
8.2.2 Existing Architecture of DMS 
The current system is a web-based modular architecture that is built on Microsoft’s supported 
products and is  deployed on servers located in the data centre of the company. These include 
Windows Server 2003/2008 that serves as a document management server; Visual Studio for 
contents development; an SQL database that is used for storing and retrieving data. In particular, 
the system is implemented using.Net v.4 framework and other programming languages such as 
JavaScript for building many different frontend applications used by the company. In general, the 
DMS consists of four major components.   
 Frontend:  consists of a web server that provides a web interface and is directly accessed 
and interacted with by users to utilize backend capabilities residing on the document 
management server. It runs on Windows Operating System (OS) and is built using 
ASP.NET. In other words, the frontend module is responsible for communicating with 
and transferring user request and device information to backend servers. Also, the 
frontend consists of end devices that are responsible for communicating with the 
application server.   
 Backend: comprises a Windows server and a MySQL database server. The Windows 
server provides essential services to users and performs other computation tasks such as 
user management, device management and document management. The database server 
stores personal information of landlords, tenants, and other sensitive information. The 
personal information, such as name and password, are used for authorization and 
authentication. Users interact with applications in frontend to make several forms of 
requests to the backend. The backend consists of:  
o User management module: this module is responsible for the management of 
users within the company, including user identification, preferences, and profiles. 
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It also enables user group and roles that facilitates sharing and collaboration 
amongst users, and allow manipulations of documents.  
o Device management module:  this is responsible for the management of 
authorized devices used by users. It stores information about the device name, 
type, status and other essential device characteristics.  
o Document management module: this module provides three major functionalities 
for document management tasks such as document manipulation, 
synchronization and sharing. Document manipulation enables users to manage 
documents such as document creation, update, and deletion in addition to search, 
meta-data enriching and content preview. The Synchronization function enables 
cooperates with device agents to maintain data consistency between the 
document management server and user devices. The Share function enables 
document sharing among users, and it provides an efficient approach for users to 
share documents and facilitates collaboration among them.    
 Database Server contains custom configuration and user-created files. It also provides 
shared storage for all system components and also responsible for keeping asynchronous 
communication between the frontend and backend. Electronic documents are also 
uploaded and stored in the database, where XML task files are created which describes 
an executable task for the backend. Generally, the database contains sensitive information 
about landlords, tenants, personnel, sales, marketing, finance, etc.  
8.2.3 Deployment   
The document management system is currently deployed on multiple servers that are hosted on-
premise. Users from all branches of the company access the DMS and stored documents such as 
lease contracts, payments, landlord and tenant information etc. Once the cloud solutions are 
adopted, the company expects the CSP to allocate resources including virtual machines, 
networking, and virtual storage to achieve the required performance. On its part, the company 
will be responsible for installing and maintaining the Windows Server OS, .NET frontend 
applications, database and other components of DMS. The company believes that DMS can 
leverage the technological edge offered by cloud computing, including dynamicity, scalability 
and data replication. And being a small company, the management understands that expanding its 
infrastructure is not cost-effective.  
8.2.4 Concerns for Cloud Adoption  
The DMS handles a large volume of stored and real-time requests for documents creation, search 
and retrieval. If deployed in the cloud, the system must provide a consistent, transactional view 
of all user contents at all times, while also remaining dynamic for end-user needs. The company 
has some security transparency concerns regarding the adoption of cloud services. Firstly, it deals 
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with materials that require a high level of integrity and confidentiality, hence seriously concerned 
about potential issues relating to security and privacy, as well as the implementation and 
management of adequate security practices for securing the system by the CSP. Secondly, the 
management is particularly concerned about performance issues because all components of the 
system communicate over HTTP, which can be potentially harmful when storing and retrieving 
session data. Another concern is the conformance to specific security and other requirements of 
the system, such as integrity, trustworthiness, scalability, continuous availability of the system. 
The cloud is based on different technologies, security tools and practices that are generally 
difficult to monitor or measure. In general, the management of the company is concerned about 
whether the cloud offers sufficient transparency and whether it can sufficiently fulfil the company 
requirements.  
8.3 Practical Implementation of CST for Study Context 1  
As the company is considering the adoption of a cloud platform, we had the opportunity to follow 
the proposed process of CSTF to determine its relevance to a real-life context. As part of 
managing the entire implementation process, the company assigned a team of professional 
stakeholders to guide the execution of the whole implementation process, as well as ensuring 
necessary support to make sure implementation is achieved optimally. In this section, we provide 
a detailed description of how the CSTF was applied to case-study 1.  
Before starting the activities, we indulged in a business rules discovery process that enabled a 
preliminary study of the company and its systems. During this time, a meeting was organised 
where the overall implementation plan is decided, a project team developed, and initial steps taken 
towards establishing the activities of the process. The project team comprises representatives from 
senior management, the IT department and other stakeholders within the company, all of whom 
have more than four years of experience.  
The meeting commences with the project leader giving a brief presentation on CSTF, its aims, 
what the company can expect from the implementation, the role of participants, data collection 
approach, and a proposed meeting plan. The project leader also reiterated the company’s 
responsibilities concerning providing necessary information and documentation about the assets, 
business process, as well as allocating human resources with suitable expertise to participate in 
the implementation process. Hence, the implementation process was performed through a series 
of organised meetings, workshops and discussions as presented below.  
8.3.1 Activity 1: Stakeholder Analysis  
We started the activities defined in the proposed CSTF with stakeholder analysis, which allowed 
the identification and understanding of key actors, their interests within the company and the roles 
that they can play. This enabled us to interact more effectively with key actors for gathering 
information and the implementation of CSTF. By conducting the stakeholder analysis, we were 
also able to identify and prevent potential misconceptions about the positions and roles played by 
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each stakeholder, identify sources of information regarding the organization and the cloud 
migration project.  
8.3.1.1 Identified Actors  
During the preliminary meeting and interaction with stakeholders, we have been able to identify 
the key actors that will support or influence the project and the different roles they play within 
the organization. This is mainly done by considering the context where the DMS is being used 
and how it will be hosted. We also considered actors from within and outside the company; thus, 
they were categorized according to internal and external actors. To present a comprehensive 
picture of actors, we have created an actor list showing actors and their roles. Each actor has a 
certain degree of activeness. Some actors fully participated in the CSTF implementation, while 
other actors are rather passive.  
 Table 8.2: List of Actors  
Internal (Organisation) External  
Actor  Role  Actor Role 
Senior 
Management 
representatives  
Comprises high ranking personnel of the 
company whose responsibility is to 
coordinate, plan, oversee and direct the 
overall project.  
  
IT Managers In charge of the company’s technology 
strategy and responsible for 
coordinating and leading the IT 
experts/IT department of the company in 
implementing the process of the 
framework.   
  
System Analyst Responsible for coordinating the 
development of systems, asset 
requirements, and control measures for 
ensuring the security of all assets.  
  
Security Auditor Probes the safety and effectiveness of 
security controls and related security 
components of assets. Also, plans, 
execute and lead security audit, 
including evaluating the efficiency, 
effectiveness and compliance of 
business processes with organisation 
requirements, including generating a 
written report on audit findings. 
CSP  Provides computing, 
storage, processing and 
related automated 
processes for hosting 
essential components of the 
document management 
system over the internet. 
Content Manager  Responsible for approving content 
updates submitted by content editors and 
publishing all updates made to a 
document.  
  
System 
Administrator 
Responsible for the technical oversight 
of the entire content management 
system. Also charged with installing, 
supporting and maintaining servers, 
responding to service outages and other 
problems.   
  
Content Editor 
 
Responsible for handling day-to-day 
management and upkeep of contents, 
and optimisation of contents to meet 
business needs.  
  
Content Publisher  Responsible for releasing contents for 
use by other users. 
  
Registered users  Registered users those that have 
permission to use the system 
  
Security analyst  Responsible for identifying cyber threats 
and establishing plans and controls to 
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protect assets. Also responsible for 
performing vulnerability testing, risk 
analysis and security assessment 
activities 
 
8.3.2 Activity 2: Organizational Context  
Through senior management support and active involvement, we embarked upon initial 
knowledge extraction and organizational context discovery activity where we gathered initial 
information which facilitated the identification of the business strategy within the company. This 
enabled us to gain an understanding about the way things are done in terms of the company’s 
business process and the objectives to be achieved, followed by identifying the security goals that 
are part of an essential component of the company’s assets. During this time, the present 
architecture of software systems and applications were reviewed, the architectural components 
are identified, and the high-level dependencies between them were  established. We considered 
factors that influence its operations, such as the company’s structure and the system and processes 
by which work is carried out. Based on the acquired knowledge, we established asset profiles 
consisting of security goals, criticality and the business process.   
8.3.2.1 Assets Profile for DMS 
To create a consistent asset profile, the IT manager was involved in explaining and documenting 
the system and its components, which provided the basis to identify assets and their security 
needs.  The IT manager also presented a comprehensive overview of the DMS, which will be the 
target of analysis, from where we observed that the system comprises many different components. 
Based on these discussions, we analysed the architecture of the system intending to identify all 
dependencies, including how information is stored, processed and transported. By doing this, we 
were able to identify its assets, including data and applications. The asset profile is crucial because 
it can be utilized when developing and applying protection strategy, as well as risk mitigation 
plans for the system. We prepared an initial asset inventory of DMS together with details of the 
assets as shown in Table 8.3).  
8.3.2.2 Security Goals of DMS Assets  
After completing and agreeing on the asset inventory, the team turned its attention to identifying 
the security goals of DMS system. The security analyst conducted a high-level brainstorming 
exercise together with other team members to identify the most crucial security goals for the assets 
identified in the previous step. Security goals outline the qualities that an asset must aim to protect. 
At first, some representatives of the company emphasised that they are particularly concerned 
about the privacy of data held by the system. However, the security analyst explained that the 
team had reviewed the information collected during the previous step and examined every 
functional requirement. Hence, after a discussion, the project team decided to focus on the security 
goals of the system’s known characteristics and security goals to include:  
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 Confidentiality: confidentiality goals are primarily intended to ensure that no 
unauthorised access to data, application and other assets is permitted, and that accidental 
disclosure is not possible. Information or data on all the system’s components should be 
restricted to only those with the permission to access.  
 Integrity: it must be ensured that data and applications of the DMS are safe from 
unauthorised modification and can be modified only by authorised users. It also provides 
the accuracy and completeness of records, and only authorised users should be allowed 
to modify contents.   
 Availability: data and resources must be made available for authorised use without 
interference or obstruction. Data, application, and other system resources must be 
available when requested and easily accessible to authorised users.  
 Accountability: The ability to trace activities or operations that occur to data, 
applications or system components to a particular source. All users must be accountable 
for the operations they have performed.  
 Conformance: the system must operate as intended without any variation to expected 
behaviour, functions and regulatory requirements. The system must also be secured from 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited to cause unwanted behaviour.   
8.3.2.3 Assets Criticality  
Having identified assets of the system and associated security goals, the project team embarked 
on the next step of assigning criticality level to all the assets identified in the previous step. The 
criticality level is determined and assessed in greater detail as part of the asset profiling activity. 
Critical assets are those that are essential for supporting the DMS and the operations of the 
company. The security analyst determined the criticality of assets by applying a novel asset 
criticality system using fuzzy logic as proposed in the CSTF process.   
8.3.2.4 Business Process  
The business process identification and mapping workshop were organised to facilitate the 
discovery of business processes. The workshop brought together senior management from all 
units within the company to acquire valuable information from them in one instance. We set the 
context of the workshop and its objective communicated to capture the right information on how 
tasks are performed and executed within the company. The senior management provided a view 
of the process in their respective domains and leading questions were asked to understand the 
business process handovers from different units. Notes from all information from different unit 
managers were taken and provided a good view of the business process. These sessions served as 
a learning experience that revealed not only details about the business process, but also a business 
hierarchy, business rules, process operations and the assets required to support the business 
process.   
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Table 8.3 Asset Inventory  
Asset  
ID 
Asset Name Asset Description Business Process Security Goals Asset Criticality Required Protection 
Low 
Criticality  
Moderately 
Critical 
Highly 
Critical  
Basic  Average  Significant  
01 Document management 
server 
Provides customers with the capability 
to create, store and manage documents 
and content electronically.  The service 
incorporates digitization of existing 
documents and the means to manage 
information and data through workflow 
and process automation. 
Assets and content 
management  
Availability  
Integrity  
Authentication  
Conformance  
  *   * 
02 Databases Stores information about the company’s 
customers, personnel, marketing, 
landlords, tenants, transactions, assets, 
finances, and other information about 
the company’s business process.   
Assets and content 
management  
Integrity  
Confidentiality 
Availability 
Accountability  
Conformance  
  *   * 
03 Company and customer 
data  
Represent sensitive and private 
information about employees, tenants, 
landlords, finances, assets, etc.   
Operations and services Integrity  
Confidentiality  
Availability  
Conformance  
Accountability  
  *   * 
04 Web & Application 
Servers   
Provides, processes and delivers web 
contents such as images and assets 
information to employees and 
customers. The application server  
provides the platform for hosting 
frontend applications used by the 
company 
Web contents 
managements  
Availability  
Integrity  
 
 *   *  
05 Frontend Application Provides the user interface that allows 
employees and customers to visualise, 
access, and patronise the company’s 
services.  
Service delivery  Availability  
Accountability  
Integrity  
 *   *  
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8.3.3 Risk Management  
The next activity involved a risk management process, whose goal is to identify as many potential 
threats, vulnerabilities and risks as possible. The activity was also organised as a workshop with inputs 
from actors with expertise on risk management. The actors involved in this activity included the security 
analyst, security auditor and members of senior management. Also, various methodologies and 
standards were employed at various steps of performing risk management. All participating actors were 
briefed about the parts of the standard/methodologies used and the benefit of doing so.   
8.3.3.1 Threats Profile  
The analysis team moved on to create a threat profile which contains the threats that can potentially 
affect assets and compromise sensitive information. To direct this process, the project’s team members, 
a security analyst and system administrator were brought together to conduct an informed brainstorming 
session to identify a detailed list of threats. A list of security threats compiled by ENISA and CSA was 
presented to the team. Firstly, the team started with identifying a combined list of 10 security threats 
that they perceived to be important to the company’s assets. After a brief reconsideration, the list was 
updated with two additional threats.   
Secondly, the previously short-listed security threats had to be ranked. STRIDE and DREAD models 
were introduced to the participants to get an understanding and provide an approval of the 
methodologies that will be used for ranking the threats. STRIDE model was used to identify, and 
evaluate threats for determining whether tthreats threats fall under one of such categories as spoofing 
identity; tampering with data; reputation; information disclosure; denial of service; and elevation of 
privilege. In this regard, the team considered all potential threats from the perspective of hosting the 
DMS on-premise and in the cloud. Moreover, DREAD model is used for determining impact rating for 
the threats by asking the participants a set of questions according to damage potential, reproducibility, 
exploitability, affected users, and discoverability of threats. The adoption of these two models proved 
to be a simple, yet effective way to identify, categorise and determine the impact of potential threats, 
and it led to the participants having a better understanding of threat elements. It also mitigates any 
problem that may arise as a result of using simplistic threat categorisation and rating system, which are 
likely to be rejected by the team members. Thus, to document the threats associated with the assets, a 
template that shows several threat attributes is used. The security analyst documents the result of the 
meeting by filling a threat profile as shown in table 8.4 
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Table 8.4 Threat Profile  
Threat 
ID 
Threat Name Description  Threat Category  Target Assets Threat Severity 
S T R I D E D R E A D Severity Rating  
T01 Data breach  Incidents involving unauthorised access, damage, alteration and disclosure of 
confidential data company data such as financial records, personal data for 
landlords and tenants, etc. A data breach can be the primary objective of a 
targeted attack or the result of human error, application vulnerabilities or 
poor security practices.   
   *   Company and 
customer data  
3 2 3 2 3 High  
T02 Weak identity, 
credential and 
access 
management 
The lack of scalable identity access management, weak multifactor 
authentication and lack of on-going automated rotation of cryptographic 
keys, passwords and certificates leading to data breach and system 
compromise.   
      Application and 
databases  
2 3 3 2 3 High  
T03 Insecure APIs Malicious exploitation of application programming interface (APIs) and user 
interface (UI) that users use to interact with cloud services leading to the 
compromise of integrity, availability, confidentiality and accountability of 
user assets. 
 * * *  * Frontend 
application 
3 2 1 2 2 Medium  
T04 System and 
application 
vulnerabilities 
The exploitation of system vulnerabilities and bugs in programs to infiltrate 
cloud systems with the intent of stealing data, control or disrupting cloud 
service operations.    
* * * * * * Application, 
database, 
company and 
customer data.  
3 2 3 3 3 High  
T06 Malicious 
insiders 
Involve instances where current or former cloud employees, contractors, or 
third party service supplier who have authorised access to a cloud network, 
systems or data, intentionally misuse their privilege in a manner that 
negatively compromises the confidentiality, integrity or availability of an 
organisation’s assets 
* *  *   Application, 
databases, 
company and 
customer data.   
3 2 3 2 1 Medium  
T07 Advanced 
persistent 
threats (APIs) 
Includes the application of sophisticated techniques using malware and 
cyberattacks that exploit vulnerabilities and infiltrates cloud systems to 
   *  * All assets  3 1 1 3 1 Medium  
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establish a foothold in computing infrastructure used by the organisation 
from which data and intellectual property are smuggled out. 
T08 Data loss The compromise of valuable and sensitive data hosted in cloud infrastructure 
due to malicious attacks, theft, accidental deletion, or physical catastrophe 
such as an earthquake.    
  *  *  All data  2 2 1 2 1 Medium  
T09 Insufficient due 
diligence 
Insufficient exercise of due diligence before  adopting cloud services to 
determine the risks and mitigation strategies put in place by the CSP and 
review the control 
* * * * * * All  assets  3 3 2 2 1 Medium  
T10 Abuse and 
nefarious use of 
cloud services 
Spammers, hackers and other criminals take advantage of the convenient 
registration, simple procedures and relatively anonymous access to cloud 
services to launch various attacks 
    *  All assets  2 1 1 3 2 Medium  
T11 Denial of 
service 
A malicious attack that focuses on shutting down cloud resources such as 
networks, applications, services and operating systems, making it 
inaccessible to legitimate users 
    *  All assets  2 1 1 2 1 Low  
T12 Shared 
technology 
vulnerabilities 
Misconfigurations, breaches and flaws in cloud resources, infrastructure, 
platforms and applications shared by users affect the organisation. 
   *  * All assets  1 2 2 1 1 Low  
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8.3.3.2 Creation of a Risk Register  
The analysis team had created a threat profile based on inputs from other participants, threat category 
and impact rating have now been approved. They have also developed the vocabulary needed to start 
identifying and assessing the risks that can impact assets. The analysis team embarked upon a series of 
structured workshops to identify risks, estimate likelihood, impact and control measures.  
The first workshop entailed the identification of risks. The participants were presented with multiple 
sources of risks that are usually associated with cloud computing and assets of all types. Industry bodies 
provided the risk sources and they are regularly updated, which means that they offered up-to-date 
information about the most pressing security risks associated with assets hosted in the cloud. In 
particular, a list of risks provided by OWASP and ENISA was presented in the workshop, and the 
participants were tasked with selecting risks they perceive to be relevant. A combined list of 23 risks 
was identified but later narrowed down to 15 as shown in Table 8.5.  
The second workshop was organised to enable the analysis team to estimate the likelihood and impact 
values of risks identified. During the workshop, all participants were engaged to provide an estimate 
that is as correct as possible. Hence, OWASP risk rating methodology was  presented. The main idea 
behind using OWAS methods is that since the participants represent different expertise, they are likely 
to have a different opinion regarding the evaluation of risk likelihood and impact values.  
Lastly, another workshop was organised to identify the necessary control measures for reducing or 
subdue risk. During this exercise, the analysis team was given a list of potential controls drafted by 
ENISA and CSC CIS. These controls provide a defence-in-depth set of best practices that are 
implementable to mitigate most forms of risks. Then, the analysis team was involved in a discussion to 
identify potential control measures and decided on which ones will control or reduce the risks to 
acceptable levels. Most of the control measures were taken from CSC CIS, while others were derived 
from ENISA especially in situations where CSC CIS have not provided controls for specific risks. 
Finally, a risk register was created showing the risks, likelihood, impact and control measures as shown 
in table 8.5  
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Table 8.5 Risk Register  
Risk Name  Risk 
ID  
Risk Likelihood  Impact to Security goals  Control Measures  Security Measures  
EoD  EoE Aw I_D  Conf.  Int.  Ava.  Acc.  Con Fin. RD NC PV  
Disruption of business 
process  
R01 Med High Med Low - - Med  - Med  Med  High Low  - Robust and effective implementation of 
data recovery capabilities, business 
continuity and disaster recovery plans, 
policies and processes that ensure the 
continuity of services in the face of 
disruptive events. Regular third-party 
audits to demonstrate adherence to 
standards, procedures and policies, and to 
establish the adequacy of restore 
procedures, including the accurate 
complete and timely recovery of business 
functions and services. Specific controls 
include:  
 Documented incident response 
procedures  
 Designated personnel to support incident 
handling  
 Running automated vulnerability 
scanning  
Failure to provider 
security transparency 
and accountability by 
the CSP 
R02 Med High  Low  High  - - - Med Med  - Med  Med  - Regular and periodic performance of 
third-party audits to monitor CSPs 
compliance to security practices, 
effective implementation of proactive 
and reactive controls which should 
include data auditing, information 
tracking, log recording and supervising, 
hazard identification, and policy 
implementation. The CSP should ensure 
that all access and changes to the 
company’s assets produce auditable trails 
or record that include clear indications of 
any delegations of identity or 
authorisation of all activities executed. 
Specific controls should include:   
 Publish information regarding 
reporting computer anomalies and 
incidents 
 Implementing automated monitoring 
and detection systems 
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 Regular review of audit logs  
Inability of the CSP to 
meet compliance 
needs of data and 
services 
R03 Low  Low High  Low  - - - - Med  - Med High   The CSP should be willing to undergo 
periodic security audits and present 
necessary security certifications that 
demonstrate compliance to relevant 
regulatory bodies. The CSP should also 
ensure meeting compliance obligations 
specific to specific laws and regulations 
within the UK, and all other laws and 
regulations formally documented in 
governance policies of the company such 
as ISO standards, Sarbanes Oxley Act, 
NIST Framework, COBIT, CSA STAR, 
and FEdRamp.  
Inadequate data and 
application security, 
administration and 
control.  
R04 High  Med  High  Low  Med  Med  - - Low  Med  High Med  High  The existence of robust and effective 
security controls must be provided by the 
CSP, which provide assurance to the 
company regarding how data and 
applications are adequately secured 
against unauthorised access, change and 
destruction. A regular review and 
monitoring of user access must be 
performed, including the security 
administration of data and adequacy of 
rights, segregation duties, handling and 
disclosure of changes to asset status. 
Formal procedures should be 
implemented to prevent, detect and react 
to security breaches. Primary controls 
included are:  
 Establishing a penetration test 
program, and conducting regular 
external and internal penetration 
tests 
 Use of vulnerability scanning tools  
 Documenting penetration tests using 
open, machine readable standards.   
 Automated operating system patch 
management  
 Use of multifactor authentication for 
administrative access across all 
assets 
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Unavailability of 
critical data and assets 
R05 High  Med High  Low  - - High  - - High High Low - The CSP should provide significant 
guarantees against loss of critical data 
and services. Adequate back-up, recovery 
schemes, and data replication policies 
should be implemented by the CSP, 
which aim to prevent data loss, 
destruction and disruption of services. 
The CSP should provide proof the 
adequacy of restore procedures including 
accurate, complete and recovery of data.  
 Ensuring regular automated backups  
 Performing complete system 
backups  
 Testing data on backup media 
Loss of data integrity 
and unauthorised 
changes to assets 
R06 Med  Med  Low  Med  - High  - - - Low Med Low low Data segregation should be enforced 
using correctly defined through adequate 
and secure configuration of virtual 
machines and hypervisors hosting the 
system. All changes to assets should be 
managed in order to minimize the 
chances of malicious disruption, 
unauthorised changes and errors. 
Adequate control measures should be 
used including compliance to standards 
and policies, formal approval and 
acceptance of changes. The CSP must 
maintain sufficient audit logs that no 
unauthorised changes have occurred 
during a specified period. Controls 
included are:  
 Deploying system configuration 
management tools  
 Establishing secure configurations  
  
Data loss and leakage   R07 Med  Med  High  Low  High  Med High  Low Med High High Med High  Reactive and proactive security controls 
must be implemented to ensure the 
security and prevent unauthorised use, 
disclosure, damage or loss of data. 
Adequate back-up, recovery schemes, 
and data replication policies should be 
implemented by the CSP, which aim to 
prevent data loss, destruction and 
disruption of services. The CSP should 
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provide proof the adequacy of restore 
procedures including accurate, complete 
and recovery of data. 
 Data encryption both in transit and at 
rest 
 Monitoring and detection of 
unauthorised usage 
 Maintaining an inventory of data  
 Enforcing access control 
 Ensuring regular automated data 
backups  
 Performing complete system 
backups  
Failure to satisfy 
stipulated 
requirements by the 
CSP 
R08 Med  Med  Low  Low  Med  Med low - High  High Low Low low Periodic performance of audits and 
probing of CSP for establishing the 
fulfilment of requirements. The CSP 
must comply to standard, including 
Service Organisation Control (SOC)2, 
ISO 27001, NIST 899 and CSA  
 
Where: EoD = ease of discovery; EoE east of exploit; Aw = awareness; I_D = intrusion detection. Conf = confidentiality; Int. = integrity; Aav = availability; 
Acc = accountability; conf = conformance. Fin = financial; RD = reputation damage; RD = noncompliance; PV = privacy violation    
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8.3.4 Activity 4: Requirements Specification 
The next activity involves requirement specification, which was also organised as a workshop involving 
the risk management team members who decide and establish security controls from different 
perspectives that must be met by any potential CSP. During the seminar, the security analyst presented 
the risk register, while also reiterating the need to make a formal specification of requirements using 
existing risk control or develop a new compilation of security controls from CSA CCM. Thus, it was 
proposed that requirements be should be specified according to four fundamental categories, namely 
security transparency requirements, baseline security requirements, business requirements and 
operational security requirements. The participants became involved and based on their expert opinion; 
requirements are specified as shown in Table 8.6:  
191 
 
Table 8.6: Requirements Specification   
Requirement  Control Domain) Control Type Control ID Specification  
Transparency  Supply chain mgmt., transparency 
& accountability 
Data quality & Integrity  T1 CSP should work with their supply –chain partners to ensure data quality 
errors and associated risks are prevented. Providers should also design and 
implement controls to mitigate and contain data security risks through 
adequate access controls, separation of duties and least privilege access to 
all personnel within their supply chain.  
Incident reporting  T2 Information about security incidents that affected customers should be made 
available by the CSP through electronic methods such as portals.  
Provider Internal Assessments T3 Internal security assessments should be performed at least annually to 
establish conformance and effectiveness of policies, procedures and 
supporting measures.   
Third-party agreement  T4 Supply chain agreements between the CSP and the organisation shall 
incorporate the scope of business relationship covered and the services 
offered;   information security requirements; notification and/or pre-
authorization of any changes controlled by the provider with customer 
impacts; timely notification of a security incident to customers; assessment 
and independent verification of compliance with agreement terms; 
expiration of the business relationship and treatment of customer. 
Third-party providers T5 There should be reasonable information security across their supply chain, 
which includes all third-party providers upon which the CSP’s information 
supply chain depends.    
Identity and access management  Audit tools access T6 There should be appropriate restriction and segmentation access to, and use 
of audit tools that interact with the organisation’s information systems to 
prevent compromise and misuse of log data? 
User access 
restriction/authorisation  
T7 Policies and procedures should be established to ensure identities are only 
accessible based on rules of least privilege.    
Infrastructure & virtualisation 
Security  
Audit detection  T8 A high level of assurance should be provided regarding the protection, 
retention and policy management of audit logs that adhere to applicable 
legal, statutory, and regulatory compliance obligations. User access 
accountability should also be provided for detecting potential suspicious 
behaviours and file integrity anomalies and supporting forensic 
investigations in the event of a security breach.  
Audit assurance & compliance  Independent audits T9 Intended reviews and assessments should be performed to support the 
organisation address nonconformities of established requirements, 
standards, policies, procedures and compliance obligations.   
Application & interface security  Customer access requirements  T10 Security, contractual and regulatory requirements for the organisation should 
be addressed prior to granting access to an organisation’s assets.  
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Baseline requirements  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Datacentre security  Controlled access points  B1 There must be a classification of assets according to business criticality, 
service-level expectations, and operational continuity requirements of the 
organisation. A complete inventory of business-critical assets located 
geographical locations must be maintained and regularly updated, with 
defined roles and responsibilities.     
Equipment identification  B2 Before granting access request, automated mechanisms should be used to 
identify connection request based on equipment location. 
Policy  B3 A safe environment must be provided in rooms and facilities that store 
sensitive assets by establishing strong policies and procedures, implemented 
business process.   
User access  B4 Physical access to facilities storing critical assets must be restricted and 
controlled.  
Encryption & key mgmt. Key generation  B5 Policies and procedures for managing cryptographic keys in the cloud 
service cryptosystem must be established.   
Storage and access  B6 Appropriate platform and data encryption validated formats and standard 
algorithms should be implemented while making sure that keys are not 
stored in the cloud but maintained by a trusted vital management provider.  
Identity & access management  Diagnostic configuration ports 
access 
B7 User access to diagnostic and configuration ports shall be restricted to 
authorised individuals and applications. 
User ID Credentials  B8 User accounts credentials  should be restricted in line with appropriate 
identity entitlement, and access management and according to established 
policies and procedures   
Source code access restriction  B9 Access to applications, programs, object source, and other forms of 
intellectual property belonging to the organisation should be restricted by 
following the rules of least privilege based on job function as per established 
user access policies and procedures of the organisation.  
Utility program access B10 All utility programs that could potentially override system, object, network, 
virtual machines and applications should be restricted 
 Human resources  Asset returns  B11 Policies and procedures should be established that ensure organizationally-
owned assets are returned within an established period upon the termination 
or expiration of cloud service contract. 
  
Business  
  
  
  
Business community mgmt. & 
operational resilience  
Business continuity planning  BS1 Procedures and policies shall be established for a unified framework that 
documents and ensures business continuity plans ensures business continuity 
plan are consistent in addressing priorities for testing, maintenance and 
development according to organisation’s requirements.  
Business continuity testing BS2 There should be planned testing of Implemented business continuity and 
security incident response plans on regular intervals or upon significant 
changes to CSP’s environmental factors.   
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Resource provisioning  BS3 Cloud resources should be sufficiently provisioned according to 
organisation’s requirements.   
Identity & Access Management  Third-Party Access  BS4 A risk management assessment should be used to identify, assess and 
prioritise risks posed by business processes requiring third-party access to 
the organisation’s assets. Followed by a coordinated application of resources 
to minimize, monitor and measure the likelihood and impact of unauthorised 
access to assets.  
Security incident management, e-
discovery, & cloud forensics 
Incident Response Legal 
Preparation 
BS5 Appropriate forensic procedures and processes, including chain of custody 
should be maintained for the presentation of evidence to support potential 
legal action subject to relevant jurisdiction after a security incident. An 
organisation and other external parties impacted should be allowed to 
participate as per statutory requirements of forensic investigation.  
 Governance and Risk 
Management 
Baseline Requirement 
 
BS6 Baseline security requirements that comply with applicable legal, statutory, 
and regulatory compliance should be established for organizationally-owned 
assets. Any deviation following change management policies and procedures 
must be authorised. Compliance with security baseline requirements should 
be periodically reassessed  
Operational  
  
Threat and vulnerability 
management  
Antivirus/malicious software  OP1 Technical measures, including policies and procedures, should be 
established to prevent the execution of malware on organizationally-owned 
assets 
 Vulnerability/patch management OP2 Technical measures, policies and procedures should be implemented and 
established to enable timely detection of vulnerabilities within 
organizationally-owned assets to ensure the efficiency of security controls. 
A remediation approach for mitigating vulnerabilities should also be used. 
The CSP should inform the organisation of policies and procedures and 
identified weaknesses especially if the organisation is affected by emerging 
vulnerabilities.   
Governance and risk management  Risk assessments  OP3 Risk assessments associated with data governance requirements shall be 
conducted at planned intervals and consider: the awareness of where 
sensitive data is stored and transmitted. Compliance with defined retention 
periods and end-of-life disposal requirements; data classification and 
protection from unauthorised use and access.  
  
Datacentre security  Data centre security and asset 
management  
OP4 Processes, procedures and controls should be implemented for ensuring 
physical security parameters for safeguarding sensitive assets.   
Application & Interface Security Application Security OP5 The provisions and recommendations of industry standards should be 
followed in the design, development, deployment and testing of applications 
and programming interfaces (APIs) 
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Interoperability & Portability APIs OP6 The provider shall use open and published APIs to ensure support for 
interoperability between components and to facilitate migrating 
applications. 
Data request  OP7 All structured and unstructured data shall be available to the customer and 
provided to them upon request in an industry-standard format (e.g., .doc, 
.xls, .pdf, logs, and flat files). 
Policy & Legal OP8 Policies, procedures, and mutually-agreed-upon provisions and/or terms 
shall be established to satisfy customer (tenant) requirements for service-to-
service application (API) and information processing interoperability, and 
portability for application development and information exchange, usage, 
and integrity persistence. 
Standardized Network Protocols OP9 The provider shall use secure (e.g., non-clear text and authenticated) 
standardized network protocols for the import and export of data and to 
manage the service, and shall make available a document to consumers 
(tenants) detailing the relevant interoperability and portability standards that 
are involved. 
Virtualisation  OP10 The provider shall use an industry-recognized virtualization platform and 
standard virtualization formats (e.g., OVF) to help ensure interoperability, 
and shall have documented custom changes made to any hypervisor in use, 
and all solution-specific virtualization hooks, available for customer review. 
Data Security & Information 
Lifecycle Management 
Classification OP11 Data and objects containing data shall be assigned a classification by the data 
owner based on data type, value, sensitivity, and criticality to the 
organization. 
Change Control & Configuration 
Management 
Outsourced Development OP12 External business partners shall adhere to the same policies and procedures 
for change management, release, and testing as internal developers within 
the organization (e.g., ITIL service management processes). 
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8.3.5 Activity 5: Assessing various CSPs 
As the company is yet to adopt a specific CSP and migrate to the cloud, it becomes imperative to 
perform a comparative assessment of the security transparency services offered by various CSPs. 
The security transparency of CSPs elaborates the steps and actions taken towards fulfilling 
customer requirements and controlling security risks. A workshop was organised consisting of 
multiple team members. The team comprises representatives who have experience in the field of 
cloud computing, including system administrator, IT manager, and security analyst. They were 
briefed on the steps involved for collecting information, and the assessment questions and criteria 
that are used for determining suitable CSPs. The team then embarked on exploring commercially 
available CSPs that provide security transparency mechanisms for divulging information to 
existing and potential customers and subsequently performed the assessment. Hence, nine popular 
CSPs were initially identified for consideration but later reduced to four for the evaluation. The 
real names of the CSPs have been anonymized to conceal their real identity.  
8.3.5.1 Collected Information 
The assessment team used various channels and sources of information for discovering the extent 
of disclosure supported by the respective CSPs chosen for analysis. The focus is to establish how 
each of the CSPs can satisfy the requirements earlier specified in activity 5. Moreover, while all 
the CSPs support various forms of disclosing information, some have a greater depth of disclosure 
than others. Additionally, most of the CSPs have accessible public information published on their 
web portals, security whitepapers and reports, while other types of information are contained in a 
security audit reports that are shared with the assessment team after contacting the CSPs. 
However, information collected is not included in this thesis due to the size and nature of the 
information.  
8.3.5.2 Performing the Assessment  
The team proceeded to perform the assessment based on the information collected and using 
questions that are formulated according to the principles of security transparency, as presented in 
Chapter Four. A measurement metric is also applied, which uses a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ for assigning 
score value to each question. If the answer to a question is ‘Yes’, then a value of 1 is assigned, 
meaning that the CSP has achieved an aspect of security transparency relating to that question. A 
‘No’ answer attracts a value of 0 which implies the CSP does not meet the respective principle of 
security transparency in that regard. Measurement criteria that reflect the deployment practices of 
security transparency (i.e. opaque and explicit transparency) are applied for determining the type 
of security transparency proffered by each CSP.  
From the assessment shown in table 8.7, it is discovered that all four CSPs have achieved explicit 
security transparency. CSP A scored 5, CSP B scored 7, while CSP C and D scored 6 respectively. 
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However, it is observed that CSP B gained the highest score of 7, which justifies the perception 
that CSP B has a higher degree of transparency than the others.  
Further, the top management decided to migrate the DMS to the cloud and consolidate existing 
services to a centralised infrastructure-as-a-service solution that is hosted and maintained by CSP 
B. The IaaS incorporates necessary technologies that all work together to host the assets of the 
DMS. This implied that the IT systems in 6 locations of the company’s offices have been merged 
into a unified system that is hosted and maintained by the CSP. Also, all data and applications 
have been consolidated and all locations now work seamlessly together in the same cloud service 
environment. A testing process was performed to check all applications that have been migrated 
are working correctly; confirm that all data have been migrated successfully; ensure all company 
and business data have been migrated and consolidated successfully, and ensure all peripherals in 
both locations are installed and configured correctly.  
Moreover, during the transition to cloud services provided by CSP B, a Service Level Agreement 
(SLA) was signed, which is a contractual agreement that is composed of many clauses that 
describe the responsibilities of the company and obligations of the CSP in implementing security 
mechanisms, ensuring their effectiveness, and ensuring fulfilment of the set of specific 
requirement earlier specified. Another vital part of the agreement explicitly underlined a right-to-
audit clause that stipulates the need for an independent assessment to be conducted at quarterly 
intervals by an auditor assigned by the company to ensure the security and privacy of assets, and 
compliance to requirements, which must be supported by the CSP with the provision of necessary 
evidences that are required as part of the audit. The agreement also covers the use of STAT as a 
supporting for conducting the assessment. The tool’s features were elaborately described to the 
CSP including how it can be used for providing evidence and the procedure for implementing 
remedial actions. In general, the agreement covered all aspects of the processes involved in the 
use of STAT and the CSP obliged to support its use. Training regarding the use of STAT was 
given to a customer representative assigned by the CSP, including their role and how all features 
for CSP dashboard can be executed.   
Table 8.7: CSP Assessment  
Security 
Transparency 
Principle 
Relevant Question CSPs Assessed 
CSP
A 
CSP
B 
CSP 
C. 
CSP 
D 
Availability  Does the CSP publish information relating to their security practices, 
policies and procedures as well as the status of customer assets being 
hosted in its cloud platform?  
1 1 1 1 
Clarity  Does the CSP publish information relating to security practices and 
procedures that is clear, precise, unambiguous, and which can be 
objectively interpreted by customers?   
0 1 1 1 
Current  Does the CSP publish up-to-date information regarding any changes to 
customer assets, policies, procedures, practices or current trends that might 
compromise customer assets?  
0 1 1 0 
Relevance  Does the CSP publish information that is relevant to the context of 
customer assets in terms of satisfying security requirements and addressing 
risks? 
1 1 1 1 
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Notification  Does the provider support tools, features or services for timely reporting 
of unauthorised activities, incidents, operations, or processes that might 
affect or that affected customer assets?   
1 1 1 1 
Verifiable  Does the CSP support features and components that generate system and 
activity logs as evidence for tracing and verifying operational events of 
systems hosting customer assets?    
1 1 0 1 
Free/Low cost Does the CSP publish information relating to policies, procedures and 
activities at a low cost or free of charge? 
1 1 1 1 
 Total  5 7 6 6 
Transparency Type   Expl
icit 
Expl
icit 
Explic
it 
Expl
icit 
 
8.3.6 Activity 6: Security Audit  
The first step in the audit process is confirming with the top management when the audit will take 
place, which also provides an insight as to how often the cloud services will be audited.  Three 
months after the successful migration, an audit team is created and assigned the responsibility to 
perform to evaluate the CSP’s services and establish whether security processes and controls are 
being implemented according to the company’s requirements. The team is headed by the Cloud 
Auditor and comprises other team members from senior management and IT departments who 
supervise the activities to ensure the audit is performed according to ISO/IEC 19011:2018 and 
ISAE 3402 Audit Standards. The audit activity requires the auditor to gather the necessary 
evidence to evaluate the compliance of the CSP and prepare a report of findings, including 
remedial actions.    
In this regard, a workshop was organised and the steps involved in the audit activity are introduced 
to the participants. They are briefed about the features of STAT, shown how a security checklist 
is created and used; how evidence is collected; how to audit criteria are formed; how to determine 
conformance level; how audit findings are established; and how a report is generated. STAT was 
successfully installed, configured and deployed to support the audit activity.    
8.3.6.1 Requirements to be Audited  
A meeting was organised for the security audit team to review the requirements specified during 
the requirements specification activity to verify and establish what will be assessed during the 
audit process. After reviewing the list of requirements, it was  agreed that the same four main 
categories of requirements (transparency, baseline, business and operational) and the associated 
control domains earlier prescribed should form the basis of the security audit. The summary of 
requirements, including the control domain and control types, are shown in Table 8.6.  
8.3.6.2 Collection of Audit Evidence 
The first phase of the assessment focuses on gathering, analysing and assessing evidence about 
the company’s requirements. After verifying and documenting the requirements to be audited, the 
security auditor embarked on developing a comprehensive audit checklist that is key for carrying 
out the security audit and collection of evidence. As part of creating the checklist, the 
documentation of CAIQ and CIS are extensively studied and reviewed by the audit team to ensure 
198 
 
that it is adapted to the requirements of the company and that it does not become too generic. 
Therefore, the checklist was  created, comprising a set of questions derived from CAIQ and CIS 
as shown in Appendix A. The purpose of the checklist is to provide the main focus and scope of 
the audit. Each question is associated with a type of evidence that is produced by the CSP as a 
direct response to the checklist, and which are appropriate to the requirements for which they are 
produced. This provided the benefit of obtaining different forms of evidence to support the audit 
process. The checklist was electronically inputted into STAT with the aim of using it to support 
the audit activity.  
8.3.6.3 Performance of the Security Audit  
Having received a response to the checklist and evidence from the CSP, the audit team evaluated 
all 133 questions in the checklist that fall under 17 control domains (target verification) and 32 
(base measure) control types within the four key requirements. Essentially, the evaluation is 
performed on  ISA 200 and ISA 402 Audit Standards using criteria the audit criteria, with the aim 
of subjectively determining a compliance level that is associated with it.  
8.3.6.3.1 Step Conformance Levels  
After the performance of the security audit and assessment of evidence, the audit team embarked 
on establishing the conformance level of the CSP in order to ensure that findings are coherently 
presented to top management. In all areas of the 4 requirements, the audit team determined 
conformance levels ranging from “very high” to “nonconformity”. A summary of the 
conformance levels according to each requirement as well as the overall conformance levels 
discovered by the auditors are provided. As the purpose of the analysis at this juncture was to 
provide the management with a snapshot of the CSPs conformance levels against requirements, 
no remedial actions are included in association with the conformance levels. A summary of the 
findings is provided as: 
 58% of requirements assessed were found to be very high conformance  
 7% of requirements assessed were found to be high conformance 
 18% requirements assessed were found to be medium conformance   
 5% of requirements assessed were found to be low conformance 
 12% of requirements assessed were found to be conformance 
 
In addition, Figure 8.2 provides a summary of the overall compliance levels for all the 
requirements that have been assessed. To provide a more detailed picture, the compliance level 
for each requirement is provided, including a summary of questions and CSP responses, the count 
and percentage of compliance for each requirement.  
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Figure 8.2: Summary of Overall Conformance Levels  
9.3.6.3.2 Conformance Level for Transparency Requirements 
The assessment results revealed that 40 questions in the checklist are related to transparency 
requirements and all questions have been responded to and evidence supplied. Also, the result 
shows that the CSP scored 64% “Very High” conformance level, 11% “High” conformance, 19% 
“Medium” conformance, and 6% “Low” conformance level. Details of the compliance level for 
security transparency are provided in Fig. 8.3  
 
Figure 8.3: Transparency Requirement Compliance Levels in Percentage  
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8.3.6.3.3 Conformance Level for Baseline Requirements  
The CSP scored 68% “Very High” conformance level. 10% “Medium” and 16% 
“Nonconformity” levels respectively as shown in Fig. 8.4    
 
Figure 8.4: Transparency Requirement Baseline Levels in Percentage  
8.3.6.4.4 Conformance Levels for Business Requirements  
The summary of conformance levels for business requirements indicate that the provider scored 
53% with “Very High”, 17% with “High”, and 10% with “Medium” conformance levels 
respectively, whereas 13% “nonconformity” is observed as shown in Fig. 8.5.      
 
Figure 8.5 Count of Compliance Levels for Business Requirement  
8.3.6.4.5 Conformance Levels for Operational Requirements  
A summary of conformance levels for baseline requirements is provided. It indicates that this 
requirement has achieved significant non-conformance compared to the other requirements. 26% 
of the questions are non-conformant, while 65% scored “Very High”, and 6% with “Medium” 
compliance level. These are shown in Fig. 8.6 
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Figure 8.6: Transparency Requirement Operational Levels in Percentage  
8.3.6.4 Audit Report  
The security audit team had assessed and determined conformance level for each requirement. 
The majority of evidence provided by the cloud provided were assessed. The results of the 
assessed requirements led to the impression that some of the CSP security practices and 
mechanisms are somewhat robust from operational and technical perspectives, while certain areas 
must be reviewed and improved. Also, weaknesses were identified in some cases that contradict 
the company’s requirements. The areas of requirements identified to have achieved low and 
nonconformity were thoroughly reviewed, prioritised and measured for their remediation were 
proposed by the audit team. Hence, based on the assessment undertaken, the result of the 
assessment was prepared which were documented and delivered in the form of an assessment 
report. The report contained a summary of findings on CSP conformance level and a detailed list 
of remedial actions that must be implemented by the CSP (as shown in Appendix D). The report 
was communicated with the CSP and an implementation plan outlining the duration it will take 
for each remedial action to be effected was also provided.   
8.4 Analysis of Feedback Results for CSTF  
This section presents an analysis of feedbacks collected from stakeholders through the 
implementation of CSTF. The focal point of the analysis is to determine the validity of CSTF in 
supporting organisations to achieve security transparency from the stakeholders’ point of view. 
The total number of responses received is shown in Table 8.8 
Table 8.8: Responses from received from Case-Study 1 
Case-study  Stakeholders that Participated Stakeholders that Responded 
Senior Management IT Personnel Senior Management IT Personnel 
Case-study 1 5 13 4 12 
Total  18 16 
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The validity and acceptability results for CSTF and STAT are analysed based on the evaluation 
criteria (ease of use, relevance, usefulness, flexibility and dynamics, compliance to security 
standards and best practices, trustworthiness) as shown in Appendix A. The compiled results of 
responses from the stakeholders’ according to the evaluation criteria are presented below. 
8.4.1 Ease of Use Criteria 
From the analysis result, 6 out of the 16 respondents representing 37.5% indicated they strongly 
agreed the proposed framework is simple to use, while nine respondents representing 56% agreed 
the framework is easy to follow. Only one respondent was not sure whether the framework is easy 
to follow or not. These results in a total of 93.5% expressing a positive opinion that the framework 
is simple and easy to use by organisations as depicted in Table 8.9. 
Table 8.9: Stakeholders’ Perception of CSTF’s Ease of Use 
Ease of Use 
Do you agree that CSTF is clear and easily understandable to intended users?  
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 6 37.5% 
Agree 9 56% 
Not sure 1 6.5% 
Disagree 0 0% 
  
8.4.2 Criteria 
In terms of the relevance of the framework in supporting the attainment of security transparency, 
37% percent of the respondents strongly agreed, and 50% agreed that the framework is relevant 
for helping organisations achieve security transparency. Further, 13% of the respondents are not 
sure about its relevance. These prove that the proposed framework is relevant for addressing 
security transparency related issues at the organizational level. This is shown in Table 8.10  
Table 8.10: Framework’s relevance for supporting the organisations achieve security transparency  
Relevance   
Do you agree the proposed framework is relevant for supporting organisations to achieve security transparency?   
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 6 37% 
Agree 8 50% 
Not sure 2 13% 
Disagree 0 0% 
 
8.4.3 Usefulness Criteria 
Based on responses about the usefulness of the framework in terms of producing expected 
deliverables, a significant increase in stakeholders’ rating is observed. The responses show that 
93% of the stakeholders agreed that the framework is useful for achieving expected results as 
shown in Table 8.11   
 
 
203 
 
Table 8.11: Responses on the Usefulness of CSTF  
Usefulness  
Do you agree that the proposed framework is useful in terms of the expected deliverables?  
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 8 57% 
Agree 5 36% 
Not sure 1 7% 
Disagree 0 0% 
 
8.4.4 Flexibility Criteria 
The proposed framework is designed with considerations to adapt to dynamic and changing 
environments. Based on the responses shown in Table 9.13, 27% of respondents strongly agreed 
that the framework is flexible, while 53% agreed that the framework on the framework’s 
flexibility. The total percentile of those that agreed to represent 80%, which is significantly higher 
than those that are not sure (13%) or disagreed (7%) with the framework’s flexibility as 
represented in Table 8.12  
Table 8.12: Responses on the Flexibility of CSTF 
Flexibility  
Do you agree the proposed framework is flexible to adapt to dynamic contexts?   
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 4 27% 
Agree 8 53% 
Not sure 2 13% 
Disagree 1 7% 
 
8.4.5 Compliance with Security Standards and Best Practices Criteria 
The framework was developed on the foundations of various security standards and best practices. 
The acceptability rating of the framework’s compliance with relevant laws and regulations 
achieved the highest rating with 94% of the respondents agreeing that it compliances with relevant 
laws and regulations, as shown in Table. 8.13 
Table 8.13: Rating on Framework’s compliance with relevant laws, standards and best practices.  
Compliance with Security Standards and Best Practices 
Does the framework comply with relevant laws, standards and best practices?   
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 10 67% 
Agree 4 27% 
Not sure 1 6% 
Disagree 0 0% 
 
8.4.6 Trustworthiness Criteria 
Trustworthiness is a holistic attribute that encompasses the ability of the framework to produce 
outputs according to users expectation. In this line, the trustworthiness rating of the framework 
achieved the lowest rating according to stakeholders’ feedback. The acceptance rating shows that 
74% of the respondents perceived CSTF as being trustworthy, whereas 3 respondents representing 
20% were not sure about its trustworthiness. On the other hand, 1 respondent disagreed that the 
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framework is trustworthy. Based on rating results, it can be established that the framework’s 
trustworthiness rating is validly significant. This is depicted in Table 8.14 
Table 8.14: Responses on the Trustworthiness of CSTF 
Trustworthiness  
Do you consider the proposed framework to be trustworthy in ensuring privacy and security?   
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 4 27% 
Agree 8 46% 
Not sure 3 20% 
Disagree 1 7% 
 
 
Figure 8.7: Acceptability ratings of the CSTF using six different evaluation criteria  
8.5 Implementation Outcome and Lessons Learned: Case Study 1  
An analysis of stakeholder feedback was conducted by following evaluation criteria derived from 
the renowned TAM and UTAUT models. The reason behind the analysis was to determine 
whether the proposed framework has achieved its intended aims for enabling and enhancing 
security transparency as proposed in the research objectives. The analysis results have shown 
positive outcomes in terms of the overall perception of stakeholders regarding the acceptability 
of CSTF. This assertion is made given the total positive responses obtained when “Strongly 
Agree” and “Agree” are combined to determine the optimism of respondents on each of the 
evaluation criteria, as highlighted below:  
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 Ease of use: 93.5% of the respondents considered the CSTF to be easy to use.  
 Relevance: 87% of the respondents believed that CSTF is relevant  
 Usefulness: 93% of the respondents believed that CSTF is useful  
 Flexibility: 80% of the respondents considered CSTF to be flexible  
 Compliance with relevant Laws, Standards and Best Practices: 94% of the respondents 
believed CSTF to be compliant 
 Trustworthiness: 73% of the respondents considered CSTF to be trustworthy 
Based on the overall summation of the feedback, as shown above, it can be established that an 
average of 87% of the respondents have accepted the proposed framework, while only about 13% 
views expressed otherwise. In a positive sense, the respondents have expressed enthusiasm and 
appreciation of CSTF for representing good coverage of their needs. They acknowledged that it 
had a positive impact on the organisations’ security transparency aspirations. With this, it can be 
established that the research objective 1 and 2 have been achieved.   
Also, through the process implementation, the researcher identified some valuable observations 
such as the importance of organisations using a simplistic approach that focuses on security 
transparency to guide their cloud strategies and adoption, rather than a generic strategy. The 
activities of CSTF are comprehensive, simple, and direct, which neither a required financial 
burden nor significant workforce burden to the organisation. Most of the activities within the 
process are easily implementable without the need for extensive training or instructions. The 
stakeholders that took part in the exercise were able to follow the steps without bottlenecks or 
major challenges. More importantly, the study observed that the incapacity to property identify 
requirements that focus on security transparency and adequately probe CSP internal practices are 
likely to result in major issues that cannot be rectified swiftly enough after cloud migration. 
8.6 Case-study 2: Implementation of STAT  
The previous case-study context mainly focused on the application of CSTF process – from the 
first activity through to the last. This case-study focuses and emphasises on the practical 
implementation of STAT in a company that is different from the previous one. The goal of the 
study is not to perform a repetitive application of the CSTF, a comparison of evaluation results or 
differentiate between the two case-studies. Instead, the focus is to evaluate STAT and determine 
its acceptance, applicability and validity to a real-life context. As such, the evaluation also helps 
to generalise the research findings on the overall approach of assisting organisations in achieving 
security transparency in the cloud.  
The study context reflects a company that has already migrated its asset to the cloud, and whose 
major concern is to achieve security transparency. Hence, because cloud migration has already 
taken place, only the last activity of CSTF is followed, i.e. the audit activity which entails the 
application of STAT. Therefore, a description of the case study is provided, including and the 
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approach used for validity. Also, feedback from stakeholders is collected on the applicability and 
usability of the tool, which is presented in the subsequent parts of this Chapter.  
8.7 Evaluation Approach  
Similar to the first case study, an empirical method was selected to evaluate the main contributions 
of this study. Stakeholders are engaged and trained on the usability of the tool, including its 
features and functionalities in an introductory workshop. The stakeholders that took part are 
mostly employees with more than two years of working experience. The research team collected 
feedback data from the stakeholders on their general perception about the tool, according to 
questions that are formed in line with six important criteria:  ease of use, relevance, usefulness, 
flexibility and dynamics, compliance to security standards and best practices, as well as 
trustworthiness. Data was collected through a questionnaire that was prepared and physically 
distributed using the six criteria. The questionnaire was filled by the stakeholders after the 
implementation exercise and returned to the research team. Subsequently, stakeholders’ feedback 
are analysed to assess the participants' general perception and acceptance of the tool.  
8.7.1 Company Background  
As part of its strategy to improve and make it easier for the public to access urgent healthcare 
services, a Borough in London introduced a free healthcare system that gives patients and the 
public easy and swift access to urgent care, treatment and advice for less urgent medical problems, 
as well as providing clinical expertise, nurses and paramedics with an integrated access to 
patient’s health information and assessment tool. All patients requests are made through a 
telephony system or alternative routes (online platforms) and received by a team of fully trained 
advisers, supported by experienced nurses and paramedics who ask questions to assess patients’ 
symptoms, and give healthcare advice or referral to the local service that can help best. Also, the 
system also provides doctors with access to relevant aspects of patients’ medical and care 
information, where the patient has consented to this being available. To this point, the Borough 
has a robust technical and organizational infrastructure in place that handles a million patient 
contacts and has also invested heavily in the telephony systems to support its strategic objectives. 
As a consequence of the high volume of care provided, the Borough recently migrated to a cloud-
based environment that supports the clinical record system to improve patient care.  
8.7.2 Technical Infrastructure  
The system consists of a healthcare patient relationship manager (PRM) that manages the 
relationship between healthcare expertise and patients to foster effective communication, create 
a greater mutual understanding, trust and patient involvement in decision making. The system is 
a VOIP solution, which uses local intelligent queue servers and other essential databases to ensure 
complete flexibility of provisioning:  
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 Summary Care Records (SCR): This server hosts an electronic summary of key clinical 
information about patients. It is used by authorised healthcare professionals to support 
a patient’s care and treatment. Patient’s information is only stored and shared with the 
patient’s consent, and additional information to the patient’s record is added with a 
patient’s consent. 
 Special Patient Notes (SPN): The system provides a functionality that enables registered 
medical staff to access full medical record of patients, including special notes that can 
be attached to a new or existing patient to alert or highlight any specific care 
requirements, long term care plans or any other item of useful information for the 
patient. 
 Patient Demographic Service (PDS): A database that holds patients’ demographic 
details such as name, address, and date of birth. It enables swift and accurate 
identification of patients by healthcare staff. 
8.7.3 The Problem  
Due to the sensitivity of personal health information (PHI) and stringent security requirements 
for the security, confidentiality and privacy of patients’ information, the stakeholders are 
concerned about potential privacy and security, regulatory compliance, service reliability and 
interoperability issues that could arise as a result of migrating to the cloud. Specifically, the 
hospital’s management is concerned about the prospects of being informed about where and how 
the PRM is managed, and the security controls applied in ensuring its protection. Also, the 
management is concerned about how the CSP is fulfilling essential security, transparency and 
operational requirements of the system. Thus, they agreed to use STAT in helping them to assess 
the CSP’s activities and have full transparency on their assets.   
8.8 Practical Implementation of STAT  
In contrast to the previous case-study, the activities in this context primarily focused on the 
installation, testing and deployment of STAT for use by the company. The rationale behind this 
decision is the fact that the company has already migrated to the cloud, and the activity aimed to 
evaluate STAT. Therefore, the implementation exercises mainly involved stakeholder analysis, 
STAT deployment and collection feedbacks.  
8.8.1 Stakeholder Analysis  
The exercise started by identifying the stakeholders involved and keeping them informed about 
the tool, the activities, the installation preparations and a brief aim of the research. The actors are 
mostly personnel within the organisation who have at least three years of working experience. 
The identification enabled the research team to precisely engage stakeholders in the 
implementation and collection of feedback. Thus, the list of actors that participated in this context 
as shown in Table 8.13. 
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Table 8.13: List of Actors  
Internal (Organisation) External  
Actor  Role  Actor Role 
Representatives 
from top 
management  
Charged with the responsibility of 
organising, directing, and controlling 
activities of the  overall project for STAT 
implementation  
CSP  Providing the platform, 
computing and storage 
facilities for hosting PRM  
IT Managers In charge of the Borough’s technology 
strategy and responsible for coordinating 
and leading IT experts/IT department.  
  
Members of the IT 
Department  
Different personnel within the IT 
department of the Borough that is charged 
with establishing, monitoring and 
maintaining information systems and 
services, including the administration and 
use of the PRM  
  
Security Auditor Include expert personnel that are assigned 
the responsibility of conducting the audit 
by collecting, analysing and generating 
reports regarding the security and 
effectiveness of controls and overall safety 
of PRM components. 
  
 
8.8.2 STAT Deployment  
A training workshop was organised, and stakeholders were given training for using STAT. During 
the training workshop, a demonstration was performed showing a practical guide on the 
installation and application of STAT, including the many dashboards that provide essential 
functionalities. Also, in a walkthrough conversation, a representative agent assigned by the CSP 
to support the company in performing the security audit was equally briefed about the steps 
involved and how to use STAT. The features of STAT are thoroughly explained with particular 
focus on the CSP dashboard that can be used by the representatives to accept audit invitation, 
answer the checklist and upload evidence where applicable, as well as receiving audit findings. 
Before the configuration of STAT, it was essential to ensure that the tool will behave as intended. 
The configuration possibilities were typically easy for the stakeholders to understand. The 
stakeholders are made to understand configuration settings in practice and what they should 
expect the system to do. After that, the STAT was deployed without many technical instructions 
as they already know and are familiar with the activity. Furthermore, STAT was comprehensively 
applied to serve its purpose.  
8.9 Analysis of Feedback Results on the Validity of STAT  
In this section, the analysis result of stakeholders’ feedback regarding the effectiveness and 
usability of STAT are shown. The analysis is performed to determine the validity, relevance, and 
acceptability of STAT’s features in supporting the organisation achieve security transparency 
from a technical perspective. Similarly, the analysis is performed according to the evaluation 
criteria earlier mentioned, which include: ease of use, relevance, usefulness, flexibility and 
dynamics, compliance to security standards and best practices, trustworthiness, as shown in 
Appendix B. Table 89.14 shows a summary of the responses to the questionnaire.  
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Table 8.14: Responses from received from Case-Study 1 
Case-study  Stakeholders that Participated  Stakeholders that Responded   
Senior Management IT Personnel  Senior Management IT Personnel 
Case-study 1 2 15 2 13 
Total  17 15 
 
8.9.1 Ease of Use Criteria 
The ease of use criteria tends to measure the extent to which the tool can be used with ease and 
efficiency in terms of its functionalities and features. The result indicates that four respondents 
(27%) strongly agree and 9 (60%) respondents agree that the tool is easy to use, while two 
respondents representing 13% are not sure whether the tool is easy to use. This suggests that the 
tool has an overall acceptability rating of 87% as shown in Table 8.15 
Table 8.15 Respondents perception about STAT’s Ease of Use  
Ease of Use  
Do you agree that STAT is simple and easy to use?  
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 4 27% 
Agree 9 60% 
Not sure 2 13% 
Disagree 0 0% 
 
8.9.2 Relevance Criteria 
It is observed that a significant acceptance of the tool’s relevance in supporting the attainment of 
security transparency. This assertion is manifested by the respondent’s perception where 40% 
strongly agreed and 53% agreed about the tool’s relevance. Only one respondent representing 7% 
disagree about the relevance of STAT, as depicted in Table 8.16  
Table 8.16: Relevance of the tool in supporting the organisations achieve security transparency.  
Relevance   
Do you agree that the tool supports the organisation in achieving security transparency? 
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 6 40% 
Agree 8 53% 
Not sure 0 0% 
Disagree 1 7% 
 
8.9.3 Usefulness Criteria 
A significant number of respondents perceived the tool to be usefulness. From the analysis results, 
57% strongly agreed, while 36% agreed to the usefulness of the tool. Only 7% are not sure, which 
indicates that the overall acceptability rating of the tool is this criterion is high at 93% as shown 
in Figure. 8.17.  
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Table 8.17: Responses on the Usefulness of STAT 
Usefulness  
Do you agree that the proposed tool is useful in terms of achieving expected deliverables?  
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 5 57% 
Agree 8 36% 
Not sure 1 7% 
Disagree 0 0% 
 
8.9.4 Flexibility Criteria 
The respondents are asked to express their view about the flexibility of the tool to adapt to 
dynamic contexts. From the responses analysed, there is a reduction in the acceptability rating of 
the tool’s flexibility in comparison to other criteria. Thirteen percent (13%) of the respondents 
strongly agreed, and 67% agreed about the tool’s flexibility. While 7% are not sure and 13% 
disagreed as represented in Table 8.18 
Table 8.18: Responses on the Flexibility of STAT 
Flexibility  
Do you agree STAT is flexible to adapt to dynamic contexts?   
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 2 13% 
Agree 10 67% 
Not sure 1 7% 
Disagree 2 13% 
 
8.9.5 Compliance with Security Standards and Best Practices Criteria 
Regarding compliance with security standards and best practices, the respondents’ acceptability 
rating shows that 33% strongly agreed about the tool’s compliance with security standards, while 
40% agreed and 27% expressed that they are not sure about the tool’s compliance, which results 
to a total of 73% acceptance. This criterion achieved the lowest acceptability rating compared to 
the preceding ones as shown in Table 8.19 
Table 8.19: Rating on STATs compliance with relevant laws, standards and best practices.  
Compliance with Security Standards Best Practices 
Do you agree that the tool complies with relevant laws, standards and best practices?   
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 5 33% 
Agree 6 40% 
Not sure 4 27% 
Disagree 0 0% 
 
8.9.6 Trustworthiness Criteria  
In comparison to other criteria, the trustworthiness criteria recorded a decrease in the acceptability 
rating from respondents. As observed from responses, 20% strongly agreed, and 47% agreed that 
the tool could be trustworthy in ensuring the security and privacy of data. Thirteen percent (13%) 
expressed doubts, while 20% are not sure about the tool’s trustworthiness, as depicted in Table 
8.20. 
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Table 8.20: Responses on the Trustworthiness of STAT 
Trustworthiness  
Do you consider the proposed tool to be trustworthy in ensuring privacy and security?   
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Strongly agree 3 20% 
Agree 7 47% 
Not sure 3 20% 
Disagree 2 13% 
 
Figure 8.8: Acceptability ratings of the STAT using six different evaluation criteria 
8.10 Evaluation Outcome and Lessons Learned: Case Study 2:  
The analysis of respondents’ feedback regarding STAT demonstrates significant acceptance 
rating of the tool. By computing all positive responses, i.e. “Strongly Agree” and “Agree”, the 
evaluation outcome has revealed strong positive acceptability amongst respondents that have used 
the tool.  
 Ease of use: 87% of the respondents believed that STAT is relatively easy to use 
 Relevance: 93% think that STAT is relevant to the context  
 Usefulness: 93% also considered STAT to be useful  
 Flexibility: 80% believed that STAT is flexible   
 Compliance with relevant Laws, Standards and Best Practices: 73% of the respondents 
believe that STAT is compliant with relevant laws and standards  
 Trustworthiness: 67% perceived STAT to be trustworthy   
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An average of 82% of the stakeholders that evaluated STAT expressed optimism regarding the 
acceptability, validity and usefulness of STAT. The result is a reasonable one that highlights the 
significance of STAT to support the attainment of security transparency. The tool has enabled the 
organisation to address the key issues related to security transparency. In particular, the results 
have shown that STAT can be used as an independent security transparency tool or as a 
supplementary component to CSTF.     
In general, STAT has proven to be highly useful and suitable for companies that have already 
migrated to the cloud. The implementation exercise was carefully observed, which enabled the 
researcher to document information that reflects on experiences. We observed that conducting an 
audit using STAT neither requires great resources, nor significant expertise. The assessment was 
run in a timely professional manner by auditors who were able to use effectively STAT in the 
context of the case study without significant hindrance. Besides, the time it takes to set up the 
system and train the stakeholders was relatively shorter than how the research team expected. The 
stakeholders were able to use the tool to achieve the audit objectives with effectiveness, efficiency 
and satisfaction. The features of the tool bolster the auditors’ ability to assess because it provides 
quality features that facilitate the creation of an audit checklist, evaluation criteria and control 
actions.   
8.11 Comparison between CSTF with other Works 
This section provides a comparative analysis and discussion between this research and other study 
results found in the literature, particularly research results that enable security transparency in 
cloud computing. Such comparison aims to enable the researcher to generalise the research 
findings and identify the factors that reflect the context of security transparency.  
To construct a comparison, some of the major scholarly works in the literature and industry 
projects that appear to address the issue of security transparency are selected to measure overall 
similarity and contrasting facets to CSTF. Further, several parameters comparison parameters in 
the form of questions are defined. The questions are formulated based on several distinctive 
contributions of the thesis, such as tool support; formal representation of knowledge; 
conceptualisation of security transparency; adoption of industry standards and best-practice; and 
implementation process for the approach.      
8.11.1 Comparison Parameters  
As mentioned earlier, the comparison parameters are created by formulating questions with 
respect to the key contributions of this thesis. Hence, the contribution is highlighted, followed by 
the associated question, and a brief description. The comparison parameters are shown in Table 
8.21: 
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Table 8.21: Comparison Parameters  
Parameter  Question  Details  
 
 
 
 
 
Tool Support  
 
 
 
 
Does the literature provide tool 
support towards security 
transparency?   
Each approach is analysed based on the support of 
automated tool that augments and enhances security 
transparency from cloud users viewpoint through 
computation, analysis, visualisation, and evaluation of CSP 
conformity to requirement. Tool support is imperative for 
automated evidence collection from the CSP, and the 
verification and determination of CSP conformity to various 
requirement. Such a tool potentially strengthens security 
transparency specifically by making audit assessments and 
expert judgement procedure more effectively and timely. 
Thus, it is essential to have strong tool support, thereby 
facilitating and improving the effectiveness of security 
transparency (Robinson et al., 2010).    
The 
conceptualisation 
of security 
transparency  
Does the literature establish and 
decompose the key concepts 
necessary for security 
transparency?   
It is paramount for each approach to dissect security 
transparency from cloud users’ point of view by laying the 
foundational knowledge on key concepts. Ryoo (Ryoo et al., 
2014) emphasised the need for an approach that identifies, 
analyse and represents security transparency from the lens 
of conceptual knowledge to enhance understanding and 
provide reference points to cloud users.  
Formal 
representation of 
knowledge 
Has the literature considered the 
formal and explicit representation 
of security transparency using 
ontology?  
Ontology is regarded as an important technique for the 
formal and explicit specification of knowledge in the 
domain of interest and specifies how the concepts are 
related to each other through logical axioms expressed in a  
formal language. Youssef `(Youseff et al., 2008) the need 
for an ontology that ensures shared understanding of related 
by reducing conceptual vagueness and terminological 
confusion between cloud customers and users, supporting 
the reuse of knowledge, as well as supporting semantic 
visualisation.    
Adoption of 
industry 
standards  
Does the literature leverage and 
integrate industry standards? 
Industry standards provide a significant level of assurance 
to customers that critical best practices are followed by 
cloud providers, as well as assurance that all operations are 
executed according to generally accepted security principle. 
This is due to the global acceptance of industry standards, 
best-practice, and frameworks  (Lewis, 2013).  
The 
comprehensive 
implementation 
process of the 
proposed 
approach 
Has the literature defined a 
comprehensive implementation 
process for the proposed 
approach?  
The implementation process is an important feature of every 
proposed approach. A process should provide a step-by-step 
actionable guideline for the implementation of the proposed 
conceptual model, framework or approach to cloud users to 
accomplish security transparency.  
 
8.11.2 Comparison of Selected Literature against Comparison Parameters  
In this section, the essential literature selected for comparison against the parameters listed in the 
previous section is presented, followed by the contrasting and similarity aspects with the work 
presented in this thesis.   
 P1: Tool support.  
 P2: Conceptualisation of security transparency 
 P3: Formal representation of security transparency using ontology  
 P4 Adoption of industry standards 
 P5: Comprehensive implementation process of the proposed approach 
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Table 8.22 Comparison of Selected Literature against Comparison Parameters  
Literature  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5  
CSA CCM (Cloud Security Alliance, 2017a) x x x  x 
CSA CAIQ (Cloud Security Alliance, 2017b) x x x  x 
STAR (Cloud Security Alliance, 2015) x x x   
Assurance Framework (European Network and Information Security Agency, 2010) x x x   
C.A.RE (Ouedraogo and Mouratidis, 2013)  x x   
Nitro Web (Laurén and Leppänen, 2018)  x x x  
HIDSCloud Deshpande (Deshpande et al., 2018) x x x x x 
Tian et al. (Tian et al., 2019) x x x x x 
CPTS (Pauley, 2010) x x x   
SMICloud Framework (Garg et al., 2013)  x x x  
CloudHarmony (Leitner and Cito, 2016)  x x   
CloudCMP Framework (Li et al., 2010)  x x   
CSTF      
 
8.11.3 Discussion on Comparison Findings  
The comparison in table 8.22 highlighted the results between CSTF and other security 
transparency approaches based on five important parameters that are peculiar to this research’s 
contributions. The following section elaborates the comparison findings.   
8.11.3.1 Tool Support:  
In terms of tool support, there is substantial similarity, either fully or partially, amongst CSTF 
and those presented in the existing literature. For instance, (Garg et al., 2013) developed a 
SMICloud, which supports a decision-making tool that helps cloud customers to find the most 
suitable CSPs according to customers’ key performance indicators and requirement such as 
quality of service, speed of VM, network latency. Customers provide their essential and non-
essential requirement to the tool, which then generates a list of cloud services where the customer 
can deploy their asset. Also, CloudHarmony (Leitner and Cito, 2016) supports a performance 
measuring and analysis tool that run benchmark tests on multiple compute instances from 
different CSPs. The benchmark results could be used to compare the performance of CSP compute 
services using performance characteristics that are relevant to the customer, such as CPU and disk 
performance. CloudCmp (Li et al., 2010) also supports a benchmarking tool that compares the 
common services offered by various CSPs and uses the results to predict the performance and 
costs of customers asset when deployed on a CSPs environment. Hence, the most noticeable 
similarity between CSTF and the results in that literature is that they all support customers to 
specify the essential requirement that could be assessed. However, the difference between these 
works and CSTF is that they mainly focus on comparing multiple CSPs based on performance 
and cost characteristics before cloud adoption. CSTF supports the probing of CSP security 
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practices by seeking evidence about how CSP fulfils specific requirements, analysis of evidence, 
establishing assurances about the degree to which CSP conforms to such requirement, including 
the establishment remedial controls.  
8.3.11.2 Conceptualisation of Security Transparency   
The conceptual understanding of the factors relating to security transparency in cloud computing 
service is especially important because it provides simplification and consolidation of prior 
knowledge in the domain. The significant research efforts on security transparency have produced 
considerable propositions, and they all have different views and interpretation of security 
transparency concepts (Jaatun et al., 2018). The need for a consistent meaning and understanding 
of transparency is ever-increasing for helping organisations have a comprehensive understanding 
of how security transparency can be achieved and implemented from a customer perspective 
(Pearson and Benameur, 2010b). However, the results of the comparison have shown that existing 
literature have not considered the pressing need to define the various concepts that constitute 
security transparency. CSTF is unique in this regard because it conceptualised security 
transparency using a set of concepts. The concepts (such as actors, constraints, and goals) are 
based on Secure Tropos (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007). CSTF extends secure Tropos with new 
concepts such as evidence, risk, and audit in an attempt to develop the proposed framework. The 
reason for choosing Secure Tropos is that it provides an in-depth analysis of security issues from 
an organisation and its social setting.  The concepts of Secure Tropos and those proposed in our 
approach are integrated to provide a comprehensive understanding of the salient aspects that 
constitute security transparency and how it could be achieved.  
8.3.11.3 Formal Representation of Security Transparency using Ontology 
It is worth mentioning that the comparison results have shown that existing literature commonly 
represented security transparency either by using natural language or graphical representations, 
both of which lack the computational semantics needed to enable automated validation or 
execution of key concepts. In some literature, the authors have mainly considered the technical 
aspects of security transparency but not it's related contextual and organizational aspects. In 
particular, contributions in the literature have not particularly used formal models to create a 
common language for describing the processes and functions associated with security 
transparency. CSTF has addressed the gap as mentioned earlier because it adopted an ontology 
approach, which is a formal language that can help in the detection of semantic ambiguities, 
uncertainties and contradictions between the concepts of security transparency. The ontology 
defines a structured set of security transparency concepts, the relationship between these concepts, 
and a set of rules on how the concepts can be combined to represent semantic knowledge. It also 
reduces the conceptual vagueness and terminological inconsistencies by providing a common 
understanding of related concepts between cloud customers and CSPs. The ontology is machine-
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readable and the use of concepts and relationships ensures that knowledge is represented 
completely.    
8.3.11.4 Adoption of Industry Standards  
Industry standards generally provide well-documented rules, guidelines, or characteristics for 
activities, and consensus approved by a recognised body which aims at the achievement of the 
optimum degree of order (Saint-Germain, 2005). A significant number of the literature considered 
for comparison has promoted the use of industry standards to enable consistency and a reliable 
metric for assessing the validity of results. For example, CSA CCM and CAIQ (Cloud Security 
Alliance, 2017a) are both intensively mapped to various security standards such as NIST CSF 
(Shen, 2014) and CoBIT (Von Solms, 2005). Furthermore, the authors in CPTS (Pauley, 2010), 
C.A.RE (Ouedraogo and Mouratidis, 2013), (Leitner and Cito, 2016) and CloudCMP (Li et al., 
2010) have also considered the integration of industry standards in their approach. Most of the 
standards used by these works are more security-oriented, which means that there is a significant 
similarity with CSTF in terms of the integration of security standards. However, CSTF uses a 
unified approach by focusing on specific sections of renowned guidelines, frameworks and 
models rather than just security standards. They are mostly applied across different activities 
within the process by looking at specific features within the standards, frameworks, models and 
guidelines and where they best fit into the process. For example, CIS CSC and ENISA have been 
used for identifying risk control measures. This is because CIS CSC provides 20 controls 
categorised into three prioritised and defence-in-depth best practices that are implementable to 
mitigate attacks against systems and networks. Some of these controls are relevant to cloud 
security transparency, while others are less relevant. Further, ENISA provides 27 baseline security 
controls that are more CSP-oriented and focuses on control measures that protect cloud computing 
systems against operational risks. As a result, a parallel matching is performed for identifying 
semantic equivalence between controls in CSC CIS and ENISA. Also, Microsoft has proposed a 
structured approach for analysing the security of systems and application, namely DREAD and 
STRIDE models. Such models enable the identification, classification, rating, comparison and 
prioritization of security risks associated with systems and applications, and these two important 
models have been adopted for threat analysis. OWASP methodology is also used for determining 
the impact of risks because it estimates risks from business process and technical perspectives, 
and it is highly adaptable and applicable to most organisations of all sizes. In identifying relevant 
risks, risk sources from ENISA and OWASP are also considered mainly because the latter 
maintains a regularly-updated list of most pressing cloud security concerns, and the former 
provided a list of 35 risks that fall under categories such as technical, organizational, legal and 
non-cloud specific. Besides, in the course of specifying requirements, CSA STAR is adopted 
because it provides sixteen essential security principles that serve as a guide to CSPs and also 
provides organisations with the structure to achieve asset security in the cloud-tailored 
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environment. In the audit activity, ISAE 3402 and ISO 19011:2018 is used mainly because it sets 
forth internationally accepted guidance on conducting and managing audit program that applies 
to all organisations that need to conduct security audits.   
8.3.11.5 Implementation Process  
An effective implementation guide for any approach to a problem has been highlighted as a crucial 
success factor for any proposed solution to an existing problem (Gottschalk, 1999). A process 
provides a systematic set of activities that aim to achieve desired objectives, deliver results and 
outputs (Chang et al., 2016). The various studies examined have such as Nitro Web (Laurén and 
Leppänen, 2018), SMI Cloud (Garg et al., 2013), CloudCMP (Li et al., 2010) and CloudHarmony 
(Leitner and Cito, 2016) have provided the underlying architectural and technical guide for 
implementation. ENISA’s Assurance Framework (European Network and Information Security 
Agency, 2010) also developed a methodology based on a set of questions that organisations can 
ask a CSP to get the assurance that assets can be sufficiently protected. This shows that there is a 
commonality between the literature mentioned above and CSTF. However, the process proposed 
by CSTF is more transparency-oriented. It consists of different phases of activities that 
organisations can follow for understanding and strengthening security transparency by looking at 
important considerations such as identifying roles, assessing risks, etc. The process also guides 
organisations to build a cloud migration strategy from initiation to completion phases based on 
the need for continuous validation of CSP promises. Also, the process is guided by a variety of 
leading industry best practices, frameworks, guidelines and standards that are generally applicable 
to all organisations regardless of size. This implies that the process is all-encompassing in nature, 
not tailored to a specific organisation type or solution, but built upon high-level considerations to 
ensure important cloud adoption issues are not entirely missed.     
8.12 Empirical Studies Conclusions 
The empirical research method used in this research and the application of the case-study 
approach has allowed the researcher to perform an in-depth longitudinal examination of different 
real-world contexts. The adoption of the case-study technique has enabled the researcher to make 
systematic observations, collect and analyse data, and to establish findings within the context 
which activities took place. It also allowed the researcher to observe complexities of real-life 
situations, which may not otherwise be captured through other forms or methods. Many 
participants from two different companies - whose names have been anonymised for 
confidentiality reasons, took part in the implementation and determining the validity of the 
research. The participants provided invaluable feedback on their experiences and perception of 
the proposed framework and its supporting tool. The analysis of the participants’ feedback 
provided an encouraging finding that shows the relevance, validity and acceptability of the 
proposed framework amongst organisations. The participants expressed optimism about CSTF 
218 
 
and its potentiality in addressing the current and emerging security transparency issues in cloud 
computing.  
8.12 Chapter Summary  
In this chapter, the empirical evaluation of CSTF and STAT was discussed. The chapter provided 
a detailed discussion regarding empirical studies for validating this research, using a case-study 
approach. Questionnaire technique enabled the collection feedback from participants that took 
part in the implementation of CSTF and STAT with the aim of analysis for establishing the 
validity, acceptability and relevance of the proposed framework. The chapter also presented 
results from the case-study contexts. Stakeholder feedback was collected and used to evaluate 
their perception and view of regarding the validity and acceptability of the framework. The 
stakeholders expressed confidence and reasonable satisfaction. The results proved that the 
proposed framework is highly relevant for helping organisations in attaining security 
transparency. Also, the chapter provided a comparison between some of the key approaches to 
security transparency in the literature. Five comparison parameters have been defined based on 
which CSTF could be compared against selected the selected literature. The comparison 
parameters are created according to the distinct features or contributions of CSTF. The results of 
the comparison have shown that the research has made notable contributions to the knowledge 
domain.  
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CHAPTER NINE  
Conclusion and Further Research 
9.1 Introduction  
Cloud computing offers a combination of advantages such as agility and scalability that are 
driving businesses to rely on cloud technology as a foundation for enablement of business 
opportunities. It enables organisations to adopt innovations and respond to business demands 
quickly. But these advantages cannot be fully utilised if transparency into cloud environments is 
not improved.  Cloud services that offer limited visibility result in significant security and 
operational challenges to organisations, such as the problems in attaining operational 
requirements, challenges reporting security issues to management, and other forms of compliance 
issues. Security transparency has a crucial role to play in the future of cloud services because it 
facilitates visibility and provides organisations with a view on the status of assets and how 
important requirements are satisfied. These considerations necessitate for transparency to be 
strengthened so that businesses can be poised and stimulated about cloud service adoption. 
Improved transparency will certainly revamp the level of trust between organisations and CSP, 
and ultimately shape the future of cloud adoption.   
This thesis has proposed a solution for addressing security transparency-related challenges. To do 
so, CSTF has been proposed that supports organisations develop foundational knowledge of 
security transparency, integrate the concepts within organizational settings for guiding cloud 
migration, and a tool called STAT that helps the collection and assessment of evidences from 
CSP. The proposed CSTF and STAT have been validated amongst different real-environment 
study contexts. Furthermore, the feedback has been collected and analysed to establish the 
acceptability, usability, relevance and validity of the proposed framework.   
To conclude this thesis, this is the final chapter that presents concluding remarks of the entire 
research. It expounds how the research objectives could be met, expatriate research contributions 
to knowledge, and highlights limitations and future research directions.  
9.2 Responding to Research Questions and Objectives 
The proposed CSTF has been developed and validated against real-environment case-studies to 
meet the research aim, which was to develop a systematic framework that supports security 
transparency in cloud computing, which will ultimately increase businesses trust in cloud 
services. To ensure that the research aims above are satisfied, three objectives were specified as:  
 Objective 1: Develop a novel framework that aims to provide users with a solution to 
achieve security transparency from conceptual, organizational, and technical 
perspectives. 
220 
 
 Objective 2: Propose an implementable process for cloud migration activities which is 
founded on multifarious industry standards and frameworks to achieve security 
transparency. 
 Objective 3: Develop a dedicated security transparency tool that enables organisations to 
continuously collect evidence, probe, and assess CSP’s conformance to established 
requirements, as well as suggesting remedial actions in areas where security 
improvements are needed.   
It became imperative that the three research objectives shown above are checked to ascertain 
whether they are accomplished in the course of the research. The research has strived to ensure 
they are  accomplished, and an attempt has is made to justify how the objectives are accomplished 
9.2.1 Develop a Novel Framework  
A fundamental objective of the research entails the development of the proposed CSTF, which is 
also a requisite for achieving the final research aim. Objective One was accomplished via Chapter 
Four and Chapter Five. Chapter Four, on the one hand, provided the rudimental principles, 
background knowledge and understanding of cloud security transparency. Sections 4.2 – 4.5 
introduced the basics of transparency from broad perspectives and different domains considered 
in forming a novel definition of the term from cloud context. Also, Section 4.4 provided the 
properties of security transparency in terms of the building blocks that are essential in delivering 
security transparency. Section 4.6 establishes the fundamental principles and norms that govern 
the delivery of transparency, which were borrowed from different domains and tailored to cloud 
security. Further, there are various circumstances where organisations can seek and receive 
information regarding CSP activities and services. Thus, in Section 4.6, the research elaborately 
outlined the types of situations or scenarios where CSP tend to supply information to stakeholders, 
such as proactive, reactive and contractual. This led to categorising security transparency 
according to proactive, reactive and contractual. Mostly some information disclosed by the CSP 
could be inconsequential to stakeholders or perhaps contradictory. Therefore, the two types of 
security transparency that can be associated with a CSP are defined in Section 4.8.   
On the other hand, in Chapter Five, the proposed framework— as per considerations from the 
principles and background knowledge formed in Chapter Four was introduced and discussed. The 
Chapter started with the approach adopted for the proposed CSTF that uses three levels of 
abstraction. Each level is associated with certain deliverables. The first level establishes and 
provides an understanding of the various concepts that constitute security transparency, which is 
formed based on the principles of security transparency presented in Chapter Four. The second 
level deals with important concepts that are used within organizational setting to achieve security 
transparency. As it is a highly recommended and common practice to build any framework of 
relevance based on established theory or methodology, a novel agent-oriented software 
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methodology called Secure Tropos (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007) was chosen to develop these 
concepts. Secure Tropos covers software development from initial requirement analysis and uses 
concepts such as actors, constrains, and goals. The concepts in Secure Tropos are extended with 
new concepts such as evidences, and audit in an attempt to develop concepts at organizational 
level. In addition, ontology and semantic web modelling language were applied (Maedche and 
Staab, 2001) to broaden further and improve domain knowledge of concepts at organizational 
level. The last level covered the various technical means that can support the attainment of 
security transparency and highlighted some conventional mechanisms and initiatives. This 
enabled the adoption of a security audit as a means for achieving transparency.    
9.2.2 Propose a Security Transparency Process  
Objective 2 aimed at proposing an implementable security transparency process for cloud 
migration activities based on the framework, which is formed based on the principles of various 
industry standards. There are existing processes for cloud migration such as CloudGenius 
(Menzel and Ranjan, 2012), however, such processes have certain limitations because they are 
not specifically developed with focus or emphasizing on security transparency. In order to fulfil 
this objective and address the gap, the research attempted to provide a collection of structured and 
related activities in a specific sequence that produces different outcomes and ensure that the 
proposed CSTF can be applied to real-world settings. The objective is met via Chapter 6 in which 
different phases of distinct activities are introduced that guide organization to structure their cloud 
migration from start to finish based on the artefacts of CSTF as proposed in Chapter 5. The 
activities consist of important exercises that range from: analyzing stakeholders involved in the 
project; analyzing the organizational context; identifying and classifying assets that are being 
migrated to the cloud, performing a risk assessment on the assets; specifying requirements for the 
assets; and performing audit to determine how requirements are being satisfied by the CSP. All 
these activities and others are combined together to create a process for implementing the CSTF. 
Essentially, to ensure adaptability and diverseness, the activities are created in consideration and 
by following an assortment of industry best practices, guidelines and standards that are generally 
applicable to all types of organizations regardless of size or industry. Section 7.2 of the Chapter 
presented a Unified Approach to CSTF process wherein the sections taken from industry 
standards, best practices and guidelines used in forming the activities are presented. The risk 
management activity considered STRIDE (Swiderski and Snyder, 2004) and DREAD (Shostack, 
2008) models; OWASP (OWASP Cloud - 10 Project, 2014) and ENISA (ENISA, 2009); and CIS 
CSC(Centre for Internet Security, 2018) and (ENISA, 2016) for developing threats profile, risk 
register and controls respectively. Also, CSA CCM(Cloud Security Alliance, 2017a) is adopted 
for the specification of requirements activity. For the audit activity, ISAE 500 Standard 
(ISAE500), CSA CAIQ (Cloud Security Alliance, 2017b), ISA 200-700 (ISA, 2016), SAS 
70(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Auditing Standards Board, 1997) are 
adopted.    
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9.2.3 Develop a Security Transparency Tool  
Objective 3 aimed at developing an assessment tool that enables organizations to collect evidence, 
probe and assess CSP’s conformance to established requirements, and for recommending 
remedial actions in areas where improvements are needed. The objective is drawn by considering 
the limitations associated with existing works, approaches and tools that have been designed to 
foster security transparency such as CSA CAIQ (Cloud Security Alliance, 2017b). For example, 
CAIQ provides a comprehensive checklist that cloud users can ask for and receive information 
about CSP services; however, CAIQ does not support users to collect and analyze, and establish 
findings based on the analysis. Therefore, this Objective is fulfilled via Chapter 6. The Chapter 
has successfully designed and implemented a proposed tool called STAT (Security Transparency 
and Audit Tool) that is built to serve as a supporting platform that automates the audit activity 
within CSTF. The limitations have been addressed by incorporating evidence collection, analysis 
and reporting routines. By addressing these limitations, STAT enables security auditors delegated 
by an organisation, to probe the activities of a CSP by seeking information about specific 
requirements, receiving evidence about how the requirements are being met, establishing 
assurances about the degree to which the CSP fulfils requirements, and making recommendations 
for remedial actions. The primary objective of STAT is to facilitate the collection and analysis of 
evidence, including the establishment of subjective audit judgement and determination of the 
necessary course of actions that needs to be taken, thereby promoting security transparency in the 
cloud. Section 8.6 provided a detailed overview of the features that are supported by STAT which 
are included in three main dashboards: the administrative, cloud auditor and CSP dashboards.   
9.3 Research Limitations  
While the primary aims and objectives set out for this research have been achieved, the research 
is not entirely free of lacks. During implementation and evaluation, the researcher has taken note 
of several shortcomings and limitations facing the research. The major limitations of the research 
are summarized as:  
 Time constraints: time constraints was the major factor that limited this research work, 
which resulted in many intended research activities, particularly for enhancing the 
proposed framework and tool,  not being accomplished. However, the unaccomplished 
research activities are considered for future research and are described in the section that 
follows.   
 Empirical Evaluation: another notable limiting factor for this research is the empirical 
evaluation method that covered only two case-studies. The evaluation part of CSTF and 
STAT enabled the researcher to collect and analyze feedback from stakeholders’ 
perception and acceptability of the proposed framework and tool respectively. The 
limited number of case-studies used and responses collected could potentially impact the 
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research’s generalization. The findings would have been more extensive if more case 
studies had been covered.  
 Implementation Bottlenecks: during the implementation phase of CSTF, some 
bottlenecks unfolded that were not predicted during the development phase of the 
proposed framework. These included misconception and/or misinterpretation of some of 
the steps involved. Specifically, most of the activities in the framework, such as risk 
management, are mostly carried out manually without the application of automated 
techniques. This resulted in a human error due to some stakeholders misunderstanding 
the procedures of following the step. The involvement of the researcher curtailed this 
problem; however, it could be a potential issue when generally adopted.  
 Evidence Assessment: the current deployment of STAT involves manual assessment of 
evidence produced by the CSP. Evidence collected are subjectively analyzed and 
compared to a defined set of criteria for interpretation and establishing conformance to 
requirements and areas where CSP practices need improvements. A noticeable limitation 
in this regard is that STAT does not support an automated assessment of evidence, which 
could be resource and time-consuming.       
 Scalability to broader contexts: although the target beneficiaries of the proposed 
framework are companies of all size, especially small and medium-sized, the scalability 
and adaptability of the framework to accommodate diverse and changing environments 
like that of large enterprises who have complex systems and immense requirements is not 
performed. Therefore, there is a need to apply the research to the context of large 
businesses to establish its suitability to attune diverse contexts.    
9.4 Further  Research  
The previous section had identified some of the crucial limitations observed in this research. This 
research has unlocked the potentials for different research directions and works in the area of 
cloud transparency. It is important to outline the direction of future research and how some of the 
above-mentioned limitations can be addressed.  
 Integration of Supplementary Concepts: extensive research was carried out in the area 
of cloud security transparency, and numerous concepts were established and used to 
develop the framework. These concepts enabled the modelling of security transparency 
by considering various domains such as risk management and audit and they have 
provided the foundation on which to improve the scope and boundary of transparency in 
the cloud. Vital future work can focus on identifying and integrating supplementary 
concepts to accommodate other essential domains of concern such as cost-related 
transparency and vendor lock-in in the cloud services.  
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 Automation of the Overall CSTF Process: another potential future research is the 
complete automation of the activities and steps involved in the CSTF process. Full 
automation of the process will ensure that every activity is performed with consistency 
and accuracy and reduce the chances of human error. Also, it will provide time-saving by 
reducing the time and the number of personnel required to undertake each activity. 
Further, the automation of CSTF process will also improve reliability, thereby leading to 
wider acceptability amongst businesses.     
 Integration with artificial intelligence: another future research area is the application 
of artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques for collecting, processing, and 
analyzing evidence, as well as for predicting certain anomalies that could result to 
breachinging of requirements. This will mostly consist of designing or creating a set of 
rules that enable auditors to direct, optimize and deliver assessment results, which will 
ensure better assessment and optimization of findings, as well as avoiding bias in audit 
judgement.  
 Evaluation with Large Scale Companies: the evaluation of CSTF and STAT was 
performed in proportionately medium-sized case-studies contexts. Nevertheless, there is 
a need for further validation in more onerous and larger-scale situations. Therefore, a 
potential research area is the adjustment and application of the proposed framework to 
large scale scenarios for testing its efficacy to address enterprise-scale security 
transparency needs.   
9.6 Summary  
Lack of security transparency is becoming an increasingly important concern for businesses who 
entrust their information assets with a CSP. The significance of security transparency is 
expanding, even more, every day as businesses are growingly concerned about the level of 
visibility rendered by cloud services, which also adversely affect user trust. There is the dire need 
tor a viable solution that supports companies to systematically have visibility into cloud activities, 
methodically track and probe how salient requirements are being fulfilled. This doctoral thesis 
contributes in that direction by proposing a comprehensive framework and a tool to support the 
accomplishment of security transparency, which potentially improves businesses trust in cloud 
services. We believe that the proposed framework, its process and supporting tool will have a 
significant impact on the cloud computing domain and state-of-the-art in general.  
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Questionnaire Evaluation for Framework Evaluation 
Acceptability Ratings for the Proposed Framework  
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect your feedback about the proposed “A Framework for 
Security Transparency in Cloud Computing”, which is aimed at supporting your organisation in 
achieving and enhancing security transparency. Your feedback is highly important in helping us establish 
the validity of the proposed framework and areas of improvement. Kindly respond to the questions that 
follow by “checking” one of the boxes where appropriate. The questions are designed and evaluated 
according to criterion as:  
1. Ease of use: enquires whether the framework is designed in such a way that can be easily used 
by users.   
2. Relevance: determines whether the framework is relevant in terms of feasibility for supporting 
your organisation achieve security transparency   
3. Usefulness: whether the framework will be very useful in helping the organisation achieve 
security transparency.  
4. Flexibility and dynamics: whether the framework is dynamic enough to cover and deal with 
larger contexts and scenarios.   
5. Compliance to security standards and best practices: attempts to establish whether the framework 
complies with industry standards such as ISO27001/2, and NIST  
6. Trustworthiness: enquires whether the framework is trustworthy in ensuring the privacy and 
security, as well as preventing future security issues.  
Thank you for your cooperation.  
S/N Evaluation 
Criteria 
Question Response Options 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Not 
Sure 
Disagree 
1.  Ease of Use  Do you agree that CSTF is clear and easily 
understandable to intended users? 
    
       
2.  Relevance  Do you agree the proposed framework is 
relevant for supporting organisations 
achieve security transparency?   
    
       
3.  Usefulness  Do you agree that the proposed framework 
is useful in terms of the expected 
deliverables? 
    
       
4.  Flexibility  Do you agree the proposed framework is 
flexible to adapt to dynamic contexts?   
    
       
5.  Compliance with 
security standards 
and best practices  
Does the framework comply with relevant 
laws, standards and best practices?   
    
       
6.  Trustworthiness Do you consider the proposed framework 
to be trustworthy in ensuring privacy and 
security?   
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Appendix B: Questionnaire for Evaluating Security Transparency and Audit Tool 
Evaluation (STAT) 
Acceptability Ratings for the Proposed Security Transparency and Audit Tool (STAT) 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect your feedback about the proposed “Security Transparency 
and Audit Tool”, which is part of the research titled: “A Framework for Security Transparency in Cloud 
Computing”. The tool is aimed at supporting your organisation in achieving and enhancing security 
transparency. Your feedback is highly important in helping us establish the validity of the proposed Tool 
and areas of improvement. Kindly respond to the questions that follow by “checking” one of the boxes 
where appropriate. The questions are designed and evaluated according to criterion as:  
7. Ease of use: enquires whether STAT is considered to be designed in such a way that can be easily 
used by users.   
8. Relevance:  determines whether STAT is relevantly feasible to support your organisation in 
achieving security transparency   
9. Usefulness: whether STAT will be very useful in helping the organisation achieve security 
transparency.  
10. Flexibility and dynamics: whether STAT is dynamic enough to cover and deal with larger 
contexts and scenarios.   
11. Compliance to security standards and best practices: attempts to establish whether STAT 
complies with industry standards such as ISO27001/2, and NIST  
12. Trustworthiness: enquires whether STAST is trustworthy in ensuring the privacy and security, 
as well as preventing future security issues.  
Thank you for your cooperation.  
S/N Evaluation 
Criteria  
Question  Response Options  
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Not 
Sure  
Disagree  
1.  Ease of Use  Do you agree that CSTF is clear and easily 
understandable to intended users? 
    
a.        
2.  Relevance  Do you agree the proposed framework is 
relevant for supporting organisations 
achieve security transparency?   
    
a.        
b.  Usefulness  Do you agree that the proposed framework 
is useful in terms of the expected 
deliverables? 
    
3.        
a.  Flexibility  Do you agree the proposed framework is 
flexible to adapt to dynamic contexts?   
    
4.        
5.  Compliance with 
security standards 
and best practices  
Does the framework comply with relevant 
laws, standards and best practices?   
    
6.        
7.  Trustworthiness Do you consider the proposed framework 
to be trustworthy in ensuring privacy and 
security?   
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Appendix C: Security Audit Checklist 
Transparency Requirements 
Requirement  Target 
Verification 
(Control 
Domain) 
Base 
Measure 
(Control 
Type) 
Specification  Question  CSP Response  Means of 
Verification 
 
Audit Criteria Conformance 
Level  
Yes  No N/A S C U A R 
Transparency  
  
  
  
Supply chain 
mgmt., 
transparency 
& 
accountability   
Data quality 
& Integrity  
CSP should work with their 
supply –chain partners to ensure 
data quality errors and 
associated risks are prevented. 
Providers should also design 
and implement controls to 
mitigate and contain data 
security risks through adequate 
access controls, separation of 
duties and least privilege access 
to all personnel within their 
supply chain.  
Do you inspect and account 
for data quality errors and 
associated risks, and work 
with your cloud supply-chain 
partners to correct them? 
   Authentication 
and 
authorisation 
logs, third party 
security audit 
report, security 
policies.  
      
Do you design and implement 
controls to mitigate and 
contain data security risks 
through proper separation of 
duties, role-based access, and 
least-privileged access for all 
personnel within your supply 
chain? 
         
Incident 
reporting  
Information about security 
incidents that affected 
customers should be made 
available by the CSP through 
electronic methods such as 
portals.  
Do you make security 
incident information available 
to all affected customers 
through electronic methods? 
   Events 
notification 
mechanisms or 
platforms, 
intrusion 
detection 
reports, 
vulnerability 
scan report, and 
penetration test 
reports.  
      
Do you provide tenants with 
capacity planning and usage 
reports? 
         
Do you permit tenants to 
perform independent 
vulnerability assessments? 
         
Do you have external third 
party services conduct 
vulnerability scans and 
periodic penetration tests on 
your applications and 
networks? 
         
Do you log and alert any 
changes made to virtual 
machine images regardless of 
   Virtual resource 
access and 
activity reports, 
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their running state (e.g., 
dormant, off or running)? 
security incident 
management 
policies and 
report 
mechanisms 
Are changes made to virtual 
machines, or moving of an 
image and subsequent 
validation of the image's 
integrity, made immediately 
available to customers 
through electronic methods 
(e.g., portals or alerts) 
         
Will you share statistical 
information for security 
incident data with your 
tenants upon request? 
         
Do you make security 
incident information available 
to all affected customers and 
providers periodically through 
electronic methods (e.g., 
portals)? 
         
Provider 
Internal 
Assessment
s 
Internal security assessments 
should be performed at least 
annually to establish 
conformance and effectiveness 
of policies, procedures and 
supporting measures.   
  
Do you perform annual 
internal assessments of 
conformance and 
effectiveness of your policies, 
procedures, and supporting 
measures and metrics? 
   Proof of 
certification and 
accreditation 
issued by 
standards, best 
practice and 
independent 
third-party 
attestations, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications. 
      
Do you provide customers 
with a copy of governing 
standards, policies and 
guidelines upon request?  
         
Do you notify customers with 
changes to governing policies, 
standards and guidelines?   
         
Do you have a security policy 
that is clearly documented 
and represented to all 
concerned clients?  
         
Do you have a security policy 
that is augmented by security 
standards or guidelines?  
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Do you provide customers 
visibility into independent 
third party audits?   
         
Do you provide customers 
visibility into assets 
management?  
         
Third party 
agreement  
Supply chain agreements 
between the CSP and the 
organisation shall incorporate 
the scope of business 
relationship covered and the 
services offered;   information 
security requirements; 
notification and/or pre-
authorization of any changes 
controlled by the provider with 
customer impacts; timely 
notification of a security 
incident to customers; 
assessment and independent 
verification of compliance with 
agreement terms; expiration of 
the business relationship and 
treatment of customer. 
Do you monitor outsourced 
providers in compliance with 
laws in the country where the 
data is processed, stored, and 
transmitted? 
   Contracts 
management 
and monitoring 
certified by 
independent 
third-party 
auditor, 
compliance to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
best practice, 
and relevant 
certifications,  
 
      
Do you select and monitor 
outsourced providers in 
compliance with laws in the 
country where the data 
originates? 
         
Do you provide clients with a 
list and copies of all sub 
processing agreements and 
keep this updated? 
         
Third party 
providers 
There should be reasonable 
information security across their 
supply chain, which includes all 
third-party providers upon 
which the CSP’s information 
supply chain depends.    
 
 
Do you have any services that 
are provided by a third-party?  
   Contracts 
management 
and monitoring 
certified by 
independent 
third-party 
auditor, 
compliance to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
best practice, 
and relevant 
certifications. 
      
If any part of your services 
are outsourced, does the 
providing party comply with 
the same policy and standards 
you enforce?  
         
Do you audit third party 
providers for compliance with 
policies and standards?   
         
Audit tools 
access 
There should be appropriate 
restriction and segmentation 
Do you restrict, log, and 
monitor access to your 
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Identity and 
access 
management  
access to, and use of audit tools 
that interact with the 
organisation’s information 
systems in order to prevent 
compromise and misuse of log 
data? 
information security 
management systems (e.g., 
hypervisors, firewalls, 
vulnerability scanners, 
network sniffers, APIs, etc.)? 
 
Authentication 
and 
authorisation 
mechanisms, 
network activity 
monitoring, 
independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications. 
 
Do you provide tenants with 
documentation on how you 
maintain segregation of duties 
within your cloud service 
offering? 
         
 Do you monitor and log 
privileged access (e.g., 
administrator level) to 
information security 
management systems? 
         
User access 
restriction/a
uthorisation  
Policies and procedures should 
be established to ensure 
identities are only accessible 
based on rules of least privilege.    
 
  
Do you document how you 
grant and approve access to 
tenant data? 
         
Do you have a method of 
aligning provider and tenant 
data classification 
methodologies for access 
control purposes? 
         
Infrastructure 
& 
virtualisation 
Security  
Audit 
detection  
A high level of assurance 
should be provided regarding 
the protection, retention and 
policy management of audit 
logs that adhere to applicable 
legal, statutory, and regulatory 
compliance obligations. User 
access accountability should 
also be provided for detecting 
potential suspicious behaviours 
and/or file integrity anomalies, 
and supporting forensic 
investigations in the event of a 
security breach.  
Are file integrity (host) and 
network intrusion detection 
(IDS) tools implemented to 
help facilitate timely 
detection, investigation by 
root cause analysis, and 
response to incidents? 
   Systems and 
network 
intrusion 
detection and 
activity 
monitoring. 
      
              
Independent 
audits 
Intendent reviews and 
assessments should be 
Do you allow tenants to view 
your SOC2/ISO 27001 or 
   Proof of 
compliance with 
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Audit 
assurance & 
compliance  
performed to support the 
organisation address 
nonconformities of established 
requirements, standards, 
policies, procedures and 
compliance obligations.   
 
 
  
similar third-party audit or 
certification reports? 
ISO 27001 and 
other relevant 
industry 
standards. 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications. 
 
 
 
Penetration test 
results, systems 
and network 
activity reports, 
data and 
systems change 
report.  
Do you conduct network 
penetration tests of your cloud 
service infrastructure 
regularly as prescribed by 
industry best practices and 
guidance? 
         
Do you conduct internal 
audits regularly as prescribed 
by industry best practices and 
guidance? 
         
Are the results of the 
penetration tests available to 
tenants at their request? 
         
Are all requirements and trust 
levels for customers’ access 
defined and documented? 
         
Are file integrity (host) and 
network intrusion detection 
(IDS) tools implemented to 
help facilitate timely 
detection, investigation by 
root cause analysis, and 
response to incident? 
         
Is physical and logical user 
access to audit logs restricted 
to authorized personnel? 
         
Can you provide evidence 
that due diligence mapping of 
regulations and standards to 
your 
controls/architecture/processe
s has been done? 
         
Are audit logs centrally stored 
and retained? 
         
Are audit logs reviewed on a 
regular basis for security 
events (e.g., with automated 
tools)? 
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Are all requirements and trust 
levels for customers’ access 
defined and documented? 
          
               
 
Baselined Requirements  
Requirement  Target 
Verification 
(Control 
Domain) 
Base 
Measur
e 
(Contro
l Type) 
Specification  Question  CSP Response  Means of 
Verification 
 
Audit Criteria Complian
ce Level  
Yes  No N/A S C U A R 
Baseline 
requirements  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Datacentre 
security  
Controll
ed 
access 
points  
There must be a classification of 
assets according to business 
criticality, service-level 
expectations, and operational 
continuity requirements of the 
organisation. A complete inventory 
of business-critical assets located 
geographical locations must be 
maintained and regularly updated, 
with defined roles and 
responsibilities.     
 
Do you maintain a complete 
inventory of all of your critical 
assets that includes ownership of 
the asset? 
   Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications. 
 
      
Do you maintain a complete 
inventory of all of your critical 
supplier relationships? 
         
Equipm
ent 
identific
ation  
Prior to granting access request, 
automated mechanisms should be 
used to identify connection request 
based on equipment location.   
   
Is automated equipment 
identification used as a method to 
validate connection authentication 
integrity based on known 
equipment location? 
   Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications. 
 
      
 Do you provide tenants with 
documentation that describes 
scenarios in which data may be 
moved from one physical location 
to another (e.g., offsite backups, 
business continuity failovers, and 
replication)? 
         
User 
access  
Physical access to facilities storing 
critical assets must be restricted and 
controlled.  
Do you restrict physical access to 
information assets and functions 
by users and support personnel? 
   Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
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Are ingress and egress points, 
such as service areas and other 
points where unauthorized 
personnel may enter the premises, 
monitored, controlled and isolated 
from data storage and process? 
   relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications 
      
Encryption & 
key mgmt. 
Key 
generati
on  
Policies and procedures for 
managing cryptographic keys in the 
cloud service cryptosystem must be 
established.  
   
Do you have a capability to allow 
creation of unique encryption 
keys per tenant? 
   Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications 
      
Do you have a capability to 
manage encryption keys on behalf 
of tenants? 
         
Do you protect encryption keys, 
and what controls are put in place 
to effect that?  
         
Storage 
and 
access  
Appropriate platform and data 
encryption in validated formats and 
standard algorithms should be 
implemented, while making sure 
that keys are not stored in the cloud 
but maintained by trusted key 
management provider.  
  
Do you have platform and data 
appropriate encryption that use 
open/validated formats and 
standard algorithms? 
   Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications 
      
Do you have procedures in place 
to manage and recover 
compromised encryption keys?  
         
Do you have a security policy that 
clearly defines what must be 
encrypted?  
         
Identity & 
access 
management  
Diagnos
tic 
configur
ation 
ports 
access 
User access to diagnostic and 
configuration ports shall be 
restricted to authorized individuals 
and applications. 
Do you use dedicated secure 
networks to provide management 
access to your cloud service 
infrastructure? 
         
             
User ID 
Credenti
als  
User accounts credentials  should 
be restricted in line with 
appropriate identity entitlement, 
and access management and 
Do you manage accounts with 
administrator or higher 
privileges?  
   Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
relevant 
industry 
      
Do you verify user identity and 
registration?  
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according to established policies 
and procedures   
 
  
Do you support use of, or 
integration with, existing 
customer-based Single Sign On 
(SSO) solutions to your service? 
   certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications. 
 
 
Authenticatio
n and 
authorisation 
monitoring 
reports and 
policies.  
      
Do you use open standards to 
delegate authentication 
capabilities to your tenants? 
         
Do you have a Policy 
Enforcement Point capability 
(e.g., XACML) to enforce 
regional legal and policy 
constraints on user access? 
         
Do you have an identity 
management system (enabling 
classification of data for a tenant) 
in place to enable both role-based 
and context-based entitlement to 
data? 
         
Do you provide tenants with 
strong (multifactor) 
authentication options (e.g., 
digital certs, tokens, biometrics, 
etc.) for user access? 
         
Do you allow tenants to use third-
party identity assurance services? 
         
Do you support password (e.g., 
minimum length, age, history, 
complexity) and account lockout 
(e.g., lockout threshold, lockout 
duration) policy enforcement? 
         
Do you allow tenants/customers 
to define password and account 
lockout policies for their 
accounts? 
         
Do you support the ability to 
force password changes upon first 
logon? 
         
Do you have mechanisms in place 
for unlocking accounts that have 
been locked out (e.g., self-service 
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via email, defined challenge 
questions, manual unlock)? 
Source 
code 
access 
restricti
on  
Access to applications, programs, 
object source, and other forms of 
intellectual property belonging to 
the organisation should be restricted 
by following the rules of least 
privilege based on job function as 
per established user access policies 
and procedures of the organisation.  
 
Are controls in place to prevent 
unauthorized access to your 
application, program, or object 
source code, and assure it is 
restricted to authorized personnel 
only? 
   Authenticatio
n and 
authorisation 
monitoring  
report  
 
Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, 
and legal 
frameworks 
      
Are controls in place to prevent 
unauthorized access to tenant 
application, program, or object 
source code, and assure it is 
restricted to authorized personnel 
only? 
         
Utility 
program 
access 
All utility programs that could 
potentially override system, object, 
network, virtual machines and 
applications should be restricted 
 
 
Are utilities that can significantly 
manage virtualized partitions 
(e.g., shutdown, clone, etc.) 
appropriately restricted and 
monitored? 
   Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications 
      
Do you have the capability to 
detect attacks that target the 
virtual infrastructure directly 
(e.g., shimming, Blue Pill, Hyper 
jumping, etc.)? 
         
Are attacks that target the virtual 
infrastructure prevented with 
technical controls? 
         
 Human 
resources  
Asset 
returns  
Policies and procedures should be 
established that ensure 
organizationally-owned assets are 
returned within an established 
period upon the termination or 
expiration of cloud service contract. 
Are systems in place to monitor 
for privacy breaches and notify 
tenants expeditiously if a privacy 
event may have impacted their 
data? 
   Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
      
   Is your Privacy Policy aligned 
with industry standards? 
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practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, 
and legal 
requirements  
 
Business Requirements  
Requirement  Target 
Verification 
(Control 
Domain) 
Base 
Measur
e 
(Contro
l Type) 
Specification  Question  CSP Response  Means of 
Verification 
 
Audit 
Criteria 
Complian
ce Level  
Yes  No N/A S C U A R 
Business  
  
  
  
Business 
community 
mgmt. & 
operational 
resilience  
Busines
s 
continui
ty 
planning  
Procedures and policies shall be 
established for a unified framework 
that documents and ensures 
business continuity plans ensures 
business continuity plan are 
consistent in addressing priorities 
for testing, maintenance and 
development according to 
organisation’s requirements.  
Do you provide tenants with 
geographically resilient 
hosting options? 
   Independent third-
party attestations to 
relevant industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, and 
legal requirements.  
      
Do you provide tenants with 
infrastructure service failover 
capability to other providers? 
         
Busines
s 
continui
ty 
testing 
There should be planned testing of 
Implemented business continuity 
and security incident response plans 
on regular intervals or upon 
significant changes to CSP’s 
environmental factors.   
Are business continuity plans 
subject to testing at planned 
intervals or upon significant 
organizational or 
environmental changes to 
ensure continuing 
effectiveness? 
   Independent third-
party attestations to 
relevant industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, and 
legal requirements 
      
Does your cloud solution 
include independent hardware 
restore and recovery 
capabilities? 
         
If using virtual infrastructure, 
do you provide tenants with a 
capability to restore a Virtual 
Machine to a previous state in 
time? 
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If using virtual infrastructure, 
do you allow virtual machine 
images to be downloaded and 
ported to a new CSP? 
         
If using virtual infrastructure, 
are machine images made 
available to the customer in a 
way that would allow the 
customer to replicate those 
images in their own off-site 
storage location? 
         
Does your cloud solution 
include software/provider 
independent restore and 
recovery capabilities? 
         
Are security mechanisms and 
redundancies implemented to 
protect equipment from utility 
service outages (e.g., power 
failures, network disruptions, 
etc.)? 
         
Do you have a formal process 
for contingency plan that 
guides the process for 
business continuity?  
         
Do you have service recovery 
point objective (RPO) and 
recovery time objective 
(RTO)?  
         
Do you have a secondary site 
for disaster recovery  
         
Resourc
e 
provisio
ning  
Cloud resources should be 
sufficiently provisioned according 
to organisation’s requirements.   
Do you have controls and 
procedures in place to manage 
resource exhaustion, 
including processing 
oversubscription, storage 
outage, and network 
exhaustion?  
   Cloud resource 
utilisation and 
management 
services 
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Do you limit subscriptions to 
the service in order to protect 
SLA agreements?  
         
Do you provide customers 
with utilisation and capacity 
planning information?  
         
              
Identity & 
Access 
Management  
Third 
Party 
Access  
A risk management assessment 
should be used to identify, assess 
and prioritise risks posed by 
business processes requiring third-
party access to the organisation’s 
assets. Followed by a coordinated 
application of resources to 
minimize, monitor and measure the 
likelihood and impact of 
unauthorised access to assets.  
  
Do you provide multi-failure 
disaster recovery capability? 
   Independent third-
party attestations to 
relevant industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, and 
legal frameworks. 
      
Do you monitor service 
continuity with upstream 
providers in the event of 
provider failure? 
         
Do you have more than one 
provider for each service you 
depend on? 
         
Do you provide access to 
operational redundancy and 
continuity summaries, 
including the services you 
depend on? 
         
Do you provide a tenant-
triggered failover option? 
         
Do you share your business 
continuity and redundancy 
plans with your tenants? 
         
           
Security 
incident 
management, 
e-discovery, 
& cloud 
forensics 
Incident 
Respons
e Legal 
Preparat
ion 
Appropriate forensic procedures 
and processes, including chain of 
custody should be maintained for 
the presentation of evidence with 
the aim of supporting potential 
legal action subject to relevant 
jurisdiction after a security incident. 
An organisation and other external 
parties impacted should be given 
the opportunity to participate as per 
Does your incident response 
plan comply with industry 
standards for legally 
admissible chain-of-custody 
management processes and 
controls? 
   Independent third-
party attestations to 
relevant industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, relevant 
certifications, legal 
and regulatory 
compliance. 
      
Does your incident response 
capability include the use of 
legally admissible forensic 
data collection and analysis 
techniques? 
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legal requirements of forensic 
investigation.   
  
Are you capable of supporting 
litigation holds (freeze of data 
from a specific point in time) 
for a specific tenant without 
freezing other tenant data? 
         
Do you enforce and attest to 
tenant data separation when 
producing data in response to 
legal subpoenas? 
         
  Do you monitor and quantify 
the types, volumes, and 
impacts on all information 
security incidents? 
         
 Governance 
and Risk 
Management 
Baseline 
Require
ment 
 
Baseline security requirements that 
comply with applicable legal, 
statutory, and regulatory 
compliance should be established 
for organizationally-owned assets. 
Any deviation following change 
management policies and 
procedures must be authorise. 
Compliance with security baseline 
requirements should be periodically 
reassessed  
 
  
Do you have documented 
information security baselines 
for every component of your 
infrastructure (e.g., 
hypervisors, operating 
systems, routers, DNS 
servers, etc.)? 
          
 Do you have the capability to 
continuously monitor and 
report the compliance of your 
infrastructure against your 
information security 
baselines? 
         
 Do you allow your clients to 
provide their own trusted 
virtual machine image to 
ensure conformance to their 
own internal standards? 
         
 
Operational Requirements  
Requirement  Target 
Verification 
(Control 
Domain) 
Base 
Measur
e 
(Contro
l Type) 
Specification  Question  CSP Response  Means of 
Verification 
 
Audit 
Criteria 
Complian
ce Level  
Yes  No N/A S C U A R 
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Operational  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Threat and 
vulnerability 
management  
Antiviru
s/malici
ous 
software  
Technical measures, including 
policies and procedures should be 
established to prevent the execution 
of malware on organizationally-
owned assets 
Do you have anti-malware 
programs that support or 
connect to your cloud service 
offerings installed on all of your 
systems? 
   Malware 
activity 
monitoring, 
intrusion 
detection and 
prevention 
reports,  
 
Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, 
relevant 
certifications, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance. 
 
 
      
Do you ensure that security 
threat detection systems using 
signatures, lists, or behavioural 
patterns are updated across all 
infrastructure components 
within industry accepted time 
frames? 
         
 Vulnera
bility/pa
tch 
manage
ment 
Technical measures, policies and 
procedures should be implemented 
and established to enable timely 
detection of vulnerabilities within 
organizationally-owned assets to 
ensure the efficiency of security 
controls. A remediation approach 
for mitigating vulnerabilities should 
also be used. The CSP should 
inform the organisation of policies 
and procedures and identified 
weaknesses especially if the 
organisation is affected by 
emerging vulnerabilities.   
  
Do you conduct network-layer 
vulnerability scans regularly as 
prescribed by industry best 
practices? 
   Malware 
activity 
monitoring 
report, system 
and network 
monitoring 
reports,  
 
Independent 
third-party audit 
and attestations 
to relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, 
relevant 
      
Do you conduct application-
layer vulnerability scans 
regularly as prescribed by 
industry best practices? 
         
Do you conduct local operating 
system-layer vulnerability scans 
regularly as prescribed by 
industry best practices? 
         
Will you make the results of 
vulnerability scans available to 
tenants at their request 
         
Do you have a capability to 
rapidly patch vulnerabilities 
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across all of your computing 
devices, applications, and 
systems? 
certifications, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance. 
 
Governance 
and risk 
management  
Risk 
assessm
ents  
Risk assessments associated with 
data governance requirements shall 
be conducted at planned intervals 
and consider: the awareness of 
where sensitive data is stored and 
transmitted. Compliance with 
defined retention periods and end-
of-life disposal requirements; data 
classification and protection from 
unauthorised use and access.  
  
Do you provide security control 
health data in order to allow 
tenants to implement industry 
standard Continuous 
Monitoring (which allows 
continual tenant validation of 
your physical and logical 
control status)? 
   Independent 
third-party audit 
and attestations 
to relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance 
      
Do you conduct risk 
assessments associated with 
data governance requirements at 
least once a year? 
         
Datacentre 
security  
Data 
centre 
security 
and 
asset 
manage
ment  
Processes, procedures and controls 
should be implemented for ensuring 
physical security parameters for 
safeguarding sensitive assets.   
 
 . 
Do you have requirements for 
controlling physical access to 
your facility? 
   Independent 
third-party audit 
and attestations 
to relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance 
      
Are physical security perimeters 
(e.g., fences, walls, barriers, 
guards, gates, electronic 
surveillance, physical 
authentication mechanisms, 
reception desks, and security 
patrols) in place? 
         
Do you have procedures for risk 
assessments for physical 
security 
         
Do you maintain and complete 
inventory of all software, 
network, hardware and virtual 
components?  
         
Do you support asset 
categorisation of different 
sensitivity levels?  
         
Do you maintain virtual 
segregation and physical 
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separation of assets at different 
sensitivity levels?  
Application & 
Interface 
Security 
Applicat
ion 
Security 
The provisions and 
recommendations of industry 
standards should be followed in the 
design, development, deployment 
and testing of applications and 
programming interfaces (APIs)  
 
 . 
Do you use industry standards 
(Build Security in Maturity 
Model [BSIMM] benchmarks, 
Open Group ACS Trusted 
Technology Provider 
Framework, NIST, etc.) to build 
in security for your 
Systems/Software Development 
Lifecycle (SDLC)? 
   Independent 
third-party audit 
and attestations 
to relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance 
      
Do you use an automated 
source code analysis tool to 
detect security defects in code 
prior to production? 
         
Do you use manual source-code 
analysis to detect security 
defects in code prior to 
production? 
         
Do you verify that all of your 
software suppliers adhere to 
industry standards for 
Systems/Software Development 
Lifecycle (SDLC) security? 
         
Interoperabilit
y & 
Portability 
APIs The provider shall use open and 
published APIs to ensure support 
for interoperability between 
components and to facilitate 
migrating applications. 
Do you publish a list of all APIs 
available in the service and 
indicate which are standard and 
which are customized? 
   Independent 
third-party audit 
and attestations 
to relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance 
      
Data 
request  
All structured and unstructured data 
shall be available to the customer 
and provided to them upon request 
Is unstructured customer data 
available on request in an 
   Independent 
third-party 
attestations to 
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in an industry-standard format (e.g., 
.doc, .xls, .pdf, logs, and flat files). 
industry-standard format (e.g., 
.doc, .xls, or .pdf)? 
relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance 
Policy 
& Legal 
Policies, procedures, and mutually-
agreed upon provisions and/or 
terms shall be established to satisfy 
customer (tenant) requirements for 
service-to-service application (API) 
and information processing 
interoperability, and portability for 
application development and 
information exchange, usage, and 
integrity persistence. 
Do you provide policies and 
procedures (i.e. service level 
agreements) governing the use 
of APIs for interoperability 
between your service and third-
party applications? 
   Independent 
third-party audit 
and attestations 
to relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance 
      
Do you provide policies and 
procedures (i.e. service level 
agreements) governing the 
migration of application data to 
and from your service? 
         
Standar
dized 
Network 
Protocol
s 
The provider shall use secure (e.g., 
non-clear text and authenticated) 
standardized network protocols for 
the import and export of data and to 
manage the service, and shall make 
available a document to consumers 
(tenants) detailing the relevant 
interoperability and portability 
standards that are involved. 
Can data import, data export, 
and service management be 
conducted over secure (e.g., 
non-clear text and 
authenticated), industry 
accepted standardized network 
protocols? 
   Independent 
third-party audit 
and attestations 
to relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance 
      
Do you provide consumers 
(tenants) with documentation 
detailing the relevant 
interoperability and portability 
network protocol standards that 
are involved? 
         
 Virtualis
ation  
The provider shall use an industry-
recognized virtualization platform 
and standard virtualization formats 
(e.g., OVF) to help ensure 
Do you use an industry-
recognized virtualization 
platform and standard 
virtualization formats (e.g., 
   Independent 
third-party audit 
and attestations 
to relevant 
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interoperability, and shall have 
documented custom changes made 
to any hypervisor in use, and all 
solution-specific virtualization 
hooks, available for customer 
review. 
OVF) to help ensure 
interoperability? 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance 
Do you have documented 
custom changes made to any 
hypervisor in use, and all 
solution-specific virtualization 
hooks available for customer 
review 
         
Data Security 
& Information 
Lifecycle 
Management 
Classific
ation 
Data and objects containing data 
shall be assigned a classification by 
the data owner based on data type, 
value, sensitivity, and criticality to 
the organization. 
Do you provide a capability to 
identify virtual machines via 
policy tags/metadata (e.g., tags 
can be used to limit guest 
operating systems from 
booting/instantiating/transportin
g data in the wrong country)? 
   Independent 
third-party audit 
and attestations 
to relevant 
industry 
certifications, 
industry best 
practice, and 
relevant 
certifications, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance 
      
Do you provide a capability to 
identify hardware via policy 
tags/metadata/hardware tags 
(e.g., TXT/TPM, VN-Tag, 
etc.)? 
         
Do you have a capability to use 
system geographic location as 
an authentication factor? 
         
Can you provide the physical 
location/geography of storage 
of a tenant’s data upon request? 
         
Do you allow tenants to define 
acceptable geographical 
locations for data routing or 
resource instantiation 
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Audit Findings/Judgement 
Transparency Requirements  
Requirement  Target Verification 
(Control Domain) 
Base Measure (Control 
Type) 
Question  Audit Judgement Remedial Actions  
Defective  Acceptable  Effective  Preventive  Detective  Corrective  
Transparency  
  
  
  
Supply chain mgmt., 
transparency & 
accountability   
Data quality & Integrity  Do you inspect and account for data quality 
errors and associated risks, and work with your 
cloud supply-chain partners to correct them? 
 *   *  
Do you design and implement controls to 
mitigate and contain data security risks through 
proper separation of duties, role-based access, 
and least-privileged access for all personnel 
within your supply chain? 
  *    
Incident reporting  Do you make security incident information 
available to all affected customers through 
electronic methods? 
 *   *  
Do you provide tenants with capacity planning 
and usage reports? 
  *    
Do you permit tenants to perform independent 
vulnerability assessments? 
  *  *  
Do you have external third party services 
conduct vulnerability scans and periodic 
penetration tests on your applications and 
networks? 
  *    
Do you log and alert any changes made to 
virtual machine images regardless of their 
running state (e.g., dormant, off or running)? 
*   * * * 
Are changes made to virtual machines, or 
moving of an image and subsequent validation 
of the image's integrity, made immediately 
available to customers through electronic 
methods (e.g., portals or alerts) 
 *   *  
Will you share statistical information for 
security incident data with your tenants upon 
request? 
  *    
Do you make security incident information 
available to all affected customers and 
providers periodically through electronic 
methods (e.g., portals)? 
  *   * 
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Provider Internal 
Assessments 
Do you perform annual internal assessments of 
conformance and effectiveness of your 
policies, procedures, and supporting measures 
and metrics? 
  *    
Do you provide customers with a copy of 
governing standards, policies and guidelines 
upon request?  
  *    
Do you notify customers with changes to 
governing policies, standards and guidelines?   
  *    
Do you have a security policy that is clearly 
documented and represented to all concerned 
clients?  
  *    
Do you have a security policy that is 
augmented by security standards or guidelines?  
  *    
Do you provide customers visibility into 
independent third party audits?   
  *    
Do you provide customers visibility into assets 
management?  
  *    
Third party agreement  Do you monitor outsourced providers in 
compliance with laws in the country where the 
data is processed, stored, and transmitted? 
*     * 
Do you select and monitor outsourced 
providers in compliance with laws in the 
country where the data originates? 
 *   * * 
Do you provide clients with a list and copies of 
all sub-processing agreements and keep this 
updated? 
*     * 
Third-party providers Do you have any services that are provided by 
a third-party?  
 *    * 
If any part of your services are outsourced, 
does the providing party comply with the same 
policy and standards you enforce?  
 *  *  * 
Do you audit third party providers for 
compliance with policies and standards?   
 *  *  * 
Identity and access 
management  
Audit tools access Do you restrict, log, and monitor access to 
your information security management systems 
(e.g., hypervisors, firewalls, vulnerability 
scanners, network sniffers, APIs, etc.)? 
  *    
Do you provide tenants with documentation on 
how you maintain segregation of duties within 
your cloud service offering? 
  *    
 Do you monitor and log privileged access 
(e.g., administrator level) to information 
security management systems? 
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User access 
restriction/authorisation  
Do you document how you grant and approve 
access to tenant data? 
  *    
Do you have a method of aligning provider and 
tenant data classification methodologies for 
access control purposes? 
*   * *  
Infrastructure & 
virtualisation Security  
Audit detection  Are file integrity (host) and network intrusion 
detection (IDS) tools implemented to help 
facilitate timely detection, an investigation by 
root cause analysis, and response to incidents? 
  *    
         
Audit assurance & 
compliance  
Independent audits Do you allow tenants to view your SOC2/ISO 
27001 or similar third-party audit or 
certification reports? 
  *    
Do you conduct network penetration tests of 
your cloud service infrastructure regularly as 
prescribed by industry best practices and 
guidance? 
  *    
Do you conduct internal audits regularly as 
prescribed by industry best practices and 
guidance? 
  *    
Are the results of the penetration tests available 
to tenants at their request? 
  *    
Are all requirements and trust levels for 
customers’ access defined and documented? * 
    * 
Are file integrity (host) and network intrusion 
detection (IDS) tools implemented to help 
facilitate timely detection, an investigation by 
root cause analysis, and response to the 
incident? 
  *    
Is physical and logical user access to audit logs 
restricted to authorized personnel? 
  *    
Can you provide evidence that due diligence 
mapping of regulations and standards to your 
controls/architecture/processes has been done? 
  *    
Are audit logs centrally stored and retained?   *    
Are audit logs reviewed on a regular basis for 
security events (e.g., with automated tools)? 
  *    
Are all requirements and trust levels for 
customers’ access defined and documented? * 
  * *  
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Business Requirements  
Requirement  Target 
Verification 
(Control 
Domain) 
Base Measure 
(Control Type) 
Question  Audit Findings Audit Findings Remedial Actions  
Defective  Acceptable  Effective  Preventive  Detective  Corrective  
Business  
  
  
  
Business 
community 
mgmt. & 
operational 
resilience  
Business 
continuity 
planning  
Do you provide tenants with geographically resilient 
hosting options? 
  *    
Do you provide tenants with infrastructure service 
failover capability to other providers? 
      
Business 
continuity testing 
Are business continuity plans subject to testing at 
planned intervals or upon significant organizational or 
environmental changes to ensure continuing 
effectiveness? 
*   *  * 
Does your cloud solution include independent hardware 
restore and recovery capabilities? 
  *    
If using virtual infrastructure, do you provide tenants 
with a capability to restore a Virtual Machine to a 
previous state in time? 
  *    
If using virtual infrastructure, do you allow virtual 
machine images to be downloaded and ported to a new 
CSP? 
 *     
If using virtual infrastructure, are machine images made 
available to the customer in a way that would allow the 
customer to replicate those images in their own off-site 
storage location? 
*     * 
Does your cloud solution include software/provider-
independent restore and recovery capabilities? 
  *    
Are security mechanisms and redundancies 
implemented to protect equipment from utility service 
outages (e.g., power failures, network disruptions, etc.)? 
  *    
Do you have a formal process for a contingency plan 
that guides the process for business continuity?  
 *  *   
Do you have a service recovery point objective (RPO) 
and recovery time objective (RTO)?  
  *    
Do you have a secondary site for disaster recovery    *    
Resource 
provisioning  
Do you have controls and procedures in place to 
manage resource exhaustion, including processing 
  *    
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oversubscription, storage outage, and network 
exhaustion?  
Do you limit subscriptions to the service in order to 
protect SLA agreements?  
  *    
Do you provide customers with utilisation and capacity 
planning information?  
 *     
         
Identity & 
Access 
Management  
Third-Party 
Access  
Do you provide multi-failure disaster recovery 
capability? 
  *    
Do you monitor service continuity with upstream 
providers in the event of provider failure? 
  *    
Do you have more than one provider for each service 
you depend on? 
  *    
Do you provide access to operational redundancy and 
continuity summaries, including the services you 
depend on? 
 *     
Do you provide a tenant-triggered failover option? *   * * * 
Do you share your business continuity and redundancy 
plans with your tenants? 
  *    
       
Security 
incident 
management, e-
discovery, & 
cloud forensics 
Incident Response 
Legal Preparation 
Does your incident response plan comply with industry 
standards for legally admissible chain-of-custody 
management processes and controls? 
  *    
Does your incident response capability include the use 
of legally admissible forensic data collection and 
analysis techniques? 
  *    
Are you capable of supporting litigation holds (freeze of 
data from a specific point in time) for a specific tenant 
without freezing other tenant data? 
  * 
 
   
Do you enforce and attest to tenant data separation 
when producing data in response to legal subpoenas? 
  *    
  Do you monitor and quantify the types, volumes, and 
impacts on all information security incidents? * 
  * * * 
 Governance and 
Risk 
Management 
Baseline 
Requirement 
 
Do you have documented information security baselines 
for every component of your infrastructure (e.g., 
hypervisors, operating systems, routers, DNS servers, 
etc.)? 
 *    * 
Do you have the capability to continuously monitor and 
report the compliance of your infrastructure against 
your information security baselines? 
*   * * * 
Do you allow your clients to provide their own trusted 
virtual machine image to ensure conformance to their 
own internal standards? 
 *  *   
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Operational Requirements  
Requirement  Target 
Verification 
(Control 
Domain) 
Base Measure 
(Control Type) 
Question  Audit Findings Remedial Actions  
Defective  Acceptable  Effective  Preventive  Detective  Corrective  
Operational  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Threat and 
vulnerability 
management  
Antivirus/malici
ous software  
Do you have anti-malware programs that support or connect to 
your cloud service offerings installed on all of your systems? 
  *    
Do you ensure that security threat detection systems using 
signatures, lists, or behavioural patterns are updated across all 
infrastructure components within industry accepted time frames? 
  *    
 Vulnerability/pa
tch management 
Do you conduct network-layer vulnerability scans regularly as 
prescribed by industry best practices? 
  *    
Do you conduct application-layer vulnerability scans regularly as 
prescribed by industry best practices? 
  *    
Do you conduct local operating system-layer vulnerability scans 
regularly as prescribed by industry best practices? 
  *    
Will you make the results of vulnerability scans available to 
tenants at their request * 
  * * * 
Do you have a capability to rapidly patch vulnerabilities across 
all of your computing devices, applications, and systems? 
  *    
Governance and 
risk management  
Risk 
assessments  
Do you provide security control health data in order to allow 
tenants to implement industry standard Continuous Monitoring 
(which allows continual tenant validation of your physical and 
logical control status)? 
*   * * * 
Do you conduct risk assessments associated with data 
governance requirements at least once a year? 
  *    
Datacentre 
security  
Data centre 
security and 
asset 
management  
Do you have requirements for controlling physical access to your 
facility? 
  *    
Are physical security perimeters (e.g., fences, walls, barriers, 
guards, gates, electronic surveillance, physical authentication 
mechanisms, reception desks, and security patrols) in place? 
  *    
Do you have procedures for risk assessments for physical 
security 
  *    
Do you maintain and complete inventory of all software, 
network, hardware and virtual components?  
  *    
Do you support asset categorisation of different sensitivity 
levels?  
      
Do you maintain virtual segregation and physical separation of 
assets at different sensitivity levels?  
      
Application & 
Interface Security 
Application 
Security 
Do you use industry standards (Build Security in Maturity Model 
[BSIMM] benchmarks, Open Group ACS Trusted Technology 
Provider Framework, NIST, etc.) to build in security for your 
Systems/Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)? 
  *    
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Do you use an automated source code analysis tool to detect 
security defects in code prior to production? 
 *     
Do you use manual source-code analysis to detect security 
defects in code prior to production? * 
  * *  
Do you verify that all of your software suppliers adhere to 
industry standards for Systems/Software Development Lifecycle 
(SDLC) security? 
*   * *  
Interoperability & 
Portability 
APIs Do you publish a list of all APIs available in the service and 
indicate which are standard and which are customized? * 
  *  * 
Data request  Is unstructured customer data available on request in an industry-
standard format (e.g., .doc, .xls, or .pdf)? * 
    * 
Policy & Legal Do you provide policies and procedures (i.e. service level 
agreements) governing the use of APIs for interoperability 
between your service and third-party applications? 
  *    
Do you provide policies and procedures (i.e. service level 
agreements) governing the migration of application data to and 
from your service? 
  *    
Standardized 
Network 
Protocols 
Can data import, data export, and service management be 
conducted over secure (e.g., non-clear text and authenticated), 
industry accepted standardized network protocols? 
  *    
Do you provide consumers (tenants) with documentation 
detailing the relevant interoperability and portability network 
protocol standards that are involved? 
  *    
 Virtualisation  Do you use an industry-recognized virtualization platform and 
standard virtualization formats (e.g., OVF) to help ensure 
interoperability? 
  *    
Do you have documented custom changes made to any 
hypervisor in use, and all solution-specific virtualization hooks 
available for customer review 
  *    
Data Security & 
Information 
Lifecycle 
Management 
Classification Do you provide a capability to identify virtual machines via 
policy tags/metadata (e.g., tags can be used to limit guest 
operating systems from booting/instantiating/transporting data in 
the wrong country)? 
*   * * * 
Do you provide a capability to identify hardware via policy 
tags/metadata/hardware tags (e.g., TXT/TPM, VN-Tag, etc.)? * 
    * 
Do you have a capability to use system geographic location as an 
authentication factor? 
  *    
Can you provide the physical location/geography of storage of a 
tenant’s data upon request? * 
    * 
Do you allow tenants to define acceptable geographical locations 
for data routing or resource instantiation 
 *    * 
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Baseline Requirements  
Requirement  Target 
Verification 
(Control 
Domain) 
Base Measure 
(Control Type) 
Question  Audit Findings  Remedial Actions  
Defective  Acceptable  Effective  Preventive  Detective  Corrective  
Baseline 
requirements  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Datacentre 
security  
Controlled 
access points  
Do you maintain a complete inventory of all of your critical 
assets that includes ownership of the asset? 
  *    
Do you maintain a complete inventory of all of your critical 
supplier relationships? 
  *    
Equipment 
identification  
Is automated equipment identification used as a method to 
validate connection authentication integrity based on known 
equipment location? 
  *    
 Do you provide tenants with documentation that describes 
scenarios in which data may be moved from one physical 
location to another (e.g., offsite backups, business continuity 
failovers, and replication)? 
*     * 
User access  Do you restrict physical access to information assets and 
functions by users and support personnel? 
  *    
Are ingress and egress points, such as service areas and other 
points where unauthorized personnel may enter the premises, 
monitored, controlled and isolated from data storage and 
process? 
  *    
Encryption & key 
mgmt. 
Key generation  Do you have a capability to allow creation of unique encryption 
keys per tenant? 
  *    
Do you have a capability to manage encryption keys on behalf of 
tenants? 
  *    
Do you protect encryption keys, and what controls are put in 
place to effect that?  
  *    
Storage and 
access  
Do you have platform and data appropriate encryption that use 
open/validated formats and standard algorithms? 
 *     
Do you have procedures in place to manage and recover 
compromised encryption keys?  
  *    
Do you have a security policy that clearly defines what must be 
encrypted?  
 *     
Identity & access 
management  
Diagnostic 
configuration 
ports access 
Do you use dedicated secure networks to provide management 
access to your cloud service infrastructure? 
  *    
        
User ID 
Credentials  
Do you manage accounts with administrator or higher privileges?  *      
Do you verify user identity and registration?    *    
Do you support use of, or integration with, existing customer-
based Single Sign On (SSO) solutions to your service? 
  *    
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Do you use open standards to delegate authentication capabilities 
to your tenants? * 
    * 
Do you have a Policy Enforcement Point capability (e.g., 
XACML) to enforce regional legal and policy constraints on user 
access? 
  *    
Do you have an identity management system (enabling 
classification of data for a tenant) in place to enable both role-
based and context-based entitlement to data? 
 *     
Do you provide tenants with strong (multifactor) authentication 
options (e.g., digital certs, tokens, biometrics, etc.) for user 
access? 
  *    
Do you allow tenants to use third-party identity assurance 
services? 
  *    
Do you support password (e.g., minimum length, age, history, 
complexity) and account lockout (e.g., lockout threshold, lockout 
duration) policy enforcement? 
  *    
Do you allow tenants/customers to define password and account 
lockout policies for their accounts? 
  *    
Do you support the ability to force password changes upon first 
logon? 
  *    
Do you have mechanisms in place for unlocking accounts that 
have been locked out (e.g., self-service via email, defined 
challenge questions, manual unlock)? 
  *    
Source code 
access 
restriction  
Are controls in place to prevent unauthorized access to your 
application, program, or object source code, and assure it is 
restricted to authorized personnel only? 
   *    
Are controls in place to prevent unauthorized access to tenant 
application, program, or object source code, and assure it is 
restricted to authorized personnel only? 
  *    
Utility program 
access 
Are utilities that can significantly manage virtualized partitions 
(e.g., shutdown, clone, etc.) appropriately restricted and 
monitored? 
*   * *  
Do you have the capability to detect attacks that target the virtual 
infrastructure directly (e.g., shimming, Blue Pill, Hyper jumping, 
etc.)? 
*   * *  
Are attacks that target the virtual infrastructure prevented with 
technical controls? * 
  * *  
 Human resources  Asset returns  Are systems in place to monitor for privacy breaches and notify 
tenants expeditiously if a privacy event may have impacted their 
data? 
*   * *  
   Is your Privacy Policy aligned with industry standards?   *    
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